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Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between international taxation 
and developing countries. The main idea is to examine this relationship through 
arguments that challenge the current legal debate that has described their interest as 
capital importers of foreign direct investment. 
Globalisation has changed the economic relations between developed and developing 
countries. The evolution of the economic aspects as well as tax policies implemented 
during the process of globalisation provides the background necessary to understand the 
increased importance of international taxation and the participation of developing 
countries in the global economy. 
The hypothesis tested here addresses the question whether the dichotomy between 
developing and developed countries and their characterisation as capital importers and 
capital exporters still provides an appropriate basis for the legal debate on international 
taxation in the context of globalisation. To approach this question, the behaviour of 
international flow of capital will be assessed in order to provide an overview of the 
economic relations among these countries. 
To perform this study, initially the meaning of globalisation and international taxation 
are explained in order to build up the framework of this thesis; secondly, the current 
debate on harmful tax competition is examined to put in evidence the problem addressed 
in this thesis; thirdly, an analysis of the international flow of capital is performed to 
identify new premises that could update the legal debate; fourthly, based on the profile 
of the international flow of capital, the phenomenon of capital flight is addressed. 
Fifthly, having in mind the difficulty in taxing capital flight, taxation of portfolio 
investment is examined. Based on the arguments raised, the legal debate is updated 
demonstrating the higher importance of double taxation over tax avoidance and evasion 
in the recent past. Finally, considering the increased relevance of international tax 
avoidance and evasion, instruments available for exchange of information are analysed, 
and their effectiveness to curb capital flight from developing countries. 
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Introduction: Hypothesis and Structure 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the relationship between international taxation 
and developing countries. The main idea is to examine this relationship through 
arguments that challenge the current legal debate that has associated their interest as 
capital importers of foreign direct investment. 
 
Globalisation has changed the economic relations between developed and developing 
countries. The evolution of the economic aspects as well as tax policies implemented 
during the process of globalisation provides the background necessary to understand the 
increased importance of international taxation and the participation of developing 
countries in the global economy. 
 
The standard assumption that limits the interest of developing countries in attracting 
foreign direct investment has also guided their involvement with tax policies defined at 
the international level such as harmful tax competition. What is this tax policy really 
about? What was the involvement of developing countries in the development of rules to 
combat harmful tax competition? These aspects need to be addressed to lay down the 
main question that this thesis will investigate: what is the effective interest of 
developing countries in international taxation? 
 
In order to update developing countries’ perspective of international taxation, the 
international flow of capital, which represents the economic premises that underpin the 
legal debate, will need to be examined. The aim of this analysis is to identify new 
arguments that can make the debate move forward from the paradigm that justifies the 
interest of developing countries in international taxation only from the perspective of 
capital importers of foreign direct investment.  
 
The hypothesis tested here addresses the question whether the dichotomy between 
developing and developed countries and, consequently, their characterisation as capital 
importers and capital exporters, can still guide the legal debate on international taxation 
14	  
	  
in the context of globalisation. To approach this question, the behaviour of the 
international flow of capital will be assessed in order to provide an overview of the 
economic relations among these countries. The idea is not to prove that the old premises 
are necessarily wrong, but to comprehend how they have changed and in this new 
context how the legal debate needs to be approached.   
 
Before going through the main ideas explored in each chapter, it is important to 
understand the driving reasons of this research. The legal debate on international 
taxation is underpinned on economic facts, more precisely on the profile of the 
international flow of capital. The basic assumption that derives from the international 
flow of capital is that developing countries are capital importers and developed countries 
are capital exporters. Consequently, in the legal debate, source taxation has been 
associated with developing countries; whereas residence taxation has been associated 
with developed countries. Based on these assumptions, the legal debate has evolved, 
focusing mainly on tax treaty rules that allocate taxing rights between source and 
residence countries. However, the international flow of capital has substantially changed 
since these taxing rules have been adopted. Countries nowadays have become 
economically interconnected. There are a significant number of economic studies 
analysing this new economic scenario, which is associated with the phenomenon of 
globalisation. Nevertheless, it is very hard to find a study that provides a complete view 
of the international flow of capital from different countries at the same time. Usually 
you have individual countries’ analysis or even regional analysis of countries with 
similar profile. A broader range study is quite hard to identify, remaining a segmented 
view of the economic facts that underpin the legal debate. As a result, the legal debate 
remains focused on paradigm economic arguments originating from the 1920s. Of 
course, there are economic studies demonstrating significant changes in the international 
flow of capital of individual countries, though a macro view of these facts was missing 
as well as its connections to the legal debate. Therefore, the contribution of this thesis 
consists in providing a critical view of the international flow of capital that underpins 
the legal debate on international taxation in order to push the discussion to arguments 
that cannot be understood without an interdisciplinary approach of the subject. 
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On the other hand, it has to be clear that the objective of this study was not to improve 
data on international flow of capital. The scope is limited to the economic data available 
from international organisations (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Bank, OECD, 
etc.) and economic studies performed by other researchers. To this extent, the analysis 
performed reflects the limitations of the economic data adopted. These limitations are 
also connected to the broad scope of this research. If the focus was narrower, it would be 
easier to find more detailed information about countries’ economic profiles. 
Nevertheless, the broader scope allowed a logical view of the relationship between 
countries of different profiles. The legal debate on international taxation was then 
examined based on the outcomes of the economic analysis.  
 
Having in mind the cornerstone arguments of this study, as well as its limitations, the 
research developed in each chapter and the connection between them becomes clear. In 
other words, the structure of this study reflects a logical sequence of questions 
originated in the development of the research. Consequently, firstly, basic concepts 
related to the scope of the thesis were examined (globalisation and international 
taxation); secondly, current flaws of the legal debate were identified (harmful tax 
competition); thirdly, economic data that underpin the legal debate were examined 
(international flow of capital); fourthly, possible explanations for the current profile of 
the international flow of capital were analysed (tax havens’ behaviour and the problem 
of capital flight); fifthly, regarding the problem of capital flight, tax policies on portfolio 
investment were examined; and sixthly, putting together the arguments raised in the 
previous chapter, the legal debate was updated, recasting the position of developing 
countries and their interest on international exchange of tax information. 
 
Chapter I and II. 
 
To perform the analysis, first of all, it will be necessary to explore the meaning of 
globalisation and how developing countries have adapted their tax policies to this new 
economic scenario. It will emerge that some tax issues need to be tackled at the 
16	  
	  
international level, whereas others remain to be decided domestically. To this extent, 
international taxation has been dealt with at the international level under two main 
issues: tax treaties and harmful tax competition. The former tackles the discussion based 
on allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries as well as to the 
classification of income in different categories (e.g. dividends, interest, capital gains, 
etc.); while the latter is focused on harmful tax practices involving tax havens and 
offshore financial centres. The initial step, therefore, will be to dismantle these 
arguments in order to understand how they have guided the discussion to aspects that 
cannot really point out the effective position of developing countries. 
 
Chapter III. 
 
In order to challenge the current legal debate, new economic premises will be evaluated. 
The analysis will use data from the international flow of capital as well as the 
international stocks of assets and liabilities held by three groups of countries: developing 
countries, high income OECD countries and tax havens. The economic data will be used 
to demonstrate that the international flow of capital is much more complex and basic 
assumptions that have characterised developing countries as capital importers and 
developed countries as capital exporters. Furthermore, it will emerge that the discussion 
cannot be polarised into two groups only (developed countries v. developing countries); 
it is necessary to evaluate the position of tax havens separately.  
 
Chapter IV. 
 
The economic analysis performed in the previous chapter demonstrated that (i) the 
North/South assumption cannot explain the behaviour of the international flow of 
capital; (ii) tax havens are important players; and (iii) developed and developing 
countries have increased difficulties in reporting outflows of capital. However, why 
have countries difficulties in reporting outflows? What is not clear in the official figures 
of outflows analysed? What is the relationship between tax havens’ behaviour and the 
difficulty of countries in reporting outflows? The phenomenon of capital flight might be 
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a reasonable explanation. The phenomenon of capital flight will be examined in order to 
evaluate a possible explanation for the current profile of the international flow of capital 
and, consequently, to verify how it can be affecting developing countries’ interest in 
international taxation. 
 
Chapter V. 
 
Another aspect emphasised by the economic analysis is the significant increase of 
Portfolio Investment. This type of investment is concentrated in developed countries and 
this premise has dominated the studies about this topic, underestimating its importance 
to developing countries. It is necessary to evaluate their interest regarding not only 
inflows but also outflows, i.e. accumulated capital flight held abroad. Thus, the 
importance of portfolio investment to developing countries needs to be considered from 
this angle, which extrapolates the conclusions reached until now, relating portfolio 
investment to developing countries. 
 
Chapter VI. 
 
Putting together the arguments raised in the previous chapters, a question is raised: Does 
it still make sense to discuss the interest of developing countries in international taxation 
based on source taxation? The analysis of the international flow of capital demonstrated 
that it is very hard to classify developing countries as capital importers and developed 
ones as capital exporters. Consequently, the justification of their tax policies based on 
their economic profile became much more complex. But why has international taxation 
been debated in terms of allocation of taxing rights between source and residence 
countries? What is in fact being discussed and why has the discussion taken this path? 
The historical analysis of the relationship between double taxation and tax evasion will 
help to understand the current profile of the international tax debate and how it might be 
updated.  
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Chapter VII. 
 
Assuming that developing countries are also interested in taxing income derived from 
assets held abroad by their residents, tax policies that deal with the problem of harmful 
tax practices are also of interest to them. In other words, developing countries are also 
interested in enforcing residence taxation. The OECD through the work on harmful tax 
competition has developed rules to improve transparency and exchange of information 
for tax purpose. How do these rules work? What are the advantages and weaknesses of 
these tax policies? These questions will be addressed in order to demonstrate whether 
these tax policies can help developed countries to solve the crisis of residence taxation. 
 
Chapter VIII. 
 
The analysis of the rules to improve transparency and exchange of information for tax 
purposes created the requested background to examine whether they can help 
developing countries to deal with the problem of capital flight. In a sense, the problem 
of capital flight represents the crisis of residence taxation for developing countries. This 
last chapter, therefore, will close the debate about developing countries and international 
taxation by examining the current instruments for exchange of information from the 
perspective of developing countries, considering the problem of capital flight. It will 
become clear if the measures adopted by developed countries to solve the crisis of 
residence taxation from their perspective can also help developing countries to deal with 
the problem of capital flight. 
 
Chapter IX. 
	  
The final chapter will highlight the important outcomes reached in the previous chapters 
and, consequently, how they contributed to the final conclusion of this project. The 
connections between each chapter will become clear as well as the contribution of this 
thesis to the literature.  
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Chapter I. Globalisation and International Taxation 
 
Most studies have discussed the impact of globalisation on taxation in order to call for 
changes in tax policies. However, what is the effective meaning of globalisation? This 
term has been used in so many different contexts that before associating it to taxation it 
is necessary to approach its effective meaning for the study performed. The approach 
adopted to understand globalisation will reveal its impact on taxation and, consequently, 
the increased importance of international taxation. To this extent, the history of tax 
treaties will show how international taxation has been discussed and its focus on 
allocation of taxing rights. 
 
The structure of this chapter consists of three sections: (i) the meaning of globalisation; 
(ii) the impact of globalisation on tax policies; and (iii) the use of tax treaties to allocate 
taxing rights. The first section provides the necessary arguments to comprehend the 
development of international taxation from a broader perspective, considering the 
economic changes suffered by countries brought on by globalisation. The second section 
explains the increased importance of the international aspect of domestic tax policies. 
The third section examines the background of tax treaties in order to demonstrate how 
the legal debate on international taxation has focused on allocation of taxing rights 
between source and residence countries. Globalisation has reshaped the economic 
relations among countries and international taxation became an emerging issue in this 
scenario.  
 
1.1. The meaning of globalisation 
 
The understanding of the term ‘globalisation’ is important because many studies 
associate it with international taxation without contextualising what its effective 
meaning is. As this word has been used in so many different situations and different 
fields, an explanation is required in order to produce a meaningful understanding of 
what has become an ambiguous term in the tax field.  
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The analysis of the characteristics of the current process of globalisation as well as its 
historical context will provide the required information to understand the underlying 
economic relations among countries that gave support to the development of 
international taxation.  
 
Globalization is a complex phenomenon encompassing economic, political and social 
aspects, which allows it to be interpreted in many different ways by researchers, 
depending on their field of research and the question being investigated. Kohler, former 
managing director of the IMF, defined globalisation in a broad sense, focusing on the 
idea of free flow: ‘the process through which an increasingly free flow of ideas, people, 
goods, services and capital leads to the integration of economies and societies’.1 
 
The idea of free flow is the core characteristic of globalisation. In fact, people, goods, 
services and capital can flow in different manners depending on the level of 
liberalisation adopted. As discussed next, the characteristics of the two periods (i.e. 
1870-1914 and 1970- to present date) of outstanding economic integration differ 
considerably due to the combination of restrictions on trade and movement of capital 
and labour.   
 
From a historical perspective, globalisation is not a new phenomenon. The period from 
1870 to 1914 (start of the First World War) was also marked by high levels of overseas 
investment and labour migration.2 By that time, labour’s mobility was at the same level 
as capital mobility. In terms of international trade, industrialised countries exported 
manufactured goods while the rest of the world supplied raw materials to them.3 Most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 H. Kohler, ‘Working for a Better Globalization’ (Conference on Humanizing the Global Economy, Jan 
2002) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/012802.htm> accessed 16 June 2009. 
2  There is a discussion in current literature about how many processes of globalisation occurred 
throughout the entire history of humanity. As the objective of this study focuses on the economic aspects 
of this phenomenon, the previous period that also had a high level of economic integration was from 1870 
to 1914. J. Osterhammel and N. P. Petersson, Globalisation: A Short History (Princeton University Press 
2005).  
3 Developed and developing countries’ nomenclature was not used by that time. Developed countries were 
commonly referred as industrialised nations, whereas developing countries were referred as ‘the rest of 
21	  
	  
developing countries were still colonies of the industrialised world, having their interests 
limited and controlled by industrialised countries’ necessities.  
 
Even though there was a high level of international trade, tariffs were still a barrier in 
the ‘golden age’ of liberalism before 1914. Trade was conducted on a bilateral basis 
rather than on a multilateral agreement, which demonstrates the absence of any 
significant institutionalisation of intergovernmental collaboration in the period of 1870-
1914. There was neither an international institution to control the international financial 
system. Thus, the main facilitator of economic integration was the adoption of the gold 
standard. The gold standard allowed the convertibility of a domestic currency to a 
specific amount of gold, eliminating the risk of foreign exchange.4  
 
The free flow of capital was unidirectional, i.e. from industrialised countries to the ‘rest 
of the world’. It was easy to classify countries as capital importers and capital exporters. 
In sum, the premises of the economic integration that happened between 1870 and 1914 
were stipulated by the industrialised nations, it becoming easy for them to identify their 
economic interest and match it with the policies embraced and enacted by them in a 
global scale.    
 
The current process of globalisation (1970 to present) is much more complex than the 
previous one. In terms of free flow, the current period has a free movement of trade and 
capital supported by the lowering of trade barriers and the liberalisation of exchange and 
capital control.5 The development of new technologies has also contributed to the free 
flow of capital and trade through the improvement of communication (e.g., Internet and 
Email) and transfer of resources (e.g., electronic banking and worldwide transfer of 
funds). However, people are not allowed to move in the same way as capital and trade.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the world’. ‘The rest of the world’ encompassed independent non-industrialised nations as well as many 
colonies of the industrialised countries.  
4 J. Ravenhill, ‘The Study of Global Political Economy’ in J. Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 8-9. 
5 Osterhammel (n 2) 143. 
6 A. Mcgrew, ‘The Logics of Economic Globalization’ in in J. Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy 
(Oxford University Press 2007) 291. 
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Consequently, nowadays labour’s mobility is more limited than capital’s mobility; 
which reflects constraints on policies of migration. The limitation of labour’s mobility is 
a remarkable difference from the previous period of globalisation. In terms of capital 
and trade, in both periods there was a high level of flow, even though with completely 
different characteristics since trade tariffs were not reduced in the first period of 
globalisation and capital performed a unidirectional movement: from industrialised to 
‘the rest of the world’. 
 
Focusing on the premises of the current process of globalisation, what we see is a 
completely different scenario from the previous period: (i) developing countries are not 
anymore colonies of the industrialised world; (ii) there are international institutions to 
control the international financial system and the international trade; (iii) countries adopt 
floating exchange rates; and (iv) multinationals dominate the international trade. What 
are the facts that led to a so different scenario between the first and the last process of 
globalisation? In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine the historical 
facts that happened between the start of the First World War  (1914) and 1970, which 
will be denominated the ‘inter-globalisation’ period.  
 
In 1914, the outbreak of the First World War jeopardised the economic integration of 
the world. It was the end of the liberal argument that economic interdependence could 
grant a peaceful period among nations. As a result, many industrialised nations only 
achieved economic integration at the same level of pre-First World War in the 1970s.7 
 
With the start of the First World War, the international gold standard broke down with a 
speculative attack on sterling. The end of the gold standard caused a misalignment of 
currencies around the world creating a barrier to international trade. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties brought by the end of the gold standard, the US raised its tariffs to high 
levels, which was answered by the European countries with retaliations, imposing more 
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obstacles on the international trade system. These measures reduced the value of world 
trade by two-thirds between 1929 and 1934.8 
 
The apex of the crisis of the liberal economic model is represented by the Great 
Depression in 1930 in which an international financial crisis triggered the collapse of 
both international lending and the international gold standard.9 Governments were 
unable to agree on a viable international financial system. Consequently, the main 
characteristic of the inter-globalisation period is the absence of a consensus to establish 
a new economic order around the world.  
 
An opportunity to create an international financial system only arose in the early 1940s, 
when the US and the UK policymakers began to plan the organisation of the post-war 
international monetary and financial system. US policymakers did not want to see a 
return to the classical liberal international economic order of the pre-1930s period. 
Instead, they hoped to find a way to settle liberal multilateralism with the domestically 
orientated priorities to fight unemployment and encourage social welfare that had 
emerged in the New Deal.10  
 
In 1944 a new economic regime was agreed. The new consensus was reached at the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, in the village of Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire. There, forty-four governments agreed on the principles that would 
guide the international monetary system in the post-war years. The Bretton Woods 
participants sought to re-establish a world of international currency stability. John 
Maynard Keynes from the UK and Harry Dexter White from the US guided the 
discussions.11   
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9 E. Helleiner, ‘The evolution of the International Monetary and Financial System’ in J. Ravenhill (ed.), 
Global Political Economy (Oxford University Press 2007) 215. 
10 ibid 219. 
11 ibid. 
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The new regime would have to reconcile market-oriented policies with prerequisites of 
domestic policies such as stability and full employment. The architects of Bretton 
Woods needed to find a way to settle domestic and international policies since the Great 
Depression had offered contradictory lessons about economic closure. On one hand, 
economic closure had precipitated the Great Depression and exacerbated its effects; on 
the other hand, an open economy could destabilise domestic economy, affecting the 
money supply and obstructing full employment.  It was necessary to find a new balance 
between domestic and international policies. Therefore, instead of what happened before 
the First World War when economies needed to adjust themselves to global pressures, 
the global economy would need to adjust itself to local necessities. A global market 
should exist and be enforced by multilateral agreements but local governments would 
control the market’s power.12   
 
The influence of developing countries on the Bretton Woods negotiations and on the 
nature of the institutions that emerged was insignificant.13 The Bretton Woods system 
created two multilateral organizations (the International Monetary Fund - IMF and the 
International Bank of Development and Reconstruction - IBRD, an institution of the 
World Bank Group) and one standing conference (GATT) in order to enforce economic 
stabilisation;14 however developing countries were at the margin of the decision process.  
The IMF would supervise and support the fixed exchange rates regimes and act as a 
lender of last resort.15 Its capacity to lend comes primarily from the contribution of 
members, whereas the World Bank can borrow from the private sector to finance its 
lending.16 The IBRD main function was to help European countries to recover from the 
war. Only later, its focus changed to developing countries. The Bretton Woods members 
did not achieve an agreement about an International Trade Organisation - ITO since the 
major players (the UK and the US) were not sure about how the after war trade would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 H. M. Schwartz, States Versus Markets: History, Geography, and the Development of the International 
Political Economy (Macmillan 2000) 192-93. 
13 C. Thomas, ‘Globalization and Development in the South’ in J. Ravenhill (ed), Global Political 
Economy (Oxford University Press 2007) 419. 
14  ibid 420. 
15 Schwartz (n 12) 191. 
16 Helleiner (n 9) 221. 
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be configured and any concession/agreement at that time might damage their trade 
position. Thus, only later in 1947, fifty countries signed in Havana the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs.17  
 
The main features agreed at the Bretton Woods conference were: (i) a financial order 
underpinned on the ‘embedded liberal’ ideology in which market allocation was limited 
by political process; (ii) currency convertibility for current account payments; (iii) gold-
dollar standard; (iv) an adjustable exchange-peg rate regime; (v) control of capital 
movements; and (iv) establishment of international financial institutions. The Bretton 
Woods conference managed to establish a new world consensus on how the 
international monetary system should work. The Bretton Woods International Monetary 
Regime stood until the US suspended the convertibility of the US dollar into gold in 
1971.18 
 
The aftermath of the Bretton Woods collapse was the privatisation of the financial 
markets, which is one of the main characteristics of the current process of globalisation. 
The growth of financial markets surpassed the cross-border trade of goods. It is worth 
noting that the Bretton Woods architects (Keynes and White) endorsed an international 
financial order in which governments could control cross-border private financial flows, 
and public international institutions would have a key function in allocating short-term 
and long-term capital at the world economy. Today, as discussed next, the opposite 
situation is configured at the international level: enormous sums of private capital flow 
around the world quite freely and the size of these flows surpasses the lending activities 
of the IMF and World Bank.19 
 
The end of the Bretton Woods system caused a new ideology to emerge: neoliberal 
policies. These policies are based on the assumption that global economic integration 
through free markets is the most effective route to promote growth.20 The neoliberal 
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economic agenda reflected ideas of the virtue of the free market combined with small 
regulatory states, which were implemented by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s.21 
Market intervention was only conceived to supply a range of public goods that could not 
be provided through competitive profit seeking and to enforce rules of competition.22 
The market-oriented policy based on the neoliberal ideas was conceived to be suitable to 
both developed and developing countries.23  
 
The facts listed above revealed the economic policies that led to the development of an 
integrated financial market. In fact, the main economic policy that granted the 
development of a global financial market was the end of exchange control, since it 
allowed the free flow of private capital around the world. However, it is interesting to 
note that the original idea was to control private financial flows, rather than leave them 
free as occurs today.  
 
Another relevant aspect is how developing countries were inserted into the global 
economy. During the first period of globalisation, most developing countries were just 
colonies of the imperialist world and their economic roles were restrained to the supply 
of raw materials requested in the process of industrialisation. Later, in the inter-
globalisation period, developing countries remained at the margin of the economic and 
political process that reshaped the world economy. Only recently the position of 
developing countries started to change: developed countries became conscious that to 
maintain the current economic order, developing countries needed to be inserted into it. 
From this perspective, different policies were designed by developed countries and 
international organisations to change the position of developing countries in the 
international economy.  
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22 ibid. 
23 Since the adoption of neoliberal policies, new policies have been enacted, however, the ideology behind 
it remains the same: free market with small intervention can promote growth. 
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1.2. The impact of globalisation on tax policies  
 
Domestic aspects of tax policies have guided policymakers when discussing tax reforms 
until recently. Policymakers’ major concerns were related to the internal constraints of a 
tax system such as administrative efficiency, raising of tax revenue and possible impact 
of reforms on economic growth. However, the phenomenon of globalisation has 
changed the economic facts that supported policymakers’ decisions. Nowadays 
policymakers need not only to regard the internal dimension of tax reforms, but also to 
consider the international aspects of national tax policies, which mean how to use tax 
policies to gain competitiveness and to influence the international movement of 
capital.24  
 
Most characteristics of tax systems were developed in a period around the Second 
World War or shortly after. The international economic relations among countries were 
very different from today since the underpinning economy had a different dynamic. As 
already described in the previous section, between 1945 and 1970, there were: (i) trade 
restrictions since many countries protected their domestic markets by using quantitative 
restrictions such as high trade tariffs and quotas; (ii) capital movement barriers curbing 
the development of multinationals’ operations and international finance; (iii) individual 
mobility limitations due to restrictions on migration and high travelling costs; (iv) 
limited amount of portfolio investment; and (v) tax havens had a marginal role in the 
movement of capital, only being used in evading taxes and in laundering money from 
illegal activities.25 In this scenario, policymakers were quite free to choose the features 
of a tax system and the tax rates of individual income tax, corporate tax, trade tariffs and 
excise taxes. The concern with the movement of capital and the attractiveness of foreign 
investment did not exist. Policymakers focused on features of the national economy to 
plan tax reforms.  
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The present situation is considerably different. With the process of globalisation, i.e. 
after 1970, the international economic relations of countries have become more open, 
following the market oriented policies implemented by the neoliberal ideology. In this 
new economy: (i) trade tariffs were reduced; (ii) capital movement barriers were 
removed enhancing the activity of multinationals’ operations and the availability of 
international finance; (iii) travelling costs were reduced, but restrictions to migration did 
not change except in specific regions such as the European Union; (iv) the volume of 
portfolio investment surpassed all other types of foreign investment; and (v) tax havens 
have an essential function on the movement of capital, being used not only for illegal 
activities but also by multinational enterprises to structure their business around the 
world.  
 
The current economy is centred on financial flows across countries. The magnitude of 
capital flows in many countries has surpassed not only the volume of foreign trade but 
also their GDP.26 In the new global economy, the tax policy of a country can have a 
significant impact on other countries’ tax policies, making policymakers face a 
fundamental dilemma when defining tax policies: the trade-off between raising tax 
revenue and gaining competitiveness to attract foreign investments. Globalisation has 
changed the way policymakers structured tax reforms, since the international aspects of 
national tax policies became a crucial element. 
 
From a political perspective, the cross-border effect of tax policies has a major impact 
on state’s sovereignty. State sovereignty has been challenged in this new integrated 
economy. Although globalisation has collaborated to create an economic integration 
among countries, national political sovereignty has increasingly come into conflict with 
this new economy. The problem is that the limit of economic markets no longer 
corresponds to national territories and thus, the taxation of economic activities requires 
the involvement of more than one jurisdiction.27 National tax policies are now affected 
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by other countries’ tax policies, which compel the design of tax policy to reflect the 
international environment. 
 
The global scenario, therefore, can be described as economically integrated, in which 
there is a remarkable mobility of resources through trade and investment (e.g. FDI and 
portfolio investment), but politically fragmented, where traditional territorial borders are 
maintained. Jeffery explained this situation as an evolution from economic nationalism 
to international economic integration. According to him, an important characteristic of 
economic integration is that it has not been even or uniform in the rate, nature or extent 
of assimilation. This uneven process has derived from the variations among countries in 
their compliance to adapt to the new changes through the national and international law 
making processes. In this process of adaptation, there are two main issues that might be 
considered by countries when determining their tax policies: (i) certain matters should 
be dealt at the international level; and (ii) matters that must be regulated at the national 
level should be consistent with the world economy.	  28 This bifocal perspective of tax 
policies helps to understand how domestic and international tax rules are related to each 
other. 
 
Regarding matters regulated at the national level, there are two crucial external 
influences on developing countries’ tax systems that made their domestic laws 
consistent with the international environment: (i) tax reforms conducted by international 
organisations; and (ii) negotiation of tax treaties. During the post Second World War 
period, economic policy of many developing countries involved a strong role for the 
state and a high priority given to industrialization, diversification and modernization of 
the economy. For tax policy, this economic policy was implemented through tariff 
protection for domestic industry, input subsidies and favourable tax regimes for 
industry.29  
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During the 1980s due to the debt crisis in developing countries, in order to lend money, 
international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank imposed some 
conditions on developing countries’ economic policies. Some conditions were related to 
tax reforms and, consequently, developing countries had to adjust their tax systems to 
the requirements imposed by the international organisations. In the 1990s, the aim of tax 
reforms implemented by these international organisations changed following new 
tendencies in the world economy and the fact that the old model of tax reform failed in 
many developing countries. Today the overarching goals of tax reform are the opposite 
of the previous period, i.e. a ‘broad based’ corporate tax that encourages savings and 
operates in an open market economy; an increased reliance on consumption taxes, such 
as the value added tax; and the elimination of trade-tariffs.30  
 
The current tax reform recognises the difficulty of taxing capital in an integrated global 
economy, but does not propose any global solution or a better understanding of what is 
going on in developing countries’ tax systems. The assumptions of the current tax 
reforms are based on the impact of globalisation on developed countries’ tax systems.  
 
In practical terms, developing countries usually accepted the interference of the IMF and 
the World Bank in their economies, implementing the tax policies suggested since they 
needed foreign investment to compensate the shortage of internal savings. The shortage 
of capital also induced developing countries to enact laws that offered tax exemptions to 
foreign investors. Developing countries, therefore, have engaged themselves in tax 
competition for foreign direct investment, i.e. productive investment that would bring 
economic benefits despite the tax incentives being offered. 
 
Another point is that the coordination of the interaction of developing countries’ 
domestic tax laws was not included in the scope of the tax reforms conducted by the 
IMF and World Bank. This coordination was left to the development of tax treaties. 
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Thus, the second fact that has influenced the adaptation of developing countries’ 
domestic tax laws to the international environment was the negotiation of tax treaties.31  
 
Tax treaties, as explained in the next section, were developed by reference to developed 
countries’ tax laws and countries willing to negotiate them had their domestic tax laws 
adapted. For instance, it was necessary to develop an individual income tax and a 
corporate income tax, otherwise it would be impossible to avoid double taxation since 
this concept is based on the imposition of comparable taxes in two states in respect of 
the same income and in the hands of the same person. Therefore, without a comparable 
income tax system between developed and developing countries, the flow of capital 
would be barred by the imposition of unparalleled taxes which tax treaties were not 
prepared to deal with. Thus, the tax treaty was the instrument elected by developed 
countries to deal with the problem of double taxation that emerged in an integrated 
global economy. 
 
Regarding matters dealt with at the international level, since the 1920s the allocation of 
taxing rights is controlled by tax treaties. Even though the current process of 
globalisation has exacerbated the cross-border tax spillovers due to the volume of 
economic transactions taking place in more than one jurisdiction, the concern with 
double taxation is not recent and the first tax treaty was made in 1899 between Prussia 
and the Austro Hungarian double monarchy.  
 
The concern with allocation of taxing rights acquired an effective global dimension in 
the 1920s when the League of Nations started to address this matter. By that time, the 
international financial market was much less complex and the concerns on the allocation 
of taxing rights were simplified to the allocation of tax revenue since the international 
movement of capital had a different dynamic: it flew from ‘industrialised countries’ to 
‘the rest of the world’. 
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The allocation of taxing rights involves, in practice, the decision on how to tax the 
foreign income of residents and the source income of non-residents since in both 
situations there is more than one jurisdiction involved which can claim the right to tax 
certain income. The problem arises when both jurisdictions claim the right to tax the 
same income in the hands of the same legal person, characterising juridical double 
taxation. Double taxation inhibits the flow of capital, discouraging an efficient 
allocation of investments. 
 
There are two different alternatives to avoid double taxation by enacting: (i) unilateral 
tax policies; and/or (ii) bilateral tax policies, i.e. tax treaties. The first alternative is dealt 
with at the national level; whereas the second one is dealt at the international level. The 
provisions of a tax treaty override the conflicting measures provided in the domestic 
legislation, which means that when a tax treaty is signed, the methods used to relieve 
double taxation will be the ones established in the treaty and not the rules established in 
the domestic legislation. There is no need for the domestic law to be harmonised with 
the tax treaty. In fact, the more outrageous the provisions of the internal law, the better 
the starting position for negotiating treaties.32 Both unilateral and bilateral tax policies 
limit the exercise of taxing rights of sovereign jurisdictions. Accepting those rules, 
national tax systems recognised some limitations on their scope of application.  
 
Unilateral tax policies allow countries to relieve double taxation by enacting rules that 
recognise a tax credit or a tax deduction for the amount of tax paid abroad or, 
alternatively, exempts foreign income from domestic taxation. On the other hand, tax 
treaties avoid double taxation by first distributing the allocation of taxing rights between 
source and residence countries and when the previous division allows both states to tax, 
the credit and the exemption method can be applied. Although both unilateral and 
bilateral tax laws can relieve double taxation, tax treaties have played a core function in 
determining the international allocation of taxing rights. Tax treaties, therefore, have not 
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only influenced domestic laws but also assumed a dominant position in determining the 
allocation of taxing rights at the international level. 
 
Tax treaties emerged as the main instrument used internationally to avoid double 
taxation by allocating taxing rights between the source and the residence countries. The 
bilateral aspect of how taxation is dealt with at the international level has made it 
necessary to have more than 1,400 separate tax treaties in order to make the 
international tax system to work.33 In fact, the loose network of bilateral tax treaties 
proved an inadequate mechanism for coordinating tax jurisdiction. The allocation of 
taxing rights promoted by tax treaties in which, basically, business profits could be 
taxed at the source, whereas returns of investment were primarily taxed at the residence 
of the investor, concealed the disagreement between major capital importers and capital 
exporters.	   34 	  A global approach was never considered in the original debate of 
international double taxation, the bilateral approach remaining the only measure 
accepted worldwide. Thus, analysing the historical background of tax treaties will shed 
some light on how we have been thinking about international taxation and the problems 
that emerged in its evolving process. 
 
1.3. The use of tax treaties to allocate taxing rights 
 
The idea of examining the background of international tax treaties35 is to make clear 
how developed and developing countries have been thinking on international taxation. 
The objective is not to point out specific problems of tax treaties but to understand how 
tax treaties work from a broader perspective, demonstrating the line of reasoning that 
has guided the current discussion between developed and developing countries. 
 
The basic ideas of a tax treaty started with the studies developed by the International 
Chamber of Commerce. Organised in 1920, this organisation emphasised the problem of 
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double taxation in the international scenario. In its organisational meeting, influenced by 
the American vision, the Chamber suggested taxation by both residence and source with 
residence deferring some taxing rights to source, while retaining a ‘right to claim the 
difference between the tax paid and the home tax.’	  36  
 
In the years that followed, the International Chamber of Commerce developed 
resolutions regarding double taxation that were to be voted on at the 1923 Rome 
Congress and were to become the draft of a model tax treaty. The Rome Resolutions 
incorporated classification and assignment rule of categories of income, restating the 
ideal of non-discrimination and proposing the allocation of business profits to source 
nations based on objective mechanisms. Because of disagreements between the 
American Committee and the British Committee (i.e. the Americans accepted taxation 
by both source and residence; while the British maintained that all taxation should be 
residence-based), the International Chamber of Commerce could not achieve a 
consensus and a committee of economists was appointed by the League of Nations to 
conduct research on double taxation.37  
 
It is worth noting that even though both US and UK were capital exporters, they had 
diverging positions on the allocation of taxing rights. The American position was 
influenced by Adams’ work, which admitted source taxation as an appropriate meaning 
of the benefit principle of taxation; administrative advantages; and as an alternative to 
reconcile the debtor nation position with the creditor nation position. On the other hand, 
the British Committee did not admit source taxation and argued that all taxation should 
be residence based, focusing on its own economic situation as the major capital exporter 
in the world.38 For instance, in 1855 the UK outflow of capital was 700 million dollars 
which corresponded to almost 80% of the total stock of foreign assets held worldwide.39 
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In 1923 the League of Nations invited four economists (Professor G. W. J. Bruins of the 
Netherlands, Professor Luigi Einaudi of Italy, Prof. Edwin R. A. Seligman of the United 
States and Sir. Josiah Stamp of Great Britain) to prepare a report on how to avoid 
international double taxation.40 The report prepared by the economists was based on the 
doctrine of economic allegiance:  
A part of the total sum (of taxes) paid according to the 
ability of a person ought to reach the competing authorities 
according to his economic interest under each authority. 
The ideal solution is that the individual’s whole faculty 
should be taxed, but that it should be taxed only once, and 
that liability should be divided among the tax districts 
according to his relative interests in each.41 
 
The 1923 Report suggested four factors to determine economic allegiance: (1) where the 
result is physically or economically produced; (2) where the final product of the 
economic process is located; (3) where the rights over the income produced can be 
exercised; and (4) where the income is consumed or disposed of. Some authors regard 
factors 1 and 4 as the primitive idea that led to the source and residence principles of 
taxation.42 By that time, the report already admitted that to allocate the exact proportion 
of economic allegiance to each category of income is a very difficult task.43 
 
Considering that the only way to prevent double taxation is through concessions made 
by the source and the residence countries, the report of the four economists presented 
the following alternatives: (i) the residence country would allow a deduction of the tax 
paid abroad on its income tax levied on foreign income earned by a resident; (ii) the 
source country would exempt non-residents from taxation of income produced from 
sources within its territory; (iii) a convention would divide the taxing rights between the 
source and the residence states, recognising the primary right of the source (limited by 
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certain parameters) and the residual right of the residence state; or (iv) also by 
convention, the source country would keep the right to tax wholly certain categories of 
income, for instance, income connected to property rights, but would exempt other 
categories of income; thus, the residence country would recognise the tax paid abroad as 
a deduction from its income tax with respect to those categories of income, while it 
would fully tax the other categories of income.44  
 
The economists’ report concluded that the best alternative would be the second one, 
which is the exemption of income from non-residents by the source state. It also 
recognised that some countries would be reluctant to abandon source taxation and in 
those cases the fourth alternative was advisable, with some adjustments proposed in the 
third one. A very interesting point is that the economists believed that by increasing the 
level of industrialisation in developing countries, they would be willing to renounce 
source taxation.45 Another reason in favour of residence taxation was that it would 
ensure taxation based on the ability to pay principle, by the application of progressive 
income taxes on the world-wide income of a resident taxpayer.46  
 
There were differences between the ideas developed previously in the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the ones presented by the four economists in the 1923 
Report. While the first broadly admitted source taxation, the second clearly preferred 
residence taxation. The conceptual difference in these approaches is a consequence of 
the distinct lines of argument sustained by the American Professors: Seligman and 
Adams. Prof. Seligman preferred a pure theoretical vision, which can be synthesised in 
the economic allegiance doctrine; whereas Prof. Adams was pragmatic and sensitive to 
political and administrative problems and chose not to base his ideas on a single theory 
but on a mix of arguments that leaned toward the technical aspects of a problem.47 In 
other words, Prof. Seligman defended residence taxation based on economic allegiance 
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doctrine, while Prof. Adams recognised the interests of debtor countries and suggested 
an alternative that considered political arguments rather than pure economic theory. The 
emphasis on residence taxation by the 1923 Report can also be justified by the fact that 
only capital export countries manifested their opinion on this report, since Prof. Einaudi 
never made any contribution, and by that time Italy was the only one of the four 
countries (UK, US, Italy and Netherlands) that was a net capital importer.48  
 
The outcome of the 1923 Report was a model that distinguished between taxes on global 
income and all other taxes. The former were levied only by residence country, whereas 
the latter were to be split between source and residence countries, according to the 
economic allegiance doctrine. Moreover, contrary to what was suggested by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the 1923 Report attributed the right to tax interest 
and dividends to residence countries.	  49  
 
Even though the 1923 Report envisaged a model tax treaty, its development was 
reassigned to the Committee of Technical Experts who elaborated a new report in 1925. 
The objective of this new report was to transform the 1923 Report into a more balanced 
proposal, i.e. a proposal that attributed taxing rights not only to residence countries but 
also to source countries. The classification of taxes as global income and other taxes was 
substituted by a classification of personal and impersonal taxes and the right to levy the 
former attributed to residence countries, while the right to levy the latter attributed to 
source countries. Explaining the division of taxing rights, the technical experts argued 
that they had no intention of theoretical coherence and, therefore, practical purposes 
were their major concern.50 Even though the 1925 Report said it considered the outcome 
of the previous report, it was not an important influence on impersonal taxes51, since the 
right to tax them was fully attributed to source countries.52  
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The 1925 Report was further developed into a model treaty by an enlarged committee of 
experts meeting in 1926, 1927 and 1928. In these meetings, the US was represented by 
Prof. Adams assisted by Mitchell B. Carrol, who later contributed to the development of 
the threshold (i.e. the permanent establishment concept) that allows source countries to 
tax active business income.53 
  
In October 1928, a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the 
Special Matter of Direct Taxes and three other model conventions dealing with 
succession duties, administrative assistance in tax matters and judicial assistance in the 
collection of taxes were drafted. The 1928 models set the fundamental elements of 
current tax treaty models.54 
 
The next model convention was drafted in 1943 and was called the Mexico model. It 
promoted taxation at the source, being recognised as the first attempt by the developing 
world to write a model treaty that reflected their particular interests. Residence taxation 
was admitted but residence countries had to provide a credit of the taxes paid abroad 
even if limited to the proportion of the tax due at home. Later on, in 1946, the Fiscal 
Committee of the League of Nations met in London and elaborated a new model which 
became known as the London model. Contrary to the source taxation tendency 
expressed in the Mexico model, the London model benefited residence taxation 
expressing the economic interest of capital exporting countries. The differences between 
these two models, i.e. the Mexico and the London model demonstrate what was going to 
be perpetuated as the opposite view of developed and developing countries in the 
allocation of taxing rights. Nowadays these differences of economic interests are 
identified in the OECD and UN model tax conventions.55 
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In the 1950s, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) assumed 
the role of drafting a tax model convention. It set up a Fiscal Committee which 
elaborated a model that was published in 1963, called the ‘Draft Double Taxation 
Convention on Income and Capital.’56 This model reflected the London Draft, which 
means it benefited residence taxation over source taxation. In fact, this model was 
aligned with the economic interest of the European member states of the OEEC. 
Subsequently, the OEEC developed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the 1963 Draft became known as the OECD Model. The 
1963 Draft was later revised and published in 1977 when it became the Model Tax 
Convention on Income and on Capital. Later, the OECD Model was updated in 1992, 
1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2008. 
 
Only in the mid-1960s did the United Nations get involved with the problem of double 
taxation, understanding its relationship with the flow of foreign investment to 
developing countries.57  The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
(ECOSOC) set up an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries in 1968. The Ad Hoc Group was joined by tax experts from 
developed and developing countries. The outcome of the Ad Hoc Group was the UN 
Model Convention between Developed and Developing Countries (UN Model) 
published in 1980. Even though the UN model aimed to protect developing countries’ 
economic interests in the international flow of capital, the way the discussion was 
conducted acclaimed the same line of reasoning adopted in the OECD Model. 
Consequently, the UN Model provided very limited variations from the OECD Model. 
These variations refer to the increased allocation of taxing rights to the source country. 
In practice, therefore, the two models are quite similar since the UN model was based on 
the structure of the OECD model, reproducing many articles. Even though the 
differences are quite subtle, they are connected to the different objectives of each model.  
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According to paragraph 7.7, article 1 of the OECD Commentary, the main purpose of 
the OECD Model is to promote, by eliminating double taxation, the exchange of goods 
and services and the movement of capital and persons, as well as to prevent tax 
avoidance and evasion.58 On the other hand, the Introduction of the UN Model Double 
Taxation Convention explains that the prevention of double taxation, the main effects of 
which are harmful to the exchange of goods and services and to the movement of capital 
and persons, is desirable to promote a greater inflow of foreign investment to developing 
countries.59 Thus, both Models aim to promote movement of capital by eliminating 
double taxation, however the UN Model is focused on a specific issue: the inflow of 
foreign investment to developing countries. 
 
Both OECD and UN Models are structured on classification and assignment rules also 
called distributive rules.60 According to these rules, income, profit and capital are placed 
in categories under a schedular system and taxing rights over them are distributed to one 
or both contracting states. One way to categorise the multiple sub-classification of 
income is by dividing it into active and passive income. Active income corresponds to 
business profit and is usually attributed to source countries, whereas passive income 
corresponds to returns of investments, e.g. dividends, interest and capital gains and is 
usually attributed to the residence country, having the source country the right to levy a 
limited withholding tax. Each category of income, therefore, has a rule that allocates 
either an exclusive or a limited taxing right to the two countries. The state which was 
not attributed a taxing right can either exempt or attribute credits for the tax paid 
abroad.61  
 
The disputed allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries 
reflected in the UN and OECD Model viewed investment of a flow of capital from a 
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home to a host state.62 A passage from the Introduction of the UN Model, quoting the 
Fiscal Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
sustains this argument:  
 
Existing treaties between industrialized countries 
sometimes require the country of residence to give up 
revenue. More often, however, it is the country of source 
which gives up revenue. Such a pattern may not be equally 
appropriate in treaties between developing and 
industrialized countries because income flows are largely 
from developing to industrialized countries and the 
revenue sacrifice would be one-sided.63 
 
The analysis of the history of tax treaties reveals what underpins the current debate 
about international taxation between developed and developing countries: allocation of 
taxing rights. Even though the development of the first tax treaty was concerned with 
capital import countries and granted source taxation on ‘impersonal income’; in their 
evolving process, tax treaties reduced the right of source countries, the division of taxing 
rights described in the 1923 Report becoming similar to the one adopted in modern tax 
treaties. This means that in the evolution of tax treaties there was an increased allocation 
of taxing rights to residence countries connected to the fact that most developed 
countries preferred it due to their economic position as capital exporters. Therefore, the 
allocation of taxing rights between source and residence has guided the debate between 
developed and developing countries. 
 
To this extent, the allocation of taxing rights in tax treaties represents the division of tax 
base aligned with countries’ economic interest. Developing countries are assumed to be 
capital importers, benefiting from source taxation, whereas developed countries are 
considered capital exporters, benefiting from residence taxation. From this angle, it 
seems that balancing the taxing rights between source and residence countries would 
solve the main problem of international taxation involving developed and developing 
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countries. Consequently, the fair allocation of taxing rights between source and 
residence countries has been already discussed in the literature, based on the theory of 
inter-nation equity.64 The justifications of source and residence taxation in this theory is 
under development so that this study opted for framing its contribution in a more 
pragmatic way, i.e. by identifying what is the effective interest of developing countries 
in international taxation, and, as a consequence, if source taxation really enlarges their 
tax base. In a sense, the hypothesis adopted is guided by the assumption that countries 
should be able to tax in their own interest, not on equity content. 
 
In this regard, globalisation has impacted on the thresholds that underpin these 
assumptions regarding the debate about allocation of taxing rights in tax treaties. The 
first challenge brought by globalisation refers to the flow of capital: how is the flow of 
capital between developed and developing countries? Are developing countries still 
capital importers? Are developed countries still capital exporters? Is allocation of taxing 
rights the fundamental issue between developed and developing countries when 
discussing international taxation? All these questions need to be addressed in order to 
understand the effective interest of developing countries in international taxation.  
 
The current assumptions regarding international taxation and developing countries have 
also further impact on their involvement with other tax policies promoted at the 
international level: the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition, as introduced in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter II. The effective meaning of harmful tax competition 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Another aspect of international taxation discussed at the international level is harmful 
tax competition, i.e. tax havens and preferential tax regimes, aiming only to regulate 
offshore centres in which financial and other services activities are located. But why has 
the legal debate focused on these aspects? This chapter will examine the evolving 
process of the legal debate on harmful tax competition in order to understand the reasons 
that shaped it and the position adopted by developing countries in this debate.  
 
The expression ‘tax competition’ has been used to designate so many different processes 
in the literature that the first task will be to examine its concept. In order to do that, the 
economic and legal approaches to tax competition will be compared. The comparison 
will make clear the different paths taken by the economic and legal literature. Next, the 
historical relationship between tax havens and developed countries will be explored to 
contextualise the evolutionary discourse of tax competition in the legal approach. The 
cornerstone ideas that underpin the legal approach will become clear, providing the 
missing arguments necessary to understand the position of developing countries in 
relation to harmful tax competition.  
 
2.2. The meaning of tax competition 
  
Globalisation has increased the interaction between countries’ economies and policies. 
In the tax field, this signifies that policies, which have been historically developed and 
focused on domestic issues, now are also affected by other countries’ tax policies. This 
reflects the fact that capital is extremely mobile nowadays, making countries consider 
the trade-off between raising tax revenue and attracting foreign investment. This 
situation has raised the concern about tax competition.  But what is tax competition? 
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Tax competition can refer to many different types of competition. Therefore, it is crucial 
to understand the different processes that tax competition can refer to. In fact, it is 
interesting to note that many studies in the economic and legal area have examined the 
phenomenon of tax competition without making clear that there are different processes 
of tax competition. This absence of awareness causes the misleading use of results of 
one type of tax competition to justify another completely different process. 
 
Tax competition can refer to different types of investment, taxes and incentives. 
Economic studies have focused on the process that countries lower their corporate 
income taxes to attract the real activity of companies which means that they are focused 
on productive investment made through foreign direct investment and its impact on 
corporate tax.65 That is, most economic studies are interested in the real movement of 
productive investment. On the other hand, the legal debate66 is interested in a different 
phenomenon: tax competition for taxing rights, i.e. competition for having income 
reported in a particular country in order to avoid taxes, without any associated 
movement of production.67 Thus, outcomes of economic studies cannot be used to 
justify the legal debate since they refer to different types of tax competition. The 
economic literature about tax competition illustrates the argument presented here since it 
is based on the analysis of how corporate income taxes have been lowered to attract the 
real activity of firms.68 The legal discussion69 on tax competition is centred on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 R. Griffith and A. Klemm, ‘What Has Been the Tax Competition Experience of the Last 20 Years?’ 
(2004) 28 Tax Notes International (Special Supplement) 1299. 
66 Here the expression ‘legal debate’ is associated to the OECD’s legal approach of tax competition. This 
association is explained in detailed in the next paragraphs.  
67 Griffith and Klemm (n 65) 1300. 
68 M. P. Devereux and R. Griffith, ‘The Impact of Corporate Taxation on the Location of Capital: A 
Review’ (2002) 9 Swedish Economic and Policy Review 79; M. P. Devereux, B. Lockwood and M. 
Redoano, ‘Do Countries Compete Over Corporation Tax Rates? (2002) 642 Warwick Economic Research 
Papers 2; M. Devereux, R. Griffith and A. Klemm, ‘Corporate Income Tax and International Tax 
Competition (2002) 35 Economic Policy 451; J. R. Hines ‘Lessons from Behavioural Responses to 
International Taxation’ (1999) National Tax Journal 305; J.R. Hines ‘Corporate Taxation and 
International Competition’ in A. J Auerbach, J. R. Hines Jr. and J. Slemrod (eds.), Taxing Corporate 
Income in the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press 2007) 268; L. Bretscher and F. Hettich, 
‘Globalisation, Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: Theory and Evidence for OECD Countries’ (2002) 
18 European Journal of Political Economy 695; M. Keen and A. Simone, ‘Is Tax Competition Harming 
Developing Countries more than Developed? (2004) 28 Tax Notes International: Special Supplement 
1317. 
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studies developed by the OECD about harmful tax competition, which are focused on 
tax havens and preferential tax regimes offered to financial and other service activities. 
In fact, ‘harmful tax competition’ defined by the OECD refers to the competition for the 
allocation of taxing rights without the movement of productive investment.70 
 
Despite the fact that the legal discussion about tax competition is centred on the 
allocation of taxing rights without the movement of productive investment, some 
particular authors have focused on the use of tax incentives to attract foreign direct 
investment.71 In this case, outcomes from economic studies were used to support further 
assumptions on the legal debate. However, the outcomes from the economic literature 
on tax competition for productive investment are inconclusive since there are many 
factors that impact on the decision of where to invest, making it hard to attribute to 
taxation the merits on determining investments’ allocation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The expression legal debate, legal discussion and legal discourse are used interchangeably in the body 
of this study and they refer to the OECD approach to tax competition. 
70  OECD, ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue’ (1998) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/1904176.pdf> accessed 03 July 2009 [hereinafter 1998 Report]; 
OECD, ‘Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and 
Recommendations by the Committee of Fiscal Affairs: Progress on Identifying and Eliminating Harmful 
Tax Practices’ (2000) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf> accessed 03 July 2009 
[hereinafter 2000 Report]; OECD, ‘The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report’ (2001) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/5/2664450.pdf> accessed 03 July 2009 [hereinafter 
2001 Report]; OECD, ‘The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report’ (2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf> accessed 03 July 2009 [hereinafter 2004 Report]; 
OECD, ‘Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries’ (2006) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/17/37446434.pdf> accessed 14 July 2009 [hereinafter 2006 Report on 
Harmful Tax Practices]; OECD, Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field - 2006 Assessment by 
the Global Forum on Taxation (OECD Publishing 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Report on Tax Co-operation]; 
OECD, Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field - 2007 Assessment by the Global Forum on 
Taxation (OECD Publishing 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Report]; OECD, Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level 
Playing Field - 2008 Assessment by the Global Forum on Taxation (OECD Publishing 2008) [hereinafter 
2008 Report]; OECD, Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field - 2009 Assessment by the Global 
Forum on Taxation (OECD Publishing 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Report]; OECD, Tax Co-operation: 
Towards a Level Playing Field - 2010 Assessment by the Global Forum on Taxation (OECD Publishing 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 Report]; OECD, The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes: Information Brief (OECD Publishing 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Report]. 
While the first five documents were developed by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs and other 
sub-divisions of the OECD (e.g. Forum on Harmful Tax Practices and Special Section on Tax 
Competition), which includes only OECD members; the last six documents available as published editions 
were elaborated by the OECD Global Forum on Taxation which includes both OECD and non-OECD 
economies. The distinction between the objectives of these documents is presented in the body of this text. 
71 Y. Margalioth, ‘Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System to 
Promote Developing Countries’ (2004) 23 Virginia Tax Review 161; A. Nov, ‘The “Bidding War” to 
Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution’ (2006) 25 Virginia Tax Review 835. 
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To this extent, Griffith and Klemm demonstrate the inconclusive findings of the 
economic literature by summarising the empirical results of different studies about tax 
competition in which countries lower their corporate income taxes to attract the real 
activities of firms. First, they classified the empirical studies as direct and indirect. 
Indirect studies looked for the responsiveness of investment to tax rates, i.e. the 
sensitivity of firms to changes in tax systems; whereas direct studies examined the 
interdependence in tax rates between jurisdictions. Examining the indirect studies, 
Griffith and Klemm concluded that although tax policy is important on the allocation of 
productive investment, the studies did not provide enough evidence either to measure 
the impact of taxation or to prove the existence of a process of tax competition. In 
addition, exploring the direct studies, Griffith and Klemm highlighted the fact that there 
are other processes besides tax competition that can lead to the interdependence of 
corporate tax rates among jurisdictions: (i) tax mimicking72; (ii) political yardstick 
competition73; and (iii) common intellectual trends74. Due to the fact that all these 
different models can predict the same behaviour response, i.e. interdependence in tax 
setting, the evidence provided by direct studies can only prove the existence of 
interdependence in tax rates, however the cause of this interdependence remains unclear. 
Griffith and Klemm could not conclude, therefore, that tax competition is the most 
relevant process in driving corporate income tax interdependence. In sum, putting 
together the outcomes of the indirect and direct studies, Griffith and Klemm 
demonstrated that it remains unclear: (i) how important is taxation on the allocation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Tax mimicking occurs when voters evaluate the performance of the government by comparing their tax 
rates to the ones in nearby countries, leading to interdependence in tax setting.  
73 Political yardstick competition takes place when spending policies in one country affect residents of 
another country, which also leads to interdependence in tax setting. 
74 Common intellectual trends could also lead to interdependence in tax setting even in the absence of tax 
competition when, for instance, a persuasive study on the optimal choice of corporate tax rates is adopted 
by policymakers in different countries. It is very interesting to note the report made by Tanzi about the 
implementation of the IMF tax reforms: ‘One aspect that might surprise economists involved for the first 
time in tax reform missions is the extent to which countries are influenced by what happens in other 
countries. To me, it was a great surprise to discover, in my earliest experiences with tax missions, that 
policymakers were far less interested in the latest academic thinking than in what other (and specially 
more successful) countries were doing, or had done. Almost without exception, they requested 
information about level, structure, and administration of taxes in other countries. Very rarely, if ever, were 
they interested in the latest academic thinking.’ V. Tanzi, ‘The IMF and Tax Reform’ (1990) 90/39 IMF 
Working Paper 5. 
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productive investment; and (ii) the reason why countries adopt similar corporate tax 
rates.75  
 
Most studies analysed by Griffith and Klemm are underpinned by developed countries’ 
data. When examining tax competition in developing countries, this phenomenon 
remains even more blurred since there are only a few studies about it and developing 
countries represent a much less homogeneous group than developed countries, which 
makes it even harder to justify the allocation of productive investment by taxation. Thus, 
even though developing countries have been offering tax incentives to attract FDI76, the 
importance of those incentives and their efficiency remains unclear. One example of the 
inconclusive importance of tax incentives to attract FDI is the fact that OECD member 
countries are the home countries for about 85% of the world’s multinational 
enterprises.77 
 
Tax competition can refer to different processes. While the economic debate defines tax 
competition as the process that countries lower their corporate tax rates to attract 
productive investment; the legal discussion characterises tax competition as the process 
that countries compete for the allocation of taxing rights without the movement of 
productive investment. Tax competition is not a unique process, but a complex 
phenomenon that can refer to different situations, depending on the characteristics of the 
process being investigated. 
 
2.3. Is tax competition good or bad? 
 
Another approach to tax competition is whether it is a positive or negative phenomenon. 
From this perspective there is also a different understanding between the economic and 
legal debate. The economic debate considers tax competition as a positive thing when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Griffith and Klemm (n 65) 1311-14. 
76  M. Klemm and A. Simone, ‘Is Tax Competition Harming Developing Countries More Than 
Developed? (2004)  28 Tax Notes International 1317. 
77 United Nations, UN Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 1999: FDI and 
the Challenge of Development. 
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adopting the Leviathan argument in which tax competition limits the government’s 
tendency to raise tax rates by forcing the state to adopt more efficient policies, besides 
limiting private interest groups. In other words, tax competition would enhance the 
efficient allocation of capital and a fair level of taxation. On the other hand, the 
economic debate can also consider tax competition as a destructive process when there 
is a ‘race to the bottom’ situation. In this situation, countries engage in ‘bidding wars’ in 
order to compete for mobile activities, ultimately resulting in no tax at all on mobile 
capital. The ‘race to the bottom’ situation may require states to: (i) shift to other revenue 
sources, taxing less mobile activities and particularly labour more heavily; and (ii) force 
a reduction in public expenditure to a suboptimal level. In this situation all countries 
would be worse off due to the fact that capital would deviate from an efficient 
allocation; and a fair level of taxation.78 
 
The concepts of bad and good tax competition argued by the economic debate are 
underpinned by political-economic theories rather than different types of investment. It 
does not matter the type of investment but the dynamics of the competition to configure 
a beneficial or ‘race to the bottom’ situation. 
 
Notwithstanding the theoretical debate on good or bad tax competition, empirical 
evidence of tax competition for FDI has not proved the ‘race to the bottom’ situation. 
Countries still levy corporate tax on FDI and, as already mentioned, it is hard to link the 
lowering of corporate tax rates to the phenomenon of tax competition. So, the 
destructive characteristic of tax competition still needs to be proved on corporate 
taxation.  
 
The situation is quite different when examining portfolio investment, since most 
developed countries exempt, for instance, interest derived from non-residents’ portfolio 
investment based on the argument that if one country starts to tax at the source, the 
capital will flow to another jurisdiction since the cost of capital will increase. Here there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 H. J. Ault, ‘Tax Competition: What (If Anything) To Do About It?’ in P. Kirchhof, M. Lehner, A. 
Raupach and M. Rodi (eds) International and Comparative Taxation: Essays in Honour of Klaus Vogel 
(Kluwer Law International Ltd 2002) 2. 
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might be a ‘race to the bottom’ situation, however in practice this conclusion is 
disguised by the fact that the exemption of non-residents’ portfolio interest at the source 
does not mean that interest will not be taxed, but that this income will be taxed only at 
the residence country. The argument here is that interest is still taxed but not by the 
source country; what happens is just a reallocation of taxing rights and not a real ‘race to 
the bottom’ situation where capital is not taxed at all.  
 
The legal debate about whether tax competition is positive or negative adopts 
completely different parameters. The distinction between what is a bad (‘harmful’) tax 
competition and what is a good (‘harmless’) tax competition is based on legal concepts 
rather than economic theories. Actually, economic theory is not completely separate 
from the legal debate, however it is not the cornerstone argument that sustains the 
distinction between harmful and harmless tax competition. For instance, the OECD 
Report on Harmful Tax Competition established as a primary step to identify a tax 
haven a ‘no or only nominal tax on income’, which is a typical condition in a ‘race to 
the bottom’ situation; though the Report detached itself from the economic argument 
when other characteristics are required to confirm the identification of a tax haven and a 
preferential tax regime (e.g. lack of effective exchange of information, lack of 
transparency, etc.). Furthermore, the legal debate has restricted the analysis of harmful 
tax competition to financial and other service activities.  
 
While economists adopt economic theories to verify if tax competition is positive or 
negative, lawyers rely on legal concepts that are limited to situations in which financial 
and other service activities are located in tax havens and preferential tax regimes. The 
legal approach tries to regulate only the specific situation described, leaving aside other 
situations that can also be characterised as harmful tax competition, as argued by the 
economic debate. Therefore, having in mind the fact that the legal debate is focused on a 
specific type of tax competition, the next section will examine in detail its characteristics 
to find out the reasons why the legal debate has taken this path. 
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2.4. The legal debate on harmful tax competition  
 
The legal debate about tax competition, as already mentioned, is guided by the OECD’s 
definition of harmful tax competition, which is focused on the meanings of tax haven 
and preferential tax regime. The flaws of these definitions have concentrated the major 
critiques to the OECD’s approach of harmful tax competition in the legal literature. 
However, in order to understand the driven reasons of the OECD’s approach it is 
necessary to examine the historical relationship between developed countries and tax 
havens.  
 
 2.4.1. Historical aspects of tax havens and preferential tax regimes 
 
The historical perspective of the relationship between developed countries and tax 
havens and preferential tax regimes will demonstrate the reasons that shaped the concept 
of harmful tax competition adopted by the OECD. The core idea of the OECD’s concept 
is connected to tax havens and preferential tax regimes. Therefore, it is necessary to 
investigate the causes that encourage their development. To this extent, as demonstrated 
next, the major cause associated with the existence of tax havens and other offshore 
centres is the deregulation of the financial market promoted by developed countries. In 
fact, the distinction between onshore and offshore transaction represents a cornerstone 
idea to understand the diffusion of tax havens and other preferential tax regimes and 
their acceptance by sovereign states.79  
 
The involvement of developing countries with tax havens and preferential tax regimes 
occurred only later in time since it was the deregulation promoted basically by 
developed countries that enhanced the development of offshore centres, including tax 
havens. Consequently, the relationship between developing countries and tax havens has 
been explained based on developed countries’ experience. In a sense, there is no clear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 R. Palan, ‘Offshore and the Structure Enablement of Sovereignty’ in M. P. Hampton and J.P. Abbott 
(eds.), Offshore Finance Centres and Tax Havens (Macmillan Press Ltd 1999)19. 
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understanding in the current literature about the impact of tax havens on developing 
countries’ economies in the context of globalisation. 
 
2.4.1.1. The relationship between developed countries and tax havens 
 
The relationship between tax havens, preferential tax regimes and developed countries 
can be explained through the evolution of the international financial market. In its 
evolving process, developed countries supported the expansion of tax havens and other 
offshore centres to enhance the international flow of capital. Developed countries 
intended to use these legal devices to reconcile the figure of the sovereign state with 
mobile economic activities.80  
 
The use of tax havens to avoid tax is not a new phenomenon and it emerged in the 1920s 
and 1930s mainly to protect wealthy families in the interwar period. For instance, 
British families used the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man; Americans preferred the 
Bahamas and Panama; and Continental Europeans opted for jurisdictions such as 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Switzerland and Luxemburg. Usually, the choice of these tax 
havens was justified by their exemption of foreign source income.81 
 
Later, i.e. after 1945, the tax shelters started also to be exploited by multinationals due 
to the remarkable increase of FDI. At that time, tax authorities were less worried about 
avoidance of corporate tax and there were no legal and administrative devices to control 
it. However, multinationals quickly discovered the benefits offered by different 
jurisdictions as well as their network of tax treaties for deferral taxation on profits and 
other income from subsidiaries incorporated abroad.82   
 
Due to the constant increase of FDI in the 1950s, new jurisdictions started to offer tax 
benefits to attract these investments. The tax benefits were offered by intermediate 
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81 Picciotto, International Business Taxation’ (n 34) 118. 
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jurisdictions rather than the place where the productive investment was made. So, at this 
stage, small jurisdictions stand out by offering different tax advantages. Most of these 
small jurisdictions had a colonial heritage with the major developed countries. The 
colonial legacy contributed to their development as tax havens since they had similar 
legal systems, that allowed them to benefit from the mother countries’ tax treaties and a 
monetary system also tied to the mother country. 83  Even today, some ‘special 
jurisdictions’ are tax havens connected to the UK, the US and the Netherlands: Overseas 
Territory of the United Kingdom (Bermuda), Dependency of the British Crown 
(Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey) and External Territory of the United States (US Virgin 
Islands). 
 
In the 1960s, other jurisdictions started to offer different types of incentive in addition to 
taxation to attract foreign investment. These new incentives represented a more relaxed 
financial regulation that withdrew some legal prerequisites on offshore financial 
transactions. Some highly regulated countries were not only tolerating but also 
supporting the deregulation of offshore transactions. Thus, the development of the 
unregulated offshore financial market can be attributed to onshore regulators that helped 
to create a situation that they could not properly control.84 But why did the offshore 
financial market develop? In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine 
some facts. 
 
The major growth in the international financial market occurred in the 1960s due to the 
restrictions on access to domestic capital markets for foreign investment. At that time, 
the US imposed restrictions to foreigners on borrowing in the US market and on 
American multinationals borrowing to invest abroad. Thus, American multinationals 
had to find a way to finance themselves abroad. This situation encouraged the 
development of the Eurocurrency markets.	  85  
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Eurocurrency is a deposit or an unsecured loan held externally from its country of 
origin, and denominated in a currency different from the official currency of the country 
where it is held. For instance, an American multinational holding a deposit of US dollars 
in a London bank is a Eurocurrency deposit. The Eurocurrency market is segregated 
from the domestic market and different regulation applies to it. Neither the country 
where the deposit is held, nor the country of the deposit’s currency regulates this market, 
which means that the Eurocurrency market is kept outside the control of any single state, 
being unregulated.	  86 
 
Thus, even though the offshore markets could not be directly regulated, the monetary 
authorities responsible for the major international currencies could have controlled it 
indirectly. In practice, however, monetary authorities from major capitalist countries 
preferred to abstain from regulating it. This passive behaviour might be justified by the 
external support required by these offshore centres and by their own interest in 
maintaining semi-autonomous and partially-controlled centres in preference to the 
growth of centres which might be harder to control. Consequently, monetary authorities 
accepted a limited control over offshore financial transactions in which a fiscal control 
was excluded. The monetary authority’s partial control over offshore transactions did 
not involve the fiscal authority, keeping tax avoidance and evasion completely out of 
control.87 
 
The deregulation of the international financial market was not idealised in the 
international monetary system agreed at the Bretton Woods Conference. On the 
contrary, by that time, the Bretton Woods architects (Keynes and White) endorsed an 
international financial order in which governments could control cross-border private 
financial flows, and public international institutions such as the IMF would have a key 
function in allocating short-term and long-term capital to the world economy.88 The 
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41-2. 
87 Picciotto, ‘International Business Taxation’ (n 34) 120-21. 
88 Helleiner (n 9) 233. 
54	  
	  
offshore financial market contributed to the end of the fixed exchange rate system based 
on the US dollar and to the final collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 
 
The major capitalist countries were interested in allowing monetary and banking 
controls to be operated with a differentiation between purely domestic and 
internationally oriented financial transactions.89 This differentiation encouraged not only 
tax havens but also other jurisdictions with firm regulation to enact offshore rules. In 
this sense, the UK, the US and Japan offered special regulation to foreigners. The initial 
attitude toward offshore activity adopted by the UK and the US was divergent, i.e. while 
the UK has tolerated offshore financial centres and used them strategically to 
reintroduce London as the centre of the global financial market, the US initially engaged 
in a complicated battle with offshore centres but later concluded that a better strategy 
would be to bring offshore activity to its own offshore centre located onshore.90 Thus, 
while the UK since the beginning promoted measures that encouraged the development 
of offshore activities, the US changed its position during the process and ended in 
establishing the International Banking Facility in New York, in 1980. Japan adopted 
similar measures to the US, introducing the Japanese Offshore Market in Tokyo, in 
1986.91 
  
These offshore financial centres, therefore, are located not only in tax havens but also in 
highly regulated jurisdictions. From this perspective, it becomes clear that offshore 
financial transactions do not take place only on an island in the middle of the ocean. 
Instead, offshore financial transactions can be conceived and executed in the traditional 
financial centres such as London and New York. It is the absence of regulation of these 
countries that allow offshore financial transactions to take place. Thus, it is the absence 
of regulation that defines an offshore transaction, which implies that there is no clear 
definition of this type of transaction. Palan clarified the difficulty on defining offshore 
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transactions by saying that the distinction between offshore and onshore finance is 
conceptual rather than empirical.	  92  
 
The identification of offshore transactions in practice is very hard since almost any state 
can offer avoidance possibilities in relation to the regulations of another jurisdiction; the 
possibility of avoidance (absence of regulation) rises from the interaction of different 
types of regulation.93  
 
Following this line of reasoning, it becomes clear that the strategy adopted by the OECD 
to curb harmful tax competition by identifying tax havens and some types of preferential 
tax regimes is inconsistent due to two main arguments: first that the definition adopted 
cannot apply to all types of tax havens and preferential tax regimes, and second that the 
legal devices targeted are only part of the problem, not the entire cause. Regarding the 
first argument, Picciotto said that ‘the broadest definition of a tax haven would include 
any country whose tax laws interact with those of another so as to make it possible to 
produce a reduction of tax liability in that other country’. The second argument, i.e. that 
tax havens are only part of the problem, is also sustained by Picciotto when he argued 
that the effective problem lies not with the havens’ (lack of) regulations, but in the 
improper, unproductive or unreasonable regulation being avoided.94 In a sense, the use 
of tax havens is encouraged by flexible regulation enacted by countries. The 
liberalisation of exchange control promoted by developed countries in the 1970s 
contributes to this argument.95  
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To this extent, it becomes evident that tax havens are only one form of offshore centre. 
There are other forms of offshore centres located in highly regulated jurisdictions. 
Developed countries supported the development of offshore financial centres. Thus, it is 
very arbitrary to attribute the responsibility of harmful tax competition entirely to certain 
individual jurisdictions identified by the OECD as tax havens. The problem is systemic 
and can only be tackled by adopting a broader perspective on the interaction of different 
tax systems.96   
 
From this broader perspective, focusing on developed countries, what became clear is 
the importance of these offshore centres (including tax havens) for the development of 
the international financial market. The offshore centres were required to reconcile the 
state with mobile economic activities.97 Offshore centres are used not only for tax 
avoidance but also to manage global operations of multinational enterprises. 98 
Developed countries, therefore, might not be interested in eliminating these legal 
devices, but only in finding a better away to control them. Thus, the relationship 
between tax havens and developed countries is not based only on conflicting interests. 
 
The problem involving offshore centres (including tax havens) is the fact that even 
though they supported the development of the financial market and the way 
multinational enterprises operate nowadays, they also contributed to the erosion of 
residence taxation. Tax havens allow capital to be invested in any part of the world 
without any further control, which makes its identification hard, unless investors 
properly inform their foreign income to national tax authorities. In this regard, tax 
havens allow increased opportunities of tax avoidance and evasion. Even though tax 
avoidance represents situations expected and permitted by tax systems of high tax 
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jurisdictions, tax evasion is prohibited and erodes in an unexpected way the countries’ 
tax base. Thus, having in mind the concept of harmful tax competition, in a sense, what 
the OECD members proposed was some kind of regulation to control the erosion of their 
tax base, through rules that aim to ensure residence taxation. 
 
The historical analysis of the relationship between developed countries and offshore 
regimes showed that tax havens and other preferential tax regimes are not anomalies in 
the international tax system but legal devices that were enforced by developed countries 
to encourage the development of the financial market. Developed countries were aware 
that tax havens have been used to avoid their tax and financial regulations, even though 
they did not control their development. Whether developing countries’ relationship with 
tax havens follows the same pattern is not evident, as examined next. 
 
2.4.1.2. The relationship between developing countries and tax havens 
 
As already mentioned, the involvement of developing countries with offshore centres 
occurred later in time since it was the deregulation promoted basically by developed 
countries that enhanced the development of offshore centres, including tax havens.  
 
Initially, developing countries were averse to the inflow of foreign investment since it 
was considered by many countries as a new form of colonialism or even imperialism.99 
This attitude only started to change after the 1970s. In fact, a remarkable acceptance of 
foreign investment in developing countries only occurred in the last two decades of the 
20th century when a dramatic increase in FDI arose in a worldwide scale.100  Nowadays 
there is a common consensus that FDI is beneficial for economic development, leading 
developing countries to compete against each other to attract it. For instance, research 
conducted by Keen and Simone involving 40 developing economies, between early 
1990s and early 2000, confirmed this tendency by demonstrating that in this period there 
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was an increased offer of tax incentives by developing countries in the form of tax 
holidays, reduced corporate taxes, tax breakers for exporters and free trade zones.101 
 
The most common forms of tax incentives used by developing countries are: tax 
holidays, investment allowances and credits, reduced corporate taxes, tax breakers for 
exporters and free trade zones. Developing countries feel bound to offer these tax 
incentives in a way that they are at least as attractive as those offered by their 
neighbours and other competing jurisdictions.102 This situation creates a dynamic game, 
settling a specific form of tax competition among developing countries for productive 
investment.  
 
The use of tax incentives to attract FDI by developing countries has been the dominant 
argument about tax competition and developing countries in the current tax literature. 
From this angle, it becomes clear the limited interest of developing countries in the 
OECD’s work since those tax inducements were not included in this organisation’s 
concept of harmful tax competition. The OECD explained in the 1998 Report that this 
specific aspect of tax competition would be addressed in a future work, even though 
until nowadays no progress has been made.103 In a sense, after examining the historical 
relationship between tax havens and developed countries, the exclusion of tax incentives 
related to FDI from the OECD concept of harmful tax competition is understandable. 
While those FDI tax inducements reflect the erosion of source taxation, the OECD’s 
project on harmful tax competition targeted the erosion of residence taxation. 
Consequently, rules that aim to ensure residence taxation are out of the scope of 
developing countries’ tax policies. 
 
The relationship between tax havens and developing countries is not entirely clear in the 
literature since developing countries’ economic interests are justified only in terms of 
inflows, specifically FDI. It is necessary, therefore, to update the analysis of the 
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international flow of capital in order to understand the effective interest of developing 
countries in tax havens and preferential tax regimes. From the current perspective, the 
limited interest of involvement of developing countries in the combatting of harmful tax 
competition promoted by the OECD is evident.  
 
 2.4.2. The OECD concept of harmful tax competition 
 
Since 1998 the OECD has been publishing reports about Harmful Tax Practices and, 
subsequently, about Tax Co-operation towards a Level Playing Field. The analysis of 
the Reports allows a critical view on how the debate on harmful tax competition has 
evolved and the current position of the OECD.  
 
Until 2011, eleven important documents have been published by the OECD: (i) the 1998 
Report; (ii) the 2000 Report; (iii) the 2001 Report; (iv) the 2004 Report; (v) the 2006 
Report on Harmful Tax Practices; (vi) the 2006 Report on Tax Co-operation; (vii) the 
2007 Report; (viii) the 2008 Report; (ix) the 2009 Report; (x) the 2010 Report; and (xi) 
the 2011 Report.104 While the first five documents were developed by the OECD’s 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs and other sub-divisions of the OECD (e.g. Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices and Special Section on Tax Competition) which include only 
OECD members; the last six documents were elaborated by the OECD’s Global Forum 
on Taxation which includes both OECD and non-OECD economies. The parallel work 
of the OECD on these two fronts demonstrates the strategy adopted by this organisation 
to involve OECD non-member countries, as discussed next. 
  
The initial idea of the OECD Reports was to define harmful tax competition. The 1998 
Report addressed harmful tax practices in the form of tax havens and preferential tax 
regimes in OECD members and non-member countries, restraining the discussion to 
geographically mobile activities such as financial and other service activities.105 Thus, 
the definition of harmful tax competition was founded upon the concepts of tax haven 
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and preferential tax regime and to the situation where these two regimes were used by 
financial and other service activities.  
 
As already mentioned, the concept adopted in the legal debate differs significantly from 
the phenomenon of tax competition addressed in the economic debate. What is the 
effective meaning of harmful tax competition? What is the OECD aiming at with these 
harmful tax policies? The next sections will answer these questions. 
 
2.4.2.1. Tax havens 
 
The primary criterion established by the OECD to identify a tax haven was: a 
jurisdiction that imposes no income taxes or only nominal income taxes and ‘offers 
itself as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence’. 
This crucial characteristic needed to be evaluated with other key factors in order to 
confirm the existence of tax haven: (i) the existence of laws or administrative practices 
which prevent the effective exchange of information with other jurisdictions; (ii) lack of 
transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal or administrative provisions which 
also would prevent effective exchange of information; and (iii) the absence of a 
requirement that the activity be substantial which allows the attraction of investments 
that are purely tax driven.106 Thus, the non-taxation (or only imposition of nominal 
income taxes) of income is the first step to determine those situations in which an 
analysis of the other criteria is required.  
 
The necessity of combining the initial criterion with other key factors leaves the 
definition of a tax haven without a precise technical meaning, depending on particular 
circumstances to identify a jurisdiction as a tax haven. The OECD was aware of the 
imprecise meaning of tax haven. 107  The OECD’s awareness contributed to the 
understanding that the case by case analysis to identify a tax haven was not a negative 
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fact from this organisation’s point of view, even though this fact has been criticised by 
the literature, as discussed next.  
 
Another aspect of the 1998 Report was to clarify that it was not its objective to explicitly 
or implicitly suggest that there was some general minimum effective rate of tax to be 
imposed on income below which a country would be considered engaging in harmful 
tax competition.108 This point was reinforced in the other OECD Reports, making clear 
that countries are free to determine the characteristics of their tax systems. The OECD, 
therefore, does not force countries to tax income.  
 
The four cornerstone criteria described in the 1998 Report to identify a tax haven have 
changed in importance in the following reports produced by the OECD. The first 
significant modification was introduced in the 2000 Report where the interest in 
cooperation to eliminate harmful tax practices gained significance.109 According to this 
new criterion, tax havens that made a public political commitment to adopt a schedule of 
progressive changes to eliminate harmful tax practices would not be included in an 
OECD List of Uncooperative Tax Havens. This list would be reviewed periodically in 
order to grant that old and also new harmful tax practices were avoided. In practice, the 
interest in cooperation overcame the other criteria since if even fulfilling the criteria 
established in the 1998 Report a tax haven would not be included in the OECD list of 
uncooperative tax havens if it demonstrated interest in cooperation to eliminate the 
condemned tax practices. In fact, the interest in cooperation to eliminate the condemned 
tax practices can be translated as the willingness to improve transparency and exchange 
of information. The cooperation did not mean to force a country to raise tax rates since it 
goes against the OECD’s principle that all jurisdictions are free to determine the 
characteristics of their own tax system according to their own public interests.  
 
In the 2001 Report, the substantial activity criterion to identify a tax haven was 
abolished by the OECD due to the fact that the determination of whether local activities 
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are sufficiently substantial is difficult.110 From then on, regarding the previous changed 
introduced by the 2000 Report, there were only two remaining factors to confirm the 
existence of a non-cooperative tax haven: (i) the existence of laws or administrative 
practices which prevent the effective exchange of information with other jurisdictions; 
and (ii) lack of transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal or administrative 
provisions which would also prevent effective exchange of information.  
 
In 2001, there was a political change in the United States that impacted on the 
acceptance of the OECD rules on harmful tax competition. Until 2000, the Clinton 
administration opted for a supportive role in relation to the OECD’s initiative, even 
though it did not assume pro-active conduct. At the beginning of 2001, with the election 
of a Republican President, the Bush administration adopted an opposite position, 
preferring to solve issues involving tax havens through bilateral talks than by working 
through the OECD.111 However, after the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the focus 
on money laundering shifted from anti-drugs to anti-terrorism. Thus, policies to combat 
international tax evasion and avoidance gained the support of the United States.112 
 
With the inclusion of the cooperation criterion in the characterisation of a tax haven, 
there are in fact two ways to analyse the position of a jurisdiction: first as a tax haven, in 
case of the fulfilment of the characteristics prescribed in the 1998 Report modified by 
the 2001 Report; and second by the subsequent classification of the tax haven as 
cooperative or uncooperative. The subsequent classification of a tax haven as 
cooperative or uncooperative in fact affects the underlying main characterisation of a 
country as a tax haven, since a cooperative tax haven is a jurisdiction that has agreed to 
eliminate harmful tax practices in the near future, which means to eradicate: (i) laws or 
administrative practices which prevent the effective exchange of information with other 
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jurisdictions; and (ii) lack of transparency which would prevent exchange of 
information. In the absence of these two factors, the only remaining characteristic of a 
tax haven is the gateway criterion, i.e. a jurisdiction that imposes no income taxes or 
only nominal income taxes. This implies that a cooperative tax haven will not be a tax 
haven anymore according to the conditions described in the 1998 Report, modified by 
the 2001 Report, when the two characteristics described are completely fulfilled. Even 
though there is this distinction between tax havens and cooperative tax havens, in 
practice, most countries maintain a list of jurisdictions classified as tax havens, ignoring 
the cooperation criterion.  
 
From a historical perspective, therefore, the list of non-cooperative tax havens evolved 
in the following way: in 2000, the OECD identified 38 jurisdictions as tax havens 
according to criteria it had established in the 1998 Report.113 However, from 2000 to 
2002, 31 jurisdictions made public political commitments to implement the OECD’s 
standards of transparency and exchange of information.114 Only 7 jurisdictions did not 
make commitments to transparency and exchange of information at that time and were 
identified in 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs as uncooperative tax 
havens.115 All of these jurisdictions subsequently made commitments and were removed 
from the list of uncooperative tax havens.116 Besides that, the OECD has changed its 
criteria of classification of un-cooperative tax havens. Since 2009, as discussed next, the 
‘black list’ includes only countries that have not committed themselves to the 
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international agreed tax standard. Even though the criteria were modified, the outcome 
is the same: there is no jurisdiction in the ‘black list’.  
 
In sum, the tax haven is one of the crucial concepts that have guided the discussion 
about harmful tax competition presented by the OECD. As demonstrated, a tax haven 
has no technical meaning and the factors used to identify it have changed over time. An 
overview of the evolving concept of tax havens showed how the OECD’s position was 
modified, i.e. starting from a more radical approach, suggesting changes in tax systems 
and ending with a discourse focused on transparency and exchange of information. The 
primary criterion, however, made clear that the original intent of the OECD was to 
identify places used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence. Thus, 
the concept of tax havens developed by the OECD refers to jurisdictions that threaten 
residence taxation, increasing opportunities of international tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
2.4.2.2. Preferential tax regimes 
 
The other crucial concept in the definition of harmful tax competition was the 
preferential tax regime. While the identification of a tax haven included the analysis of 
OECD members and non-members tax systems, the detection of harmful preferential tax 
regimes was initially limited to OECD members. The process of identification included 
four key factors, eight complementary factors and three economic considerations. 
Preferential tax regimes can provide benefits for the location of portfolio investments as 
well as foreign direct investment. However, the OECD’s approach limited the 
discussion to financial and other service activities which means that preferential tax 
regimes created to encourage productive investment were not included in the concept of 
harmful tax conception.  
 
The four key factors to identify a harmful preferential tax regime are: (i) no or low 
effective tax rates; (ii) ‘ring-fencing’ of regimes which meant regimes that were partially 
or fully isolated from the domestic economy, restricting the benefits to non-resident 
investors who could not access the domestic markets; (iii) lack of transparency; and (iv) 
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lack of effective exchange of information.117 The method of identification was similar to 
the one used for tax havens: the initial criterion (i) needed to be combined with one or 
more other key factors described in this paragraph.118 Exclusively no or low effective 
tax rates was not enough to identify a harmful preferential tax regime.119 
 
Based on the factors described in the 1998 Report, a list of harmful preferential tax 
regimes were published in the 2000 Report, where 47 preferential regimes were 
identified in member countries.120 Consequently, OECD members had to remove the 
harmful feature of such regimes and the results of their actions were published in the 
2001 Report, updated by the 2006 Report on Harmful Tax Practices. 
 
In analysing the described process to identify a harmful preferential tax regime, what we 
see is a similar sequence of steps as those described to identify a tax haven. Here there is 
also no technical meaning of harmful preferential tax regime and, consequently, as the 
process of identification is flexible, the effective elimination of such regimes remains 
unclear. Furthermore, there is also the fact that preferential tax regimes designed for 
other types of activities rather than financial services were excluded from the analysis 
which created a loophole in the concluding results. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 OECD, ‘1998 Report’ (n 70) 25-30. 
118 ibid 26. 
119 Complementary factors assisted in identifying harmful preferential tax regimes. They were: (i) an 
artificial definition of the tax base; (ii) failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; (iii) 
foreign source income exempt from residence country tax; (iv) negotiable tax rate or tax base; (v) 
existence of secrecy provisions; (vi) access to a wide network of tax treaties; (vii) regimes that are 
promoted as tax minimisation vehicles; and (viii) a regime that encourages purely tax-driven operations or 
arrangements. Ibid 30-4.  
Furthermore, there were three economic considerations in the process of identifying a harmful preferential 
tax regime. These economic effects are not easily identified even though they can help to guide the 
process of recognition of harmful preferential tax regimes. The economic considerations were presented 
as questions: (i) Does the tax regime shift activity from one country to the country providing the 
preferential regime, rather than generate significant new activity?; (ii) Is the presence and level of 
activities in the host country commensurate with the amount of investment or income?; and (iii) Is the 
preferential tax regime the primary motivation for the location of an activity? The OECD acknowledged 
that it was not easy to answer these questions and the first list of harmful preferential tax regimes did not 
assess the economic considerations. OECD, ‘2000 Report’(n 70) 12. 
120 The preferential regimes were listed by category (e.g. insurance, financing and leasing, fund managers, 
banking, headquarter regimes, distribution centre regimes, service centre regimes, shipping and 
miscellaneous activities) and some regimes were included in more than one category. Ibid. 12-14.  
By that time, the holding company regime was not analysed. In fact, the holding company regime was 
only analysed in the 2006 Report on Harmful Tax Practices. 
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The literature, consequently, has focused its critiques on the arbitrary concepts of tax 
haven, preferential tax regime and the restriction of the analysis to financial and other 
service activities since productive investments and also portfolio investment such as 
interest have been excluded from the concept of harmful tax competition developed by 
the OECD.  
 
Littlewood adopted this line of criticism to the OECD’s approach to harmful tax 
competition, explaining that the organisation’s manner of operation has been opaque and 
arbitrary which resulted in a flawed definition of tax haven and preferential tax regime. 
These flawed definitions allowed some categories of tax havens and preferential tax 
regimes to escape from the OECD’s definition.121   
 
Avi-Yonah also agreed that some tax regimes that also represent tax havens or 
preferential tax regimes were excluded from the OECD’s analysis. He emphasised this 
situation by explaining the concept of a production tax haven, i.e. a ‘jurisdiction that 
grants a tax holiday to foreign production facilities located therein, but still leaves an 
income tax on domestic corporations and individual residents’ as well as a preferential 
tax regime where an exemption is granted to interest paid to non-residents. Thus, 
according to Avi-Yonah an alternative approach to harmful tax competition is necessary. 
He advocated that the distinction between harmless and harmful tax competition might 
be drawn between general reductions that apply to all taxpayers (domestic and foreign), 
and specific reductions that are offered only to non-resident taxpayers. In Avi-Yonah’s 
view, therefore, the OECD made no systematic effort to distinguish on a normative basis 
between harmful and beneficial tax competition.122 
  
Based on the critiques presented, it can be concluded that there is no clear understanding 
in the literature pointing to the fact that the OECD is in fact not discussing tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 M. Littlewood, ‘Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 411. 
122 R. S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalisation, Tax Competition, and The Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000) 
113 Harvard Law Review 1573. 
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competition for productive investment, i.e. the erosion of source taxation. The OECD 
used the term tax competition to approach the problem of international tax avoidance 
and evasion from the perspective of its members, i.e. the erosion of residence taxation. 
Thus, assuming this line of reasoning, a question is raised: What was the involvement of 
non-member countries in this project? The outcome of this analysis will enlighten the 
main question of this study which refers to the position of developing countries in the 
international tax system.  
 
2.4.3. The dialogue with non-member countries 
 
Even though the criteria that limited the scope of the OECD’s work on harmful tax 
competition corresponded to the interest of its member countries, the OECD always 
tried to extend the project to non-member countries. The first Reports about harmful tax 
practices were developed by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs and other sub-groups 
where only member countries participated.123 The OECD was aware of the risk that a 
failure to address the harmful tax practices in non-member countries in parallel with the 
work in member countries would cause a shift of the targeted activities to economies 
outside the OECD area, attributing to them competitive advantage and limiting the 
effectiveness of the OECD’s original plan. Therefore, since the beginning of the 
OECD’s project, non-member economies were encouraged to engage themselves and to 
agree with the principles established by the OECD to curb harmful tax competition, 
even though they were excluded from the development of the rules.124  
 
The OECD’s interest of engaging non-OECD countries was to protect its objective 
rather than to help ‘non-member’ countries to protect themselves from these harmful tax 
practices. Furthermore, another peculiar aspect of the OECD effort to engage non-
members refers to the fact that tax havens, offshore finance centres and developing 
countries were treated as one single group: ‘non-members’, even though their economies 
and interests in the OECD’s work are substantially different. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 OECD, ‘1998 Report’, ‘2000 Report’, ‘2001 Report’, ‘2004 Report’, and ‘2006 Report on Tax co-
operation (n 70). 
124 OECD, ‘2000 Report’ (n 70) 22. 
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Beyond the agreement of some tax havens125 on collaborating with the OECD by 
increasing transparency and exchange of information in order to avoid their inclusion in 
the list of non-cooperative tax havens, the engagement of developing countries has been 
limited. Parallel to the work developed by the Committee of Fiscal Affairs where only 
members determined the rules, the OECD developed the Global Forum on Taxation in 
order to improve the dialogue as well as the participation of other countries, besides tax 
havens and other offshore centres.  
 
The Global Forum on Taxation was established as a multilateral framework where the 
OECD carried out dialogues on tax issues with non-OECD economies. The Global 
Forum has involved itself in the discussion of harmful tax competition from a different 
perspective: rather than identifying tax havens and preferential tax regimes, the Global 
Forum has tackled harmful tax competition by focusing on effective exchange of 
information and transparency. Since 2000, the Global Forum has been working on these 
issues and its first proposal was the development of the Model Agreement on Exchange 
of Information on Tax Matters (Model Agreement)126. The objective of this agreement is 
to promote international cooperation in tax matters through exchange of information on 
request in all tax matters for the administration and enforcement of domestic tax law 
without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax 
purposes.127 
 
The association between harmful tax competition and the Model Agreement relies on 
the fact that the lack of transparency and effective exchange of information are the key 
criteria in determining harmful tax practices. The Model Agreement represents the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Most countries classified as tax havens are small islands classified as: Overseas Territory of the United 
Kingdom (Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands), 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles), Dependency of the British Crown 
(Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey), and External Territory of the United States (US Virgin Islands).   
126 This Model Agreement is also referred as Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA). 
127 OECD, ‘A Progress Report on Jurisdiction Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum Implementing the 
International Agreed Tax Standard’ (2009) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/42704399.pdf> accessed 
17 July 2009, [hereinafter 2009 Report]. 
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standard of effective exchange of information for the purposes of the OECD’s initiative 
on harmful tax practices.128  
 
The segregation of developing countries from tax havens and offshore financial centres, 
i.e. transforming the non-member status into two different groups, is necessary to 
identify the effective participation of developing countries in the Global Forum. The 
development of the Model Agreement, which congregates the main characteristics 
accepted as the international tax standard, was executed by the OECD Working Group 
on Effective Exchange of Information (the Working Group). The Working Group was 
composed of representatives from OECD Member countries and from delegates from 
eleven tax havens: Aruba, Bermuda, Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, 
Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands Antilles, the Seychelles and San Marino.129 Thus, the 
representativeness of developing countries at the initial stage of this project did not 
occur. The involvement of non-members here means in fact the participation of tax 
havens. 
 
In 2006, the Global Forum on Taxation prepared a progress report assessing the 
implementation of the OECD’s standards of transparency and exchange of information 
in 82 economies. The set of 82 economies was composed by two different groups of 
countries: (i) 54 ‘Participating Partners’ 130  which corresponded to countries that 
committed themselves to the principles of transparency and effective exchange of 
information established in the Model Agreement; and (ii) 28131 ‘Invitees’132 which were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 OECD, ‘2006 Report on Tax Co-operation’ (n 70) 7. 
129 ibid. 
130 The group of Participating Partners was composed of: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, 
Australia, Bahrain, Kingdom of, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Canada, Cayman Islands, Cook 
Islands, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, 
Grenada, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Korea, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Niue, Norway, Panama, 
Poland, Portugal, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Samoa, San 
Marino, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, The Bahamas, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
United Kingdom, United States, US Virgin Islands and Vanuatu.  
131 China, Hong Kong and Macao presented data separately even though accounted as one country. 
132 The group of Invitees was represented by: Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brunei, 
China, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Liberia,  Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao (China), 
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represented by countries invited only to contribute to the factual assessment and to 
attend the Global Forum meeting. The group of Participating Partners was composed of 
OECD members and tax havens (according to the tax haven criteria as described in the 
1998 OECD report). The second group, i.e. Invitees, gathered tax havens, other financial 
centres and only a few developing countries (Argentina, China, Russian Federation and 
South Africa) with a substantial economy, not identified as tax havens or offshore 
financial centres.  
 
As a result, though the set of 82 countries gave the initial impression that non-OECD 
economies were interested in getting involved, in analysing the data what becomes 
evident is the commitment of only OECD countries, tax havens and other offshore 
financial centres. Moreover, not all OECD countries had committed themselves to the 
principles established by the Model Agreement since Belgium, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland had only participated as Invitees. 
  
After the 2006 Report on Tax Co-operation, the Global Forum prepared two other 
progress reports (2007 Report and 2008 Report), following the same line as the first one. 
Comparing the information displayed in the three reports what we see are very subtle 
changes regarding the number of countries participating. The number of Participating 
Partners remained the same, i.e. 59, whereas the number of Invitees increased by one 
due to the contribution of Chile in the 2008 Report. The most significant change was the 
endorsement of the principles of transparency and effective exchange of information by 
Argentina, China, Hong Kong (China),  Macao (China), Russian Federation, South 
Africa and United Arab Emirates.  
 
In 2008, due to the global financial crisis, the G20 reinforced the necessity of 
transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes in order to strengthen 
regulation of the financial sector. The importance of the task developed by the Global 
Forum was highlighted and its work was adopted as a standard model to guide all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, 
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay. 
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discussions involving this subject. The problems involving transparency and exchange 
of information for tax purposes were attributed to tax havens and non-cooperative 
jurisdictions. Thus, the solution was to engage as many jurisdictions as possible to the 
principles established in the Model Agreement. The outcome of such proposal resulted 
in the publication of a new report by the OECD Global Forum, updating the 2006, 2007 
and 2008 Reports on Tax Co-operation towards a Level Playing Field, and adopting a 
new format: the report (2009 Report) would now present the summary assessment for 
each country with respect to acceptance and implementation of the OECD standard.133  
 
The 2009 Report presents three categories where countries can be classified as: (i) 
jurisdictions that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard; 
(ii) jurisdictions that have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but have 
not yet substantially implemented it; and (iii) jurisdictions that have not committed to 
the internationally agreed tax standard. The first assessment performed based on this 
new classification was published on the 2nd April, 2009. The 2009 Progress Report 
identified: 40 countries that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed 
tax standard;134 38 tax havens and offshore financial centres that have committed to the 
internationally agreed tax standard, but have not yet substantially implemented it;135 and 
4 countries that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard.136 From 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  G20, ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, London’ (2009) 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf> accessed 23 
July 2009; G20, ‘G20 Working Group on Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting Integrity 
in Financial Markets’ (WG2: Final Report, 29 March 2009) 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_wg2_010409.pdf> accessed 23 July 2009. 
134 Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Korea, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, 
Seychelles, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the US Virgin Islands.  
135 Tax havens according to criteria established in the 1998 Report: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook 
Islands, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montserrat, 
Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and The Grenadines, 
Samoa, San Marino, Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu. Other offshore financial centres: Austria, 
Belgium, Brunei, Chile, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Singapore and Switzerland. 
136 Costa Rica, Malaysia (Labuan), Philippines and Uruguay. 
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the sample of countries examined, only 6 jurisdictions137 were identified as developing 
countries not also classified as tax havens or offshore financial centres.138  
 
In the most recent report published on the 25th May, 2011, the number of jurisdictions 
that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed tax standard reached the 
figure of 82 countries, remaining only 8 tax havens139 and other financial centres140 
classified as jurisdictions that have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, 
but have not yet substantially implemented it. All jurisdictions surveyed by the Global 
Forum have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard.141 The increased 
number of jurisdictions that have substantially implemented the internationally agreed 
tax standard occurred due to the modification of the threshold that defined it. Before 
April 2009, a country was considered to have substantially implemented the standard of 
exchange of information for the purposes of this Global Forum assessment if it had in 
place signed agreements or unilateral mechanisms that provided for exchange of 
information to standard with at least 12 OECD countries.142 After April 2009, the OECD 
started to accept as jurisdictions that have substantially implemented the internationally 
agreed tax standard, jurisdictions which had signed agreements with at least 12 
jurisdictions, whether OECD or other jurisdictions.143 The downgrade of the threshold 
encouraged tax havens and other financial centres to sign TIEA in order to improve their 
classification. However, regarding the involvement of new countries, also in this 
updated list, only a few jurisdictions could be identified as developing countries not also 
classified as tax havens or offshore centres.144 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Argentina, China, Mexico, Russia Federation, South Africa and Turkey. 
138  OECD, ‘A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in 
Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard: 2nd April, 2009’ (2009) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf> accessed 15 June 2011. 
139 Montserrat, Nauru, Nieu, Panama and Vanuatu. 
140 Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay. 
141  OECD, ‘A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in 
Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard: 25th May, 2011’ (2011) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/43606256.pdf > accessed 15 June 2011. 
142 OECD, ‘2009 Report’ (n 70) 18. 
143 OECD, ‘2010 Report’ (n 70) 9. 
144 Same countries as n (134) plus Brazil. 
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Notwithstanding the progressive changes implemented by the Global Forum, in 
September, 2009, during the Mexico Global Forum Meeting, a new structure for the 
Global Forum was proposed. One of the main adjustments consisted of the openness of 
membership to all OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions that commit to implementing the 
standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. From this 
angle, it seems that all members will participate on an equal footing. However, the main 
rules that guide the work of the Global Forum were settled before by the OECD’s work. 
Thus, the direction of the work on transparency and exchange of information for tax 
purposes was defined by the interest of OECD countries. It will be hard for new 
members to change the path of the work that has been done previously.  
 
Another relevant outcome of the Mexico Global Forum Meeting was the introduction of 
the Peer Review Report. This new report is based on two-phase review of each 
jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory framework (Phase 1) and practical implementation 
(Phase 2) of the standards on transparency and the exchange of information for tax 
purposes.145 The objective is to improve the assessment of countries’ implementation of 
the international tax standard. However, the meaning of international tax standard 
remains the same based on: (i) exchange of information on request where it is 
‘foreseeably relevant’ to the administration; (ii) enforcement of the domestic laws of the 
treaty partner; (iii) no restrictions on exchange caused by bank secrecy or domestic tax 
interest requirements; (iv) availability of reliable information and powers to obtain it; (v) 
respect for taxpayers’ rights; and (vi) strict confidentiality of information exchanged.146 
Therefore, even though the criteria for assessment of the international tax standard 
might have improved, it is not entirely clear whether the international tax standard is the 
right answer to combat international tax evasion and avoidance. The international tax 
standard was the answer established by the OECD. It is necessary first to understand 
how international tax avoidance and evasion might be affecting developing countries to 
later examine the efficiency of the international tax standard from the perspective of 
developing countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 OECD, ‘2010 Report’ (n 70) 10. 
146 ibid 15. 
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In sum, the limited involvement of developing countries in the OECD’s work on 
harmful tax competition might be explained by how this subject has been approached. 
For developing countries, tax competition was associated with the idea of competition 
for productive investment (inflows of FDI), which in fact was not covered by the 
approach established by the OECD. It was necessary to examine what was the effective 
meaning of harmful tax competition to understand developing countries’ position. To 
this extent, this chapter demonstrated that the concept of harmful tax competition 
developed by the OECD refers in fact to the combat of international tax avoidance and 
evasion and, consequently, to the erosion of residence taxation. From this angle, it 
becomes clear that the real issue in order to involve developing countries in this debate 
is to understand how international tax avoidance and evasion are affecting them.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of harmful tax competition was necessary to demonstrate what its effective 
meaning is. The OECD detached the term tax competition from its economic meaning, 
using it to address the problem of international tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
To this extent, this chapter pointed out that the limited involvement of developing 
countries in the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition is in fact a problem of 
perspective since it is not entirely clear what is the interest of developing countries in 
combating international tax avoidance and evasion.  
 
In order to identify the interest of developing countries in combating international tax 
avoidance and evasion, first it will be necessary to comprehend their interest in the 
international flow of capital to then verify whether the measures implemented until now 
also work from their perspective. 
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Chapter III. The international flow of capital 
 
3.1. Objective of this chapter 
 
This chapter will provide new economic premises to reconsider international taxation. 
The legal debate has focused mainly on allocation of taxing rights between source and 
residence countries. However, the international flow of capital has substantially changed 
in the recent past. It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate the relevance of FDI and 
Portfolio Investment in order to understand countries’ interests in international taxation 
since source and residence taxation are applied differently to income derived from these 
flows.  
 
The economic analysis that has guided the discussion about the application of source 
and residence principles in tax treaties was focused on only two groups of countries: 
developed and developing countries. However, nowadays it is also necessary to analyse 
the position of this new group of players: tax havens, since their participation in the 
international flow of capital has remarkably increased in the recent past. Moreover, 
another traditional assumption that has oriented the application of source and residence 
principles is the characterisation of developing countries as capital importers and 
developed countries as capital exporters. The current flow of capital among countries is 
much more complex than this simple assumption, presenting different characteristics 
associated with the financial assets that underlay them. The characterisation of countries 
as capital importers and capital exporters needs to consider their positions in terms of 
Portfolio Investment and FDI. 
 
The idea of this study is to analyse the characteristics of the international flow of capital 
among developed countries, developing countries and tax havens in order to identify 
new economic premises that can push the international tax debate to another frontier, i.e. 
rather than focusing on the allocation of taxing rights that emphasises only tax problems 
from the perspective of source and residence principles to understand the complexity of 
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international taxation from a global perspective based on the interaction of different 
bilateral transactions. This new perspective will be used to update the legal debate. 
 
In the traditional framework of developed and developing countries’ relationship, also 
referred as the North-South model,147 the North dominated the South economically 
because of the Southern structural dependence on Northern trade and finance.148 
Regarding trade aspects, the unbalanced interaction between the two groups derived 
from the fact that the South was represented by poor developing countries which 
specialised in the production and export of a narrow range of primary commodities 
while the North was represented by rich industrialised economies which specialised in 
the production and export of manufacturing goods.149 From the financial perspective, the 
traditional framework was based on a similar argument of dependence between North 
and South: the major direction of the flow of capital has been from the North to the 
South characterising developing countries as capital importers and developed countries 
as capital exporters.  
 
This standard perspective of trade and finance in relation to developed and developing 
countries is out of date. Both groups of countries have gone through several structural 
changes during the period of globalisation transforming the nature of interactions 
between them from one of unidirectional dependence to multifaceted 
interdependence.150 In this regard, the current aspects of the trade relationship are better 
understood since many developing countries export not only a narrow range of primary 
commodities but also manufactured goods. The financial aspects are more complicated 
since studies have adopted different premises to investigate in a consistent manner the 
evolving movement of capital between developed and developing countries, pointing 
out diverse outcomes. Even though the new perspective has been broadly accepted, i.e. 
that the nature of interactions between developed and developing countries corresponds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 R. Findlay, ‘The Terms of Trade and Equilibrium Growth in the World Economy’ (1980) American 
Economic Review, Vol. 70 (June) 291. 
148 C. Akm and M. Ayhan Kose, ‘Changing Nature of North-South Linkages: Stylized Facts and 
Explanations’ (2007) IMF Working Paper WP/07/280, 13. 
149 ibid. 
150 ibid 14. 
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to a multifaceted interdependence, its effective meaning on finance (i.e. flow of capital) 
is not entirely comprehended hampering the application of this new perspective to other 
discussions such as international taxation. 151  Furthermore, it is not possible to 
comprehend entirely the financial aspects of the relationship between developing and 
developed countries without considering the position of tax havens. This signifies that in 
order to understand the current profile of the international flow of capital and for them 
to adopt new premises to re-discuss international taxation it is necessary to examine the 
financial flows from the perspective of three groups of countries: developed, developing 
and tax havens.  
 
The new arguments introduced in the discussion of international taxation are based on a 
qualitative analysis of the flow of capital between developed, developing countries and 
tax havens. Main trends on the flow of capital will be compared and their theoretical and 
practical importance debated. However, it has to be clear that the objective here is not to 
predict an exact value of total flows and stocks per group of countries, but only to offer 
a plausible estimate of measures that can reflect what is going on among these groups of 
countries in terms of financial flows to extrapolate those findings to the legal debate. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
In this section, the methodology adopted to analyse the international flow of capital and 
the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities is described, presenting the following main 
elements: (i) types of data required; (ii) sources of data available; (iii) limitations of the 
data available; (iv) alternative sources of data of stocks of foreign assets and liabilities; 
and (v) classification of countries and premises of the analysis performed.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Economic studies have already challenged the traditional assumption of North/South flows, based on 
the Lucas Paradox which examined the lack of flows from rich to poor countries. R. Lucas, ‘Why Doesn’t 
Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?’ (1990) 80 American Economic Review 92. This question has 
been constantly examined by the economic literature.  L. Alfaro, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and V. Volosovych, 
‘Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?’ (2005) 11901 NBER Working Paper Series 1. 
L. Alfaro, S. Kalemli-Ozcan and V. Volosovych, ‘Capital Flow in a Globalized World: The Role of 
Policies and Institutions?’ (2005) 19011 NBER Working Paper Series 1. 
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In order to investigate the international flow of capital among countries, there are two 
important sources of data: (i) look at economic transactions of an economy with the rest 
of the world; and (ii) look at the stock of foreign assets and liabilities that a country 
accumulates over the years. The difference between the two sets of data is that the first 
one provides information only about economic transactions among nations, i.e. 
economic flows that reflect the creation, transformation, exchange, transfer or extinction 
of economic value which involves changes in ownership of goods and/or financial 
assets, the provision of services or the provision of labour and capital;152 whereas the 
second one provides the value and composition of the stock of an economy’s financial 
assets and liabilities at a specific date such as year-end. A change in stocks during a year 
can be attributed to: (i) transactions (flows); (ii) to valuation changes reflecting 
adjustments in exchange rates, prices, etc.; (iii) or to other adjustments.153 In other 
words, while the first set of data reflects only the value of economic transactions; the 
second alternative compiles the value of economic transactions plus other variables such 
as revaluations arising from price changes and/or exchange rate changes and other 
changes in the volume of assets (e.g. write-off claims, reclassification of assets, etc.).154  
 
From a tax perspective what really matters is the net position of a country in each type 
of flow, i.e. the difference between inflows and outflows of each financial asset held by 
the country. The annuals flows, however, can vary significantly between two 
consecutive years, making it hard to identify a consistent trend in the period analysed. 
On the other hand, even though stocks do not reflect merely the inflows and outflows of 
capital, as explained in the previous paragraph, they can provide a reliable estimation of 
the accumulated flows received by a country. The difference between the stocks allows 
us to understand whether the country has a tendency to import or to export capital in the 
long-term. Hence, the analysis of the annual flows as well as the stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities held by countries will provide complementary information to analyse the 
financial transactions among developed, developing countries and tax havens. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 IMF, Balance of Payments Manual (5th Edition, IMF 1993) 6. Hereinafter referred as ‘BOPS Manual’. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/BOPman.pdf> accessed 25 November 2008. 
153 ibid 7. 
154 IMF, Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual (IMF, 2000) 94. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/mfs/manual/index.htm>  accessed 25 November 2008. 
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The limitation of the analysis proposed in this chapter rests on the availability of data 
regarding the flows of capital among countries as well as the stocks of financial assets 
and liabilities held by them. The main source of these data is the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
 
The IMF publishes the International Financial Statistics (IFS), which compiles data from 
the IMF’s different sources: the Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS), Government 
Finance, etc. BOPS provide data on the annual flows of capital and stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities (i.e. International Investment Position’s data – IIP). The Balance of 
Payments is a statistical statement that systematically summarises, for a certain period of 
time, the economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world,155 while the 
IIP compiles a statistical statement of the value and composition of the stock of an 
economy’s financial assets and liabilities at a specific date such as year-end.156 BOPS’ 
information is harmonised, which helps one to understand the linkages between flows 
and the stocks. The basic principle that underpins the Balance of Payments is that all 
entries should result in a consistent body of positive and negative values with a total 
sum of zero.157 In the next paragraphs, the classification and standard components of the 
Balance of Payments and IIP will be briefly explained since the analysis of the 
international flows and stocks follows this classification.158 
 
The standard components of the Balance of Payments are composed of two main groups 
of accounts: the current account which pertains to goods and services, income and 
current transfers; and the capital and financial account which pertains to (i) capital 
transfers and acquisition or disposal of non-produced, non-financial assets and (ii) 
financial assets and liabilities. The capital and financial account has two major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 IMF, ‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 6. 
156 ibid. 
157 ibid 38. 
158 Even though the quantitative analysis of stocks will use IMF data only indirectly, since the primary 
source of the present analysis is the database developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, the backbone of their 
database is the IMF information and, therefore, the understanding of its classification and components is 
necessary. 
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components (the capital account and the financial account) in which assets represent 
claims on non-residents, and liabilities represent indebtedness to non-residents. All 
valuation changes and all other changes that do not reflect transactions in foreign assets 
and liabilities are excluded from the capital and financial account but reflected in the 
international investment position.159  
 
To this extent, it is important to understand what claims on non-residents and 
indebtedness to non-residents of financial account represent in terms of flows and 
stocks160:  
 
Table 3.1 – Countries Classification  
Financial 
Account 
Country’s profile Flow of 
Capital 
Stocks’ position Income yield 
Claims on non-
residents 
Capital exporter Outflow (-) Asset Inflow 
Indebtedness to 
non-residents 
Capital importer Inflow (+) Liability Outflow 
 
The classification of standard components in the financial account and in the IIP is 
based on the following criteria: all components are classified according to type of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 IMF, ‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 38-40. 
160 Other relevant concepts that need to be understood are the meaning of resident and non-resident 
adopted in the context of the Balance of Payments. According to the BOP Manual, the concept of 
residence is based on the identification of the centre of economic interest of individuals and enterprises. 
The term enterprise is explained by the terms: corporation and quasi-corporation. To this extent, a 
corporation means a legal entity created for the purpose of producing goods or services for the market; 
whereas a quasi-corporation is an unincorporated enterprise that is operated as if it were a separate 
corporation with a complete set of accounts. Regarding the meaning of residence, an individual has a 
centre of economic interest and he is said to be resident in a country when he maintains, within the 
country, a dwelling or succession of dwellings treated and used by members of the household as their 
principal. An individual may cease being a resident when he works continuously for one year or more in a 
foreign country. On the other hand, an enterprise is said to have a centre of economic interest and, 
consequently, to be a resident of a country when it is engaged in a significant amount of production of 
goods and/or services there or when the enterprise owns land or buildings located there. The enterprise 
must maintain at least one production establishment in the country and must plan to operate the 
establishment indefinitely or over a long period of time. Based on the concepts described above, it 
becomes clear that the BOPS’ concept of resident and non-resident will probably differ from the concepts 
adopted by countries’ domestic tax legislations in certain situations. ibid 20-5. 
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investment or by functional subdivision (direct investment161, portfolio investment162, 
other investment163, and reserve assets164). The positive aspect of this classification is 
that it will allow an analysis of the flows and the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities 
based on type of investment, which is necessary from a tax perspective since different 
principles are adopted, depending on the type of investment. 
 
Another important component of the Balance of Payments is the net errors and 
omissions account.165 Although the application of the main principle that underlies the 
entries in the Balance of Payments accounts is that all entries must achieve a net 
(conceptual) total of zero, in practice, the resulting balance will almost inevitably show 
a net credit or a net debit. That balance corresponds to the value reported in the net 
errors and omissions account. In other words, the value described in the net errors and 
omissions account is an offset amount to the overstatement or understatement of the 
recorder entries. For instance, if the net value of the entries is a credit, the ‘balancing’ 
value in the net errors and omissions account will be shown as a debit in the same 
amount.166 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the IMF is a useful source of data, most information is 
available from 1994 since the data in the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics are 
compiled and presented in accordance with the standard components of the fifth edition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Direct Investment is defined as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a direct investor, 
who is resident in another country, owns 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an 
incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). ibid 86. 
162 Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities, excluding any of the 
instruments included in the categories of direct investment and reserve assets. Debt securities are divided 
into bonds and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives. ibid 91. 
163 Other investment covers short-and long-term trade credits; loans (including use of Fund credit, loans 
from the Fund and loans associated with financial leases); currency and deposits. ibid 95. 
164 Reserve assets cover transactions in assets that are considered by monetary authorities of an economy 
to be available for use in funding payments imbalances. The items covered are: monetary gold, SDRs, 
reserve position in the Fund, foreign exchange assets (currency deposits and securities) and other claims. 
Valuations changes in reserve assets are excluded, along with counterparts to such changes. Also excluded 
are the allocations or cancellations of SDRs, the monetarisation or demonetarisation of gold and 
counterpart entries. These changes, which do not constitute transactions, are reflected in the international 
investment position. ibid 97. 
165 NEO concept is very important since it also represents a measure of capital flight discussed in the next 
chapter. 
166 ibid 38. 
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of the Balance of Payments Manual, (BPM5), which the IMF published in September 
1993.167 This means that although some series may have been backwardly revised in 
pre-1994 years, many are not, particularly for developing countries and tax havens. 
Therefore, the IMF will basically provide data from 1994 to 2007. 
 
Despite the importance of the flow of capital for international macroeconomics, few 
studies have compiled a complete series of data that allow a consistent analysis of the 
magnitude and proportion of this flow between developed, developing countries and tax 
havens. Hence, to investigate the behaviour of the international flow of capital among 
these three groups of countries, data from the Balance of Payments compiled by the IMF 
will be used.  
 
In relation to stocks, there were some previous studies that tried to improve the figures 
provided by the IMF and by other international organisations. Kennedy was one of the 
pioneers to investigate the stock of foreign assets and liabilities in 1980. He analysed a 
sample of 98 countries from 1962 to 1977. His objective was to interpret international 
financial relationships in the context of a comprehensive conceptual framework. He 
identified the difficulties of working with different sources of data and opted for 
accumulating annual capital flows to measure stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held 
by countries. His strategy had some shortcomings also recognised by the author, since 
the accumulation of annual capital flows from the Balance of Payments disregard two 
important components of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities: (i) revaluation of 
assets; and (ii) exchange rate changes. 168  Despite the limitation presented in his 
methodology, his attempt to measure the stock of foreign assets and liabilities shed light 
on the importance of research in this area and the difficulties imposed by asymmetries of 
data from different sources. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 In 2009, the IMF published the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Manual (BPM6). However, until 2012 data will be presented in IMF statistical publications on a 
fifth edition basis. IMF, ‘IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics Annual Report’ (2009) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bop/2009/ar/bopcom09.pdf> accessed 21 February 2011. 
168 R. V. Kennedy, ‘External Balance Sheets: Concepts and Empirical Approximation’, (1980) 26 The 
Review of Income and Wealth, 253-91. 
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Sinn developed a more complete dataset, which comprised the annual net external asset 
positions for 145 countries for the period 1970-1987. The objective of his research was 
to explain the changes on the net exchange asset positions during the 1980s as well as 
the magnitude and the implications of such changes, which have been frequently 
misstated and misunderstood.  His statistical methods to measure the stock of foreign 
assets and liabilities were more accurate than those used by Kennedy, since Sinn 
considered: (i) changes in asset prices; (ii) exchange rates; and (iii) consumer price level 
to interpret his results. The two main sources of data used by Sinn were: national 
statistical publications and statistics of international organisations. The data extracted 
from these sources (i.e. stock of foreign assets and liabilities) were presented by 
economy’s sectors: central bank, deposit money banks, private households and 
enterprises, and public authorities. His focus was on sectors of the economy even though 
some information about type of investment can also be extracted from his database.169 
 
Sinn found difficulties in understanding and interpreting data from international 
organisations, due to the lack of detailed information, however his main constraint was 
the missing data of developing countries. In order to overcome this obstacle he 
developed very interesting methods to estimate foreign assets held by the private sector. 
His assumption was that in some developing countries the private sector owns 
considerable amounts of external assets that do not appear in official statistics. 
Therefore, an alternative to estimate the private external assets of developing countries 
was to consider that part of the unrecorded capital flows was registered in the net errors 
and omissions account. A random part of the net error and omission account was used to 
estimate the private external assets of developing countries. In another alternative, he 
added to the random part of the net errors and omissions account the value of capital 
exports reported in the BOPS classified as ‘other short term capital account’. The motive 
for adding this account is the assumption that it also represented an important channel 
for capital fight, i.e. unrecorded capital flows.	  170 Sinn made a remarkable contribution 
to the estimation of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities when he developed these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169  S. Sinn, Net External Asset Positions of 145 Countries (Kieler Studien, n. 24, Institut fur 
Weltwirtscharft an der Universitat Kiel, J.C.B. Mohr, 1990). 
170 ibid 63-8. 
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alternative methods to measure the stock of foreign assets in developing countries, since 
missing data, as already mentioned, is the main limitation in this area of research. His 
methods have been incorporated in recent studies, as presented in the next paragraph.  
 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti have also investigated the stock of foreign assets and liabilities 
and they published an outstanding contribution to this area of research in 2001. The 
objective of their study was to examine the impact of the integration of capital markets 
and the composition of international investments (i.e. equity and debt) in developed and 
developing countries. They constructed estimates of foreign assets and liabilities and 
their equity and debt subcomponents for a sample of 67 industrial and developing 
countries from 1970 to 1998. The figures were based on stock measures when available 
complemented by cumulative capital flows with appropriate valuation adjustments (i.e. 
market prices and exchange rates). The data were classified and presented by type of 
investment: FDI, Portfolio Investment and Debt.171  
 
Comparing Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s study to Sinn’s research, it can be noted that the 
structure of the data has been rearranged, i.e. from sectors of the economy (Sinn’s 
perspective) to types of investment (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s approach). Another 
important comparison between the two studies is the use of the account of net errors and 
omissions as an alternative to supply missing data. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti explained 
that this account measures (net) unrecorded transactions that could reflect errors of the 
current account, the financial account or both. If it reflects unrecorded trade 
transactions, we should adjust the current account accordingly. If it reflects unrecorded 
financial account transactions, we should add it to capital flows. However, they 
assumed, following Sinn’s argument about capital fight, i.e. that not all outflows are 
reflected in official data, that net errors and omissions capture unrecorded capital flows, 
given the prevalence of capital flight in several developing countries for long periods of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 P.R. Lane and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations: Measures of Foreign Assets and 
Liabilities for Industrial and Developing Countries’, (2001) 55 Journal of International Economics, 263-
94. 
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their sample. This signifies that net errors and omissions were treated as changes in the 
stock of debt assets held abroad by domestic residents.172 
 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti expanded the use of different sources of data: BOPS and IFS 
from IMF; World Bank’s World Debt Tables and Global Development Finance (GDF); 
the OECD statistics on external indebtedness; the BIS’s data on banks’ assets and 
liabilities by creditor and debtor; and Sinn’s data. The necessity of all these different 
sources of data to estimate the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held by countries 
emphasises the complexity involved in this task, since data from different sources are 
not fully compatible, requiring further adjustments to provide information within a 
consistent framework. Besides that, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti cautiously designed 
methods to work with these data.  For instance, regarding valuation issues, i.e. the 
impact of price and exchange rate changes, they adopted different methods, depending 
on the type of investment, which demonstrates the accuracy of their work173. The effort 
to develop this methodology to estimate the stock of foreign assets and liabilities 
contributes to the argument that the main limitation for research in this area derives from 
incompatible sources of data and missing information.  
 
In February 2007, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti published a review of their 2001 work with 
improved estimates of the stock of foreign assets and liabilities.174 The availability of 
IMF’s IIP information175 for a larger sample of countries and IMF’s Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey176 (CPIS) contributed to the improvement of their database. 
As a result, country coverage and time coverage were enlarged, i.e. the new study was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 ibid 266. 
173 ibid 269-72. 
174 P. R. Lane and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended 
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 - 2004’, (2007) 73 Journal of International Economics, 
223-250.  
175 An increased number of countries published their IIP (in the first study only 20 countries in their 
sample were publishing IIP, whereas in 2007 the number increased to 80 countries). This new data 
allowed them to use flows to extend the time series backwards, rather than accumulating flows and going 
forward. ibid 231.  
176 The CPIS covers the geographical allocation of portfolio investment of over 60 investor countries in 
over 220 destination countries. 
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extended to include 145177 countries from 1970 to 2004, as well as more categories of 
investment were available to estimate the data: Portfolio Investment, subdivided into 
equity securities and debt securities; FDI; Other Investment (which includes debt 
instruments such as loans, deposits and trade credits); Financial Derivatives (new 
category) and Reserve Assets. 
 
The 2007 database built up by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti represents a more consistent 
source of data to analyse the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities than the IMF’s 
database because it was revised backward to 1970. Consequently, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti’s database is going to be adopted to analyse the stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities held by developed, developing countries and tax havens. The complete dataset 
is available online, which make it possible to access not only the figures, but also the 
identification of limitations inherent to the sample of countries selected by them.178  
 
In sum, the analysis of the flows is based on the IMF Balance of Payments’ data, 
whereas the analysis of the stocks is supported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s 
database.179 Due to the fact that different sources are used, the sample of countries in 
each analysis will differ in a certain way. The size of the samples relies on the 
availability of data. To this extent, the sample of countries used to analyse the flows is 
composed of: 100 developing countries,180 22 high income OECD countries181 and 28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Even though the sample was extended to encompass 145 countries, complete series of data are 
available for 91 countries; for 54 countries data are reported for shorter periods. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 230. 
178 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip> accessed 28 November 2008.  
179 It is important to note that the evolution of stocks will also allow some inferences about the inherent 
flows. 
180 Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People's Dem.Rep., Libya, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Republic of Yemen and 
Zambia. 
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tax havens182. On the other hand, to analyse the stocks, the sample of countries extracted 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s study is determined by: 109 developing countries183, 22 
high income OECD countries184 and 14 tax havens185. 
 
But what are the criteria to classify countries as high-income OECD countries, tax 
havens and developing countries? High income OECD countries follow the World 
Bank’s definition established at the World Development Indicators (April 2008) which 
define this group as those economies in which 2006 GNI per capita was $11,116 or 
more (Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United 
Kingdom; United States). Even though Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland were 
classified in the high income OECD group, they were also classified as tax havens, 
according to the list provided next.186 Consequently, these countries were accounted 
only in the tax haven group, having the high income OECD group composed of 22 
economies. 
 
There is no agreed-upon definition of tax havens. The list of tax havens presented next 
reflects countries with the following drivers: (i) no or nominal taxes; (ii) lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  The other OECD countries were classified as developing countries: 
Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey; and tax havens: 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
182 Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Hong Kong, Macao, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Dominica, Grenada, Ireland, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, 
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Switzerland and Vanuatu. 
183 90 countries in common with the flows’ sample, adding Algeria, Brunei Darussalan, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Iran, Malawi, Qatar, Taiwan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.  
184 The same sample of 22 countries adopted in the flows’ analysis. 
185 13 countries in common with the flows’ sample (Bahrain, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, 
Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland), plus Lebanon. 
186 Switzerland and Ireland also have substantial domestic activity besides acting as tax havens. However, 
the scale that financial services are provided to non-residents is out of proportion to the size of their 
domestic economy. In fact, these tax havens can also be classified as Offshore Financial Centers. A. 
Zorome, ‘Concept of Offshore Financial Centers: In Search of an Operational Definition’ (2007) IMF 
Working Paper WP/07/87 1, 15. 
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effective exchange of information with foreign tax authorities; and (iii) lack of 
transparency. Different studies have adopted these drivers to identify tax havens. To this 
extent, the United States Government Accountability Office developed the GAO Report, 
in which a list of tax havens based on the combination of three other lists created by 
governmental, international and academic sources was presented. The outcome was a 
list of 50 jurisdictions (Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook 
Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Macao, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, 
Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, 
Seychelles, Singapore, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands, US Virgin Islands and Vanuatu). The list was 
adopted by this study to identify countries as tax havens since it reflects the drivers 
above and it contains jurisdictions used by individuals and corporations to evade and 
avoid taxes.187  
 
It is important to mention that some tax havens are also Offshore Financial Centers 
(OFC). Similar to the absence of definition of tax havens, there is no agreed-upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  The GAO Report combined three different studies to identify tax havens: (i) the OECD’s definition, 
(ii) National Bureau of Economic Research working paper (D. Dharmapala and J. R. Hines, Jr., ‘Which 
Countries Become Tax Havens?’ National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12802  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w12802> accessed 17 August 2011), and (iii) a US District Court order 
granting leave for the Internal Revenue Service to serve a ‘John Doe’ summons. Regarding the OECD’s 
definition, currently (2010) there is no jurisdiction classified as uncooperative tax havens (A Progress 
Report on the Jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in implementing the Internationally 
Agreed Tax Standard - Progress made as at 3rd September, 2010, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/43606256.pdf> accessed 17 August 2011). The GAO’s Report was 
published in December 2008 and it explained that even though the majority of countries initially classified 
as tax havens had committed themselves to improve transparency and exchange tax information, in 
practice the OECD has not provided a clear picture of which countries are making real progress. This 
situation justified the inclusion in the GAO’s Report of 38 jurisdictions listed in the 2008 OECD’s list of 
cooperative and uncooperative tax havens. The effectiveness of the international standard to curb offshore 
finance is still not clear, therefore, the justification used by the GAO’s Report to include not only 
uncooperative but also cooperative jurisdictions to identify a list of tax havens is in line with the objective 
of the present study.  
The United States Government Accountability Office, ‘GAO Report to Congressional Requesters. 
International Taxation. Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions 
Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions’ (2008), 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09157.pdf> accessed 10 September 2010.  
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definition of OFC. Notwithstanding, the IMF tried to develop a definition based on the 
following parameters: (i) jurisdictions that have financial institutions engaged primarily 
in business with non-residents; (ii) financial systems with external assets and liabilities 
out of proportion to domestic economies; and (iii) low or nil taxation; secrecy 
provisions; and lax regulation.188 Based on the third parameter, it became clear that 
some OFC have also characteristics of tax havens. Another outcome from the IMF’s 
definition is that there are not only regulatory aspects defining OFC, but also a 
macroeconomic feature (ii). Consequently, it is possible to identify OFC based on the 
comparison of financial assets and liabilities held by countries to their GDP. Zorome 
developed a study based on this argument and proved that 80% of the sample of OFC 
selected by the IMF have financial assets and liabilities on a scale that is out-of-
proportion with the size of their domestic economies.189 Considering the sample of tax 
havens selected by this study from the perspective of Zorome’s outcomes, we can infer 
that a significant number of tax havens analysed here are also OFC (e.g. Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Guernsey, Ireland, 
Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, 
Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, and Vanuatu).  
 
Remaining countries were classified in the third group (i.e. developing countries’ group) 
if they did not fulfil the criteria to be included in the other groups (tax havens and high 
income OECD countries). There are a vast number of developing countries with 
significant differences. However, the classification in subcategories would not add 
complementary information for the analysis performed. Thus, the developing countries’ 
group represents a less homogeneous group than the high income OECD group. The 
adopted division in only three categories (developing countries, high income OECD and 
tax havens) is enough to obtain the outcomes required to perform the present analysis. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 IMF: Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, ‘Offshore Financial Centers’ (2000) IMF 
Background Paper, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm> accessed 27 
February 2011. 
189 Zorome (n 186), 14-7  
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It is essential to be aware that the outcomes of the analysis proposed in this chapter will 
reveal trends in the international flows and stocks held by these three groups of 
countries. Trends have to be evaluated with caution since they represent the average of 
the group, which can also be distorted by specific countries (i.e. outliers, in statistics 
terms). Thus, in the analysis of each group, countries that might be ‘distorting’ the 
trends will be identified and tested separately.  
 
A last observation refers to the fact that the data analysed refer only to a sample of 
countries which means that the total values presented here do not reflect the entire 
world’s data. 190  The samples, however, reflect the largest amount of information 
available for each group of countries. There were further limitations on the availability 
of information on tax havens since most of them do not provide information for the IMF 
and other international organisations. Thus, the outcomes of tax havens would be even 
more relevant if data of a larger sample were available. 
 
3.3. Analysis of the database 
 
The objective of this analysis is to identify the behaviour of the international flow of 
capital between developing countries, high income OECD countries and tax havens as 
well as the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities (i.e. cumulative position of these 
flows) held by these groups of countries. The economic data will shed some light on 
their national interest in the flow of capital and, consequently, it will contribute to 
rearrange the discussion on international taxation and developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 McKinsey Global Institute has estimated that the World Financial Assets have soared from $12 trillion 
in 1980 to $195 trillion of dollars in 2007. D. Farrell, ‘New Thinking for a New Financial Order’ (2008) 
Harvard Business Review Sep. 2008, 26-7. 
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3.3.1. Flows of Capital from 1994 to 2007191 
 
 3.3.1.1. FDI 
 
The table below summarises the main figures of the flows of FDI from 1994 to 2007.192 
All figures are presented in millions of US dollars. Figures provided in the table 
represent the average of each period.193 In order to highlight the tendencies identified in 
the tables, charts are provided next. 
 
Table 3.3.1.1. (a) – FDI Flows from 1994 to 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Complete dataset of the figures is provided in the Annexes. 
192 IMF, IFS, ESDS International, University of Manchester. 
193 The last line of the table presents the grand total values, which represents the total of averages. 
Averages were adopted to calculate each period figure since it can represent in a more accurate matter 
what happened in a certain period, avoiding the random selection of a specific year to represent a period 
which has the risk to be an outlier, providing distorted information.   
194 BCIMRS represents Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and South Africa. Due to the fact that most 
investments in the developing world are concentrated in these countries located in four different 
continents, this study segregated them to demonstrate the concentration of investment in these few 
countries. 
 I. FDI Inflows – Average 
II. FDI Outflows – 
Average 
III. Net of FDI flows –
average 
Groups 94-99 00-07 94-99 00-07 94-99 00-07 
High Income OECD 325,291 674,976 (451,170) (851,354) (125,879) (176,378) 
Tax Havens 69,489 214,896 (64,541) (234,145) 4,947 (19,248) 
Other developing 
countries 63,645 137,565 (7,235) (38,095) 56,410 99,469 
BCIMRS194 73,902 138,715 (6,664) (38,527) 67,237 100,188 
Total developing 
countries 137,547 276,279 (13,900) (76,622) 123,648 199,657 
Total of all Groups 532,326 1,166,151 (529,611) (1,162,120) 2,715 4,031 
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Chart 3.3.1.1. (a) – FDI Flows: distribution among groups 
 
 
Chart 3.3.1.1. (b) – FDI Flows: percentage of each group in the total 
 
 
The table above is subdivided in three items: (I.) Inflows of FDI; (II.) Outflows of FDI; 
and (III.) Net value of FDI (i.e. Inflows – Outflows). Data are presented by groups of 
countries already explained.195 The group of developing countries is, however, divided 
in two, to emphasise the difference between the FDI received by large developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 The list of countries included in each group is provided in footnotes 180 to 182. 
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economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and South Africa) and the other 
developing countries (94 economies).  
 
The total amount of both inflows and outflows of FDI have remarkably increased from 
the first period (94-99) to the second one (00-07). In the first period the average of 
inflows and outflows were US$532,326 million and US$529,611 million per year, 
respectively; whereas in the second period the average increased to US$1,166,151 
million and US$1,162,120 million. Developing an index that analyses the variation of 
total flows (inflows plus outflows of FDI) in relation to countries’ GDP, we can infer 
that the proportion of the flows in relation to GDP is significant higher in the second 
period (2000-07) than in the first period (1994-99). The figures below make clear this 
argument: 
 
Table 3.3.1.1. (b) – Variation of FDI Flows per GDP 
Index [(Total flows)/GDP]/ [(Total flows 1994-99)/GDP 1994-99]*100 
Groups of Countries 2000-07 
High Income OECD 150 
Tax Havens 247 
Developing countries 145 
Total of all groups 160 
 
The table above puts in evidence the overwhelming variation of flows per GDP in tax 
havens. The proportion of flows to GDP of the second period [2000-07] in relation to 
the first one [1994-99: base-year] increased by 147%, demonstrating that the rise in 
flows was significantly higher than the rise in GDP. Even though the other two groups 
[high income OECD and developing countries] also had a significant increase, the 
magnitude of the tax havens’ figures is considerable higher. This situation might be 
explained by the fact that a significant number of tax havens in the sample are also OFC 
which macroeconomic feature refers to their financial assets and liabilities out-of-
proportion to their domestic economics.  
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Regarding distribution of flows, what we see is a massive concentration of inflows and 
outflows in high income OECD countries, as represented in the charts. The net of FDI 
flows of this group demonstrates that outflows are higher than inflows, contributing to 
the argument that these countries export FDI to the other groups. Although the share of 
inflows received by them have not fluctuated significantly (61% to 58%); their share of 
outflows were reduced by more than 10% (85% to 73%). This reduction in the share of 
outflows of high income OECD countries was compensated by the increased 
participation of tax havens as exporters of FDI since they improved their share of 
outflows of FDI from 12% to 20% in relation to the total outflow of FDI. Therefore, one 
possible explanation to this situation might be the fact that high income OECD countries 
are exporting FDI to other countries through tax havens, as they are usually used as 
conduits, i.e. intermediaries.  
 
Another interesting aspect regarding the flows of FDI in high income OECD countries is 
the fact that most FDI circulates only among their economies. The net balance of flows 
is considerably low when compared to the gross amount that flows in their economies. 
Therefore, their position as exporters of FDI to developing countries only represents a 
small fraction of the amount of FDI that circulates in their economies. Most FDI is 
allocated in their economies. 
 
The group of tax havens represents the one with more significant changes since they not 
only increased in a substantial way their share of FDI inflows (13% to 18%) but also 
their share of FDI outflows (12% to 20%). The net values of FDI in tax havens are very 
low compared to the other groups (for instance, from 1994 to 1999 the net values 
compared to total inflows in high income OECD countries and developing countries 
were 39% and 90%, respectively; whereas in tax havens were only 7%), demonstrating a 
bilateral characteristic of flows received by them. The ‘bilateral’ characteristic of tax 
havens’ flows might also be justified by the fact that they are working as intermediaries 
to the flow of FDI around the world. Another characteristic of tax havens’ flows refers 
to the fact that their net flows became negative in the second period analysed (00-07) 
which implies that they inverted their tendency of importing more FDI to exporting it.  
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Going further on the analysis of tax havens, data demonstrated that a significant share of 
FDI is concentrated in Luxembourg [from 2000-07 Luxembourg received 61% of total 
inflows and 59% of total outflows on average]. These figures compared to the size of 
this country’s domestic economies contribute to the argument that it might be working 
as conduit of FDI in Europe.   
 
On the other hand, the inflows of FDI have slightly decreased to developing countries in 
percentage terms (26% to 24%) due to the reduction of share of inflows to BCIMRS. 
Regarding distribution of FDI, although the BCIMRS group represents only six 
developing countries in relation to the other group that gathers 94 developing 
economies, the former has received more inflows of FDI than the latter. This fact 
demonstrates a substantial concentration of FDI inflows in only a few economies since 
1994, even though concentration has gone down during the period analysed. The 
outflows of FDI from developing countries are less expressive though it has increased in 
the last decade (from 3% to 7%). These data contribute to the argument that FDI flows 
in developing countries have become more bilateral. This signifies that the net balance 
of flows in developing countries is falling, which contributes to the argument that even 
though developing countries are still importing FDI, they are not exclusively importers. 
 
What becomes clear from the analysis of FDI flows from 1994 to 2007 is that even 
though developing countries have maintained their position as capital importers of this 
type of investment, their net flow of FDI has decreased, demonstrating that they are not 
only importers of FDI but also exporters. Most FDI is still concentrated in high income 
OECD countries and the net of flows characterises them as capital exporters. However, 
only a reduced amount of FDI is exported to other countries when compared to the gross 
amount of FDI that circulates in high income OECD’s economies. This signifies that 
most FDI circulates only in high income OECD economies, demonstrating that they do 
not only export FDI but also import a significant amount. The remarkable change refers 
to tax havens, which have significantly increased their share of FDI flows. To this 
extent, even excluding Switzerland and Ireland, which have considerable domestic 
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economy, the size of the other economies classified as tax havens cannot justify the 
amount of FDI that flows to their jurisdictions. This situation indicates that they have 
been increasingly used as conduits to allocate FDI around the world. Considering this 
scenario, it is not possible anymore to think of the international flow of FDI based 
exclusively on developing countries and developed countries; it is also necessary to 
evaluate the position of tax havens as intermediaries of the flow, and consequently, how 
they have interfered with the direction of the flow. 
 
 3.3.1.2. Portfolio Investment 
 
Following the same arrangement of data as the previous section, the table below 
summarises the main figures of the flows of Portfolio Investment196 from 1994 to 
2007.197 All figures are presented in millions of US dollars. Figures provided in the table 
represent the average of each period. Charts are also provided to illustrate trends 
identified. 
 
Table 3.3.1.2. (a) Portfolio Flows from 1994 to 2007 
 I. Portfolio Inflow – average 
I. Portfolio Outflow – 
average III. Net of Portfolio 
Groups 94-99 00-07 94-99 00-07 94-99 00-07 
High Income OECD 709,428 1,834,122 (598,567) (1,268,129) 110,861 565,993 
Tax Havens 89,118 365,523 (133,896) (390,402) (44,778) (24,879) 
Other developing country 22,784 36,550 (8,321) (58,471) 14,463 (21,921) 
BCIMRS 40,239 45,788 (7,339) (27,359) 32,900 18,430 
Total developing countries 63,023 82,338 (15,660) (85,829) 47,363 (3,491) 
Total of all groups 861,569 2,281,984 (748,124) (1,744,361) 113,446 537,623 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities; the latter are divided 
into bonds and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives. It is different from the data of 
stocks that treat portfolio investment and other investments together; in the current section other 
investments (of which major categories are transactions in currency and deposits, loans and trade credits) 
are not covered. 
197 IMF, IFS, ESDS International, University of Manchester. 
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Chart 3.3.1.2. (a) Portfolio Flows: distribution among groups 
 
 
Chart 3.3.1.2. (b) Portfolio Flows: percentage of each group in the total 
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Inflows – Outflows). The total amount of both inflows and outflows of Portfolio 
Investment have increased remarkably from the first period (94-99) to the second one 
(00-07). In the first period the average of inflows and outflows were US$861,569 
million and US$748,124 million, respectively; whereas in the second period the total 
increased to US$2,281,984 million and US$1,744,361 million. The index below allows 
the analysis of the variation of portfolio flows [inflows plus outflows] to GDP of the 
second period in relation to the first. 
 
Table 3.3.1.2. (b) – Variation of Portfolio Flows per GDP 
Index [(Total flows)/GDP]/ [(Total flows 1994-99)/GDP 1994-99]*100 
Groups of Countries 2000-07 
High Income OECD 181 
Tax Havens 250 
Developing countries 133 
Total of all groups 183 
 
The outcomes demonstrate that the variation of flows to GDP significantly increased in 
the second period [2000-07]. It can be seen that the variation of flows was higher than 
the variation of GDP. Developing countries presented the lowest variation; whereas tax 
havens had the highest one, surpassing the average of all groups.  
 
Focusing on the distribution, the flows of Portfolio Investment are significantly 
concentrated in high income OECD countries. The net of Portfolio Investment flows of 
this group has a positive value [inflows higher than outflows] in both periods, 
contradicting the traditional argument that classifies these countries as capital exporters. 
While the share of inflows received by them has not fluctuated significantly (82% to 
80%); their share of outflows was reduced (80% to 73%). This reduction in the outflows 
of high income OECD countries was compensated by the increased participation of tax 
havens as exporters of Portfolio Investment since they improved their outflows from 
18% to 22% in relation to the total outflow of Portfolio Investment. The charts clearly 
demonstrate these trends. 
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Developing countries are at the margin of these flows of investment. They have not only 
the lowest position in the inflows and outflows but also the flows are concentrated in the 
BCIMRS countries. These six countries have received more portfolio investment on 
average during the periods analysed than the other 94 developing economies. Moreover, 
developing countries have moved from a positive low net position to a negative low net 
position. However, due to their marginal position, it is very hard to make any consistent 
inference about their net values based only on flows. The analysis of stocks will provide 
a better overview of Portfolio Investment in developing countries.  
 
Tax havens have significantly participated in the international flows of Portfolio 
Investment. During the first period [1994-99], tax havens inflows and outflows were 
US$89,118 million and US$133,896 million, whereas during the second period [2000-
07], their inflows and outflows reached the averages of US$365,523 million and 
US$390,402 million, respectively. Their share of the flows as illustrated in the charts as 
well as the variation of flows to GDP put in evidence the relevance of their position on 
the international flow of Portfolio Investment. Even though any inference from net 
values is more consistent when based on stocks, it is worth noting the fact that their net 
flow values have the opposite direction of the net values of the total net flows. In other 
words, whereas inflows surpass outflows in the total net value; the net value of tax 
havens demonstrates that outflows were significantly higher than inflows. One question 
arises here: whether they are used only as conduits, net values would have to be 
residual. Therefore, the fact that official figures indicate higher outflows than inflows is 
suggestive that there might another explanation for those figures.  
 
Portfolio Investment flows have shown tendencies that do not sustain the basic 
assumption of North/South flows, which characterises developing countries as capital 
importers and developed countries as capital exporters. As in the FDI flows, Portfolio 
Investments are very concentrated in high income OECD countries. However, Portfolio 
Investments have a different behaviour since all groups’ total inflows significantly 
surpass outflows (last line of Table 3.3.1.2.(a)). Developing countries have not increased 
their participation in this type of investment flows, whereas tax havens have done that. 
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The gap between inflows and outflows has increased over time as well as the 
participation of tax havens, indicating that there might be a connection between these 
facts, which will be explored later. 
 
In the next section, the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities held by developing 
countries, high income OECD countries and tax havens are examined in order to 
investigate whether the tendencies identified in the flows are confirmed by the stocks 
held by these countries since stocks represent, in a simplified manner, the accumulated 
flows over time. To this extent, it is also possible to make some inferences about the 
flows from movements in stocks. 
 
3.3.2. Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities198 from 1970 to 2004199 
 
3.3.2.1. International Investment Position  
 
The International Investment Position (IIP) of an economy is obtained by subtracting the 
external stocks of financial assets from the stocks of external liabilities. It represents the 
developments and trends in the performance of an economy vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world since it reflects what a country owns in relation to what it owes to other 
nations.200 In this regard, the three tables presented next summarise the data requested to 
estimate the net position of high income OECD countries, tax havens and developing 
countries: the first table (A. Assets) provides the total stock of assets composed of FDI, 
Portfolio Equity, Portfolio Debt plus Other Investments, Financial Derivative and Total 
Reserve minus Gold Assets; the second table (B. Liabilities) introduces the stock of 
liabilities composed of the same types of investment as in the Assets table, except the 
Total Reserve minus Gold stock; and the third table (C.Net) presents the IIP, i.e. the net 
values calculated from the subtraction of the second table from the first table. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 As previously discussed, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s dataset is used in this section since the IIP data 
from BOP is considerably incomplete until 2002, particularly data from developing countries. The 
missing data would compromise the outcomes of the analysis.  
199 Complete dataset of the figures is provided in the Annexes. 
200 IMF, ‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 106. 
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In the following discussion, measures of both assets and liabilities are described as 
stocks to emphasise that they represent total accumulated values and not current flows 
of capital. 
 
The objective of this section is to complement the outcomes identified in the analysis of 
the flows. The present section will investigate how the IIP of each group of countries 
has evolved since 1970, i.e. the net position of countries represented by the difference 
between liability stocks and asset stocks. The results will contribute to the identification 
of new premises to reconsider international taxation from the perspective of these three 
groups of countries. All figures are presented in millions of US dollars and they 
represent the average of each period (i.e. each decade): 
 
Table 3.3.2.1. (a) Total Assets of groups, per decade, from 1970 to 2004 
A.1. Total Assets 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s Growth from 1970 to 2000 
High Income 
OECD 1,088,225 4,632,650 15,451,703 31,642,399 29.1 
Tax Haven 118,319 624,688 2,223,256 6,706,138 56.7 
Developing 
countries 171,889 726,647 1,741,163 3,690,699 21.5 
Total of all 
groups 1,378,432 5,983,985 19,416,122 42,039,235 30.5 
 
Table 3.3.2.1. (b) Total Liabilities of groups, per decade, from 1970 to 2004 
B.1. Total Liabilities 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s Growth from 1970 to 2000 
High Income 
OECD 1,046,603 4,723,158 16,097,829 33,523,724 32.0 
Tax Haven 81,368 486,123 1,775,513 5,898,437 72.5 
Developing 
countries 277,265 1,080,963 2,706,776 4,639,989 16.7 
Total of all 
groups 1,405,236 6,290,244 20,580,118 44,062,150 31.4 
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Table 3.3.2.1. (c) Net values of groups, per decade, from 1970 to 2004 
C.1. IIP = Net value, i.e. Net = Liabilities (B.) - Assets (A.) 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income 
OECD (41,622) 90,508 646,126 1,881,326 
Tax Haven (36,951) (138,565) (447,743) (807,702) 
Developing 
countries 105,377 354,316 965,613 949,290 
Total of all 
groups 26,804 306,259 1,163,995 2,022,915 
 
 
An overview of the tables above allows the extraction of three different types of 
information about the stock of assets and liabilities that will define the IIP of those 
groups of countries: (i) the volume of stock of assets and liabilities; (ii) the distribution 
of those stocks; and (iii) the net value between assets and liabilities. 
  
Analysing the volume of assets and liabilities showed in tables A and B, the outstanding 
trend identified is the increased growth of the amount of assets and liabilities. In the 70s, 
the averages of total assets and liabilities were US$1,378,432 million and US$1,405,236 
million, achieving in the 2000s the averages of US$42,039,235 million and 
US$44,062,150 million, respectively. These figures suggest an incredible rate of 
growth.201    
 
Regarding the distribution of stocks among those groups of countries, stocks are 
considerably concentrated in high income OECD countries. Developing countries 
received only a marginal value of the total amount of stocks that circulate among high 
income OECD countries. For instance, in percentage terms, i.e. comparing the averages 
of assets and liabilities held by developing countries from the 70s to 2000s to the 
averages of the total assets and liabilities, what is verified is a reduction in the 
participation of developing countries (in the 70s they held the average of 12% of total 
assets and 20% of total liabilities; in the 2000s, these percentages decreased to 9% and 
11%, respectively). On the other hand, tax havens increased their participation on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 It is important to note that part of the growth of financial assets and liabilities might be justified by the 
inflation rate of the period.    
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trade of financial assets and liabilities, since in the 70s they held the average of 9% of 
total assets and 6% of total liabilities; in the 2000s, these percentages reached the values 
of 16% and 13%, respectively. It is worth noting, therefore, that the stocks held by them 
confirm the increased participation of tax havens in the flows of investments, as 
examined in the previous section.   
 
The last column of tables 3.3.2.1. (a) and (b) shows the growth of assets and liabilities 
from 1970s to 2000s. The growth of assets and liabilities held by tax havens is 
overwhelming, surpassing the growth of the other two groups. Another relevant aspect 
refers to the comparison between the rate of growth of assets and liabilities for high 
income OECD countries and developing ones. For high income OECD countries, the 
growth of liabilities surpassed the growth of assets; whereas for developing countries the 
opposite situation is verified, i.e. growth of assets has beaten the growth of liabilities. In 
a sense, this situation illustrates the fact that even though developing countries still 
sustain a debt position, which represents their past as debtors of the world, recently they 
have exported more capital than imported it, reversing the old trend of the past. In high 
income OECD countries, on the other hand, besides changing their position from 
creditors of the world to debtors, the rate of growth of liabilities has beaten the rate of 
growth of assets, which signifies that their position as debtors is in line with the current 
trend of inflows surpassing outflows. The tables below demonstrate this situation 
through the annual rate of change in stocks: 
 
Table 3.3.2.1. (d) Annual rate of change in Asset and Liability Stocks 
Annual rate of change of Assets 
Groups 1975 to1985 1985 to 1995 1995 to 2004 
High Income OECD 0.16 0.13 0.07 
Tax Haven 0.18 0.14 0.12 
Developing countries 0.16 0.09 0.08 
Total of all groups 0.16 0.12 0.08 
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Annual rate of change of Liabilities 
Groups 1975 to1985 1985 to 1995 1995 to 2004 
High Income OECD 0.16 0.13 0.08 
Tax Haven 0.20 0.14 0.13 
Developing countries 0.15 0.10 0.06 
Total of all groups 0.16 0.13 0.08 
 
The net values described in table 3.3.2.1. (c) are in fact the IIP of those groups of 
countries. The net values reflect the difference between the stock of liabilities and the 
stock of assets. This analysis opted for presenting the difference between those values as 
positive when liabilities are higher than assets and as negative when assets are higher 
than liabilities.202 The label net creditor and net debtor have been used by different 
authors to describe the net position of countries, according to algebraic sign. In the 
present analysis, positive values are associated with debt position, whereas negative 
values represent credit position. In this regard, the net figures suggest that tax havens 
represent the only group in which the stocks of assets are higher than the stocks of 
liabilities. This signifies that this group is financing other economies around the world, 
which can be high income OECD countries as well as developing countries since in 
these other groups the stocks of liabilities are superior to the stocks of assets. This 
outcome regarding tax havens is very intriguing since they are used mainly as conduits, 
which means that their net stocks ought to show a balanced position and not a creditor 
one. An interesting aspect in high income OECD group is the inversion in their position 
in the 1980s. This is probably due by the fact that in 1985 the US became a net 
debtor.203  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 The reason for that is based on the argument that the stock of liabilities are composed of the inflow of 
capital derived in part from the net purchases or sales of domestic assets by non-residents, whereas the 
stock of assets are determined in part by the outflow of capital resulted from the net purchases or sales of 
foreign assets by residents. In other words, liabilities less assets represent the net investment in the 
country by non-residents. 
203 Sinn (n 169) 27. 
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Besides examining the algebraic sign of countries’ stocks to identify their creditor or 
debtor position, inferences about countries’ position can also be made by analysing the 
variation of stocks from time to time. The focus on this aspect allows us to capture 
subtle changes in countries’ positions that cannot completely reverse their position, but, 
on the other hand, can indicate in the long-term a new tendency in countries’ behaviour 
as capital importers or capital exporters. From this angle, developing countries’ net 
position showed lower stocks in the 2000s (US$949,290 million) than in the 1990s 
(US$965,313 million). This fact can be interpreted as these countries changing their 
position from capital importers to capital exporters. The other two groups’ variations of 
stocks follow the same direction of their position as net creditors or debtors, not 
revealing any new tendency, besides confirming what the algebraic signs have 
demonstrated: high income OECD countries as debtors and tax havens as creditors.  
 
Table 3.3.2.1. (c) also put in evidence the increased value of the discrepancy (net values) 
over the period analysed. In the 70s the gap between stocks of assets and liabilities was 
US$26,804 million (2% of the total stocks of assets and liabilities). In the last decade 
analysed, the gap reached the figure of US$2,022,915 million (5% of the total stocks of 
assets and liabilities).  
 
In addition, it is also necessary to recognise that the discrepancy represents the error in 
total stocks, which might be explained by badly reported data. However, analysing each 
group’s net position we can infer how much each group contributes to this Error and if 
the discrepancy could be explained by other problems affecting the data, not only the 
general excuse of badly reported data. Of course that badly reported data is responsible 
for some part of the Total Error, but examining the net position of each group we might 
be able to provide some extra explanation about the discrepancy that has considerably 
increased in the recent past.  To this extent, the behaviour of tax havens’ stocks requires 
attention, since they better reported assets than liabilities, while developing countries 
and high income OECD have better reported liabilities. This evidence regarding tax 
havens’ stocks contradicts with the traditional assumption that they work as mere 
conduits of the international flow of capital.  
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Another way to analyse the IIP of those groups of countries is comparing the data 
provided in the previous tables of this section with the GDP of these groups. This 
assessment will provide further evidence of the importance of the international trade of 
financial assets and liabilities to each group of countries. The next tables show, in 
percentage terms, the relationship between average of stocks (Assets and Liabilities) and 
average of the GDP of each group, in each decade. 
 
Table 3.3.2.1. (e) Total Assets of groups from 1970 to 2004 
A.2. Average of Total Assets/Average of GDP 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 26% 45% 73% 119% 
Tax Havens 127% 255% 371% 852% 
Developing countries 9% 19% 33% 52% 
B.2. Average of Total Liabilities/Average of GDP 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 25% 46% 77% 126% 
Tax Havens 88% 199% 296% 749% 
Developing countries 15% 29% 51% 65% 
C.2. Average of Discrepancy/Average of GDP 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 1% 1% 3% 7% 
Tax Havens 40% 57% 75% 103% 
Developing countries 6% 9% 18% 13% 
 
The figures show a remarkable increase on the volume of financial assets and liabilities 
traded in the world in relation to GDP. Developing countries’ stocks have not surpassed 
the value of GDP, whereas stocks of assets and liabilities of high income OECD 
countries and tax havens have done so. This fact demonstrated that high income OECD 
countries and tax havens have shown a higher financial integration than developing 
countries.204  
In order to make it easier to grasp the information provided in the previous table, the 
graphic below illustrates the variation of Assets Stocks per GDP in logarithmic scale205, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 234-35. 
205 The adoption of logarithmic scale for this graph is very useful since data cover a large range of values.  
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demonstrating that the growth of assets in relation to the growth of GDP was 
significantly higher in tax havens than in developing countries: 
 
Chart 3.3.2.1. Growth of Total Assets v. Growth of GDP 
 
 
Each spot represents the relationship between average of GDP and of stocks of assets 
held by each group of countries in four different periods: 70s, 80s, 90s and 2000s. That 
is the reason that there are four spots for each group of countries. Lower spots are 
associated with earlier periods; whereas higher spots reflect current periods. Examining 
the outcomes what we see is that until the 1980s, developing countries had higher stocks 
of assets than tax havens. In the 1990s, tax havens’ stocks surpassed developing 
countries, increasing the margin of difference in the 2000s, despite the fact that the 
difference between their levels of GDP remained substantial. Comparing developing 
countries to high income OECD countries, what the graph highlights is the difference in 
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magnitude between their figures, even though a logarithmic scale is adopted, which 
tends to reduce the values to a more manageable range to plot them into the graph. 
Furthermore, the graph also shows that assets growth was faster during the 70s and 80s. 
 
Finally, an important consideration in relation to tax havens group needs to be 
addressed. The analysis of total assets and liabilities identified a discrepancy, which 
grand total in the 2000s (US$2,022,915 million) reflected the impact of tax havens’ net 
asset position (US$807,702 million). If tax havens were not included in the grand total, 
the discrepancy would be significantly higher. On the other hand, the data used to 
analyse stocks had only 14 tax havens, out of a list of almost 50 countries. Following 
this line of reasoning, if more data on tax havens were available, it is reasonable to infer 
that the discrepancy would be lower.  
 
From a tax perspective, the net values of stocks indicate the long-term interest of a 
country in the international flow of capital. However, as there are different methods of 
taxation depending on the financial asset involved, it is necessary to understand how the 
discrepancy is composed, i.e. how each type of asset (liability) is impacting on the net 
value. Thus, in the next sections, the stocks of FDI and Portfolio Investments will be 
examined in detail.  
 
3.3.2.2. Stocks of FDI206 
 
The graphs and tables below summarise the main figures of the stocks of FDI207 in high 
income OECD countries, tax havens and developing countries (which are subdivided in 
BCIMRS and other developing countries).208 All figures are presented in millions of US 
dollars and they represent the average of each period (i.e. each decade).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Complete dataset of the figures is provided in the Data Appendix. 
207 According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s classification, FDI category includes controlling stakes in 
acquired foreign firms (at least 10% of an entity’s equity), as well as greenfield investment. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 227. 
208 BCIMRS expression corresponds to Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and South Africa; whereas 
other developing countries group is composed of 103 countries, as explained at the beginning of the 
chapter. 
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Chart 3.3.2.2. (a) Stocks of FDI Assets and Liabilities 1970-2004 
 
 
Chart 3.3.2.2. (b) Evolution of Net FDI Stocks 1970-2004 
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Table 3.3.2.2. (a) Stocks of FDI Assets 
A. Stocks of FDI Assets (Average) 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 262,412 906,625 3,501,960 8,057,203 
Tax Haven 13,047 43,664 307,407 1,455,494 
BCIMRS 3,810 19,224 80,808 213,265 
Other developing countries 2,485 17,759 81,813 206,009 
Total developing countries 6,294 36,983 162,621 419,275 
Total of all groups 281,754 987,271 3,971,987 9,931,972 
 
 
Table 3.3.2.2. (b) Stocks of FDI Liabilities 
B. Stocks of FDI Liabilities (Average) 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 170,173 663,470 2,805,722 6,393,567 
Tax Haven 10,886 68,720 395,663 1,508,796 
BCIMRS 22,164 52,956 275,097 830,740 
Other developing countries 38,115 105,041 361,994 821,706 
Total developing countries 60,278 157,997 637,091 1,652,446 
Total of all groups 241,338 890,187 3,838,476 9,554,809 
 
 
Table 3.3.2.2. (c) Net of FDI stocks 
C. Net of FDI Stocks (Average) 
Groups 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD (92,239) (243,155) (696,237) (1,663,636) 
Tax Haven (2,161) 25,056 88,256 53,302 
BCIMRS 18,354 33,732 194,289 617,475 
Other developing countries 35,630 87,282 280,181 615,697 
Total developing countries 53,984 121,014 474,470 1,233,172 
Total of all groups (40,416) (97,085) (133,511) (377,162) 
 
The tables present figures of stocks of FDI: (A.) Assets; (B.) Liabilities; and (C.) Net 
Values. Graphs illustrate the meaning of the figures, putting in evidence the trends 
identified. At first glance, the data prove a remarkable increase in the total amount of 
FDI assets (from an average of US$281,754 million in the 70s to US$9,931,972 million 
in the 2000s) and liabilities (from an average of US$241,338 million in the 70s to 
US$9,554,809 million in the 2000s), even though the concentration in high income 
OECD countries was largely maintained over the periods analysed. 
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Examining the evolution of the groups, high income OECD countries concentrate most 
stocks of FDI Assets and Liabilities since 1970, though there was a light decrease in 
percentage terms (i.e. in the 70s their stocks of assets and liabilities represented on 
average 93% and 71%; while in the 2000s the percentages were 81% and 67%), which 
was in fact compensated by the significant increase of tax havens’ position as holders of 
FDI assets and liabilities. The net values of FDI stocks held by high income OECD 
countries are negative since their stocks of assets are higher than liabilities over the 
entire period analysed. The magnitude of their net values are higher than the net values 
of the other groups, determining the grand total net values since 1970 as negative 
figures, which characterise them as capital exporters of FDI.   
 
Tax havens represent the group that had more significant changes. These countries 
increased their stocks of both assets and liabilities not only in absolute figures (i.e. in the 
70s their stocks of assets and liabilities were on average US$13,047 million and 
US$10,886 million; while in the 2000s US$1,455,494 million and US$1,508,796 
million) but also in percentage terms, regarding the total stocks held by the other 
countries analysed in the sample (i.e. in the 70s their stocks of assets and liabilities 
represented on average 5%; while in the 2000s the percentages were 15% and 16%, 
respectively). In comparison to developing countries, tax havens have held higher stocks 
of assets; whereas stocks of liabilities have been higher in the developing countries even 
though the difference was reduced over time (Chart 3.3.2.2. (a) illustrates this point by 
showing the convergence between the lines that represent stocks of liabilities over time 
of these two groups). One interesting aspect that comes out from their net figures is the 
reduction between the last two periods (US$88,256 million in the 90s and US$53,302 
million in the 2000s), which allow us to infer that they might be exporting some FDI in 
the last period. Tax havens play an important role in the structure of multinational 
corporations and, therefore, their position as exporters of FDI could also be explained by 
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their participation in transactions of merger and acquisition, for instance.209 Moreover, 
this situation is coherent with the behaviour of flows identified before.  
 
Developing countries have maintained their position on FDI Assets (4% on average of 
the total stocks of FDI), but decreased their stocks of FDI liabilities, in relation to the 
total amount of stocks held by the other groups (i.e. in the 70s they had on average 25% 
of the stocks of FDI liabilities which in the 2000s decreased to 17%). The analysis 
segregated the position of 6 countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and South 
Africa) from the rest of the group of developing countries to demonstrate how highly 
concentrated the stocks of FDI are in these countries in comparison to the other 103 
developing economies classified as ‘other developing countries’. The net position of 
developing countries has a positive value in all periods analysed (Liabilities>Assets), 
showing that these countries have received more FDI from abroad than they have 
invested in other economies. Therefore, regarding FDI, developing countries are still 
capital importers.   
 
The graphs facilitate the comprehension of data provided by tables. They draw attention 
to the concentration of FDI stocks in high income OECD countries and the increased 
importance of tax havens in the international trade of FDI assets and liabilities. The net 
values are also easily grasped by the distance between the lines of assets and liabilities 
for each group, which adopted a logarithmic scale due to the large range of values 
covered. Regarding this aspect, whereas the distance between the lines representing 
stocks of Assets and Liabilities of high income OECD countries and tax havens is very 
narrow; the distance between developing countries’ lines is quite great, demonstrating 
the different level of stocks held by them. The last graph highlights the fact that the net 
negative values reflect the impact of high income OECD countries’ net stocks.  
 
The net values of stocks of FDI challenge the general trend described by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti in which liabilities tend to be better reported than assets. Thus, stocks of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 P. R. Lane and G. R. Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Cross-Border Investment in Small International Financial 
Centers’ (2010) IMF Working Paper WP/10/38 1, 5 
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FDI cannot explain the discrepancy identified in the sum of total assets and liabilities. In 
fact, the net negative value of FDI stocks decreases the discrepancy. Other types of 
investment might justify the discrepancy. Furthermore, the net values of FDI seem to be 
really residual in comparison with the stocks of assets and liabilities held by each group 
of countries. In absolute terms, the values representing the total of all groups (last line of 
table 3.3.2.2. (c)) are smaller than most net figures. Thus, these net values appear more 
reliable than net values from Portfolio Investment, as discussed next. 
 
3.3.2.3. Stocks of Portfolio Equity210 
 
The graphs and tables present the main figures of stocks of Portfolio Equity211 held by 
high income OECD countries, tax havens and developing countries (which are 
subdivided in BCIMRS and other developing countries). All figures are presented in 
millions of US dollars and they represent the average of each period (i.e. each decade).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Complete dataset of the figures is provided in the Annexes. 
211 According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s classification, portfolio equity holdings measure ownership of 
shares of companies and mutual funds below the 10% threshold that distinguishes portfolio from direct 
investment. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 226. 
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Chart 3.3.2.3. (a) Stocks of PI Equity Assets and Liabilities 1970-2004 
 
 
Chart 3.3.2.3. (b) Evolution of Net PI Equity Stocks 1970-2004 
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Table 3.3.2.3. (a) Stocks of PI Equity Assets 
A.     Stocks of PI Equity Assets (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 48,191 279,973 2,119,015 5,154,649 
Tax Haven 5,885 32,396 229,101 1,136,001 
BCIMRS 485 2,107 14,955 59,314 
Other developing countries 547 23,453 105,950 236,034 
Total developing countries 1,031 25,560 120,904 295,349 
Total of all groups 55,107 337,929 2,469,020 6,585,998 
 
 
Table 3.3.2.3. (b) Stocks of PI Equity Liabilities 
B.     Stocks of PI Equity Liabilities (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 72,297 367,718 2,181,746 5,198,079 
Tax Haven 9,396 44,944 268,487 1,895,412 
BCIMRS 2,737 5,876 88,322 239,754 
Other developing countries 329 5,092 87,779 176,217 
Total developing countries 3,066 10,968 176,101 415,971 
Total of all groups 84,759 423,630 2,626,334 7,509,462 
 
 
Table 3.3.2.3. (c) Net of PI Equity Stocks 
C.     Net of PI Equity Stocks (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 24,105 87,745 62,732 43,430 
Tax Haven 3,511 12,548 39,386 759,412 
BCIMRS 2,252 3,769 73,367 180,440 
Other developing countries (218) (18,361) (18,171) (59,817) 
Total developing countries 2,035 (14,592) 55,197 120,622 
Total of all groups 29,651 85,701 157,314 923,464 
 
   
The tables follow the same pattern introduced in the previous section, i.e. they present 
three types of information about the stock of portfolio equity: Assets (A.); Liabilities 
(B.) and Net values (C.). The graphs illustrate the trends identified.  
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At first glance, the data show an overwhelming increase in both stocks of assets (from 
an average of US$55,107 million in the 1970s to US$6,585,998 million in the 2000s) 
and liabilities (from an average of US$84,759 million in the 1970s to US$7,509,462 
million in the 2000s). Its distribution is still concentrated in high income OECD 
countries, even though there was a light decrease in their figures when compared to the 
total amount of stocks held by the other groups (i.e. in the 70s their stocks of assets and 
liabilities represented on average 87% and 85% of total stocks; while in the 2000s the 
percentages were reduced to 78% and 69%, respectively). Tax havens have significantly 
raised their asset and liability positions (from 11% in the 70s to 17% and 25%, 
respectively, in the 2000s); whereas developing countries remained at the margin of this 
type of investment (i.e. in the 70s their stocks of assets and liabilities represented an 
average of only 2% and 4% of total stocks; while in the 2000s the percentages evenly 
increased to 4% and 6%, respectively). Thus, both asset and liability positions of 
developing countries are insignificant when compared to the total amount of portfolio 
equity available in the international market. There might be some major constraints (e.g. 
absence of capital market structure) that prevent this type of investment in developing 
countries. 
 
The total net values of portfolio equity stocks have gradually increased until the end of 
the 1990s, as shown in the last line of table 3.3.2.3. (c). In the 2000s (last column), 
however, there was a significant increase due to the net position of tax havens. In fact, 
the net position of tax havens increased 216 times during the period analysed, putting in 
evidence their tendency as capital importers of Portfolio Equity. In this sense, tax 
havens’ net position might be justified by their use as domicile of collective investment 
schemes (mutual funds, hedge funds) and multinational corporations which claims are 
held by foreign investors.212 This trend is similar to the one identified in FDI stocks, 
which signifies that tax havens adopted a position of capital importers of equity.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Cross-Border Investment in Small International Financial Centers’ (n 209), 
5. 
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The net values of high income OECD countries decreased between the last two periods, 
which signifies that although these countries have imported Portfolio Equity for a long 
period, recently their position was inverted. On the other hand, developing countries’ net 
values increased significantly (59 times), though at a lower degree than the average 
reached by tax havens. The increased net position of developing countries can be 
explained by the difference between assets and liabilities held by BCIMRS since in the 
other developing countries the values of assets are higher than the values of liabilities. It 
is very hard to predict the meaning of the net values of Portfolio Equity held by other 
developing countries since, as already mentioned, the absence of inflows (i.e. liabilities 
in terms of stocks) might be explained by the absence of a developed capital market.  
 
Regarding the charts, the first one shows the evolution of the stocks of assets and 
liabilities as well as the proportion of net values of Portfolio Equity by demonstrating 
the distance between the two lines that represent stocks of assets and liabilities for each 
group. In high income OECD countries the two lines are almost completely overlaid; 
whereas in the two other groups the lines are separated and the liability lines are higher 
than the asset lines. The second graph highlights the impact of tax havens’ net position 
on total stocks. 
 
In sum, the evolution of Portfolio Equity stocks demonstrated that these stocks are 
highly concentrated in high income OECD countries. However, tax havens have 
considerably increased their position as holders of Portfolio Equity assets and liabilities 
over the period analysed. Developing countries, on the contrary, are still at the margin of 
this type of investment. Another interesting characteristic highlighted by the analysis is 
the diversified net position of stocks in each group of countries: high income OECD 
countries changed their position from capital importers to capital exporters due to the 
reduction of the net value of stocks; the subgroups of developing countries have 
opposite characteristics since whereas BCIMRS group is importing Portfolio Equity, the 
others are exporting it. At last, regarding the discrepancy, the net figures have a positive 
trend since liabilities are higher than assets. What is intriguing is that even though the 
IIP of tax havens is negative, showing the fact that their stocks of assets are higher than 
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liabilities, in relation to equity (both FDI and Portfolio Equity), tax havens have held the 
opposite position (i.e. stocks of liabilities are higher than stocks of assets), which 
implies that they are importing equity. 
 
From a tax perspective, the diversification of countries’ position as capital importers and 
capital exporters of Portfolio Equity makes the justification of taxation based on the 
association of these economic characteristics with the principles of source and residence 
taxation more difficult. In fact, Portfolio Equity figures challenge the traditional 
assumption of North/South flows. Stocks are still concentrated in high income OECD 
countries showing that for this type of investment the North/North flows are what really 
prevail. In relation to developing countries, besides the positive net stock position of 
BCIMRS (Liabilities>Assets), ‘other developing’ countries assumed a net negative 
position (Liabilities<Assets). The limited amount of Portfolio Equity that circulates into 
developing countries’ economies should also be regarded when evaluating their tax 
policies. 
 
Furthermore, it is not possible to assess tax policy adopted by developing countries and 
high income OECD countries without regarding the position of tax havens. Their 
participation in the international trade of Portfolio Equity has increased substantially in 
the recent past. To this extent, even though the traditional assumption is that tax havens 
work as intermediaries, having their net position balanced, the figures of Portfolio 
Equity showed a substantial positive net position, which signifies that they might be 
acting as importers of Portfolio Equity.  
 
3.3.2.4. Stocks of Portfolio Debt and Other Investments213 
 
The graphs and tables present the main figures of the stocks of Portfolio Debt and Other 
Investments214. The presentation of data follows the same pattern introduced in the 
previous sections. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Complete dataset of the figures is provided in the Data Appendix. 
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Chart 3.3.2.4. (a) Stocks of PI Debt Assets and Liabilities 1970-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214  According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s classification, portfolio debt and other investments 
corresponds to debt securities (e.g. bonds) and other debt instruments such as loans, deposits and trade 
credits. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 225-29. 
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Chart 3.3.2.4. (b) Evolution of Net PI Debt Stocks 1970-2004 
 
 
 
Table 3.3.2.4. (a) Stocks of PI Debt Assets 
A. Stocks of PI Debt and Other Investments Assets (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 672,009 3,154,210 9,106,770 17,209,996 
Tax Haven 83,584 498,421 1,516,882 3,896,500 
BCIMRS 8,379 54,951 259,915 545,428 
Other developing countries 92,463 445,665 681,527 1,146,473 
Total developing countries 100,842 500,616 941,442 1,691,901 
Total of all groups 856,435 4,153,247 11,565,094 22,798,397 
 
Table 3.3.2.4. (b) Stocks of PI Debt Liabilities 
B. Stocks of PI Debt and Other Investments Liabilities  (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 804,137 3,691,971 11,056,980 21,629,026 
Tax Haven 61,086 372,459 1,111,362 2,469,930 
BCIMRS 68,725 276,009 639,539 883,402 
Other developing countries 146,356 641,607 1,259,566 1,686,244 
Total developing countries 215,081 917,616 1,899,105 2,569,646 
Total of all groups 1,080,303 4,982,047 14,067,446 26,668,602 
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Table 3.3.2.4. (c) Net of PI Debt and Other Investment Stocks 
C. Net of PI Debt and Other Investments Stocks (Average) 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 132,128 537,761 1,950,210 4,419,030 
Tax Haven (22,498) (125,961) (405,520) (1,426,571) 
BCIMRS 60,346 221,058 379,624 337,974 
Other developing countries 53,892 195,942 578,039 539,772 
Total developing countries 114,238 417,000 957,663 877,745 
Total of all groups 223,869 828,800 2,502,352 3,870,205 
 
The first outstanding characteristic of stocks of Portfolio Debt and Other Investments is 
their total amounts. The figures demonstrate that stocks of assets started from an average 
of US$856,435 million in the 1970s and reached the average of US$22,798,397 million 
in the 2000s; whereas stocks of liabilities reached even higher values, i.e. they increased 
from US$1,080,303 million in the 1970s to US$26,668,602 million in the 2000s. Thus, 
the volume of stocks of debt (represented by Portfolio Debt and Other Investment in 
which loans are included) compared to stocks of equity (composed by FDI and Portfolio 
Equity) is significantly higher. However, regarding their dispersion among groups of 
countries both debt and equity stocks present the same pattern in which stocks are 
extremely concentrated in high income OECD countries.  
 
There are interesting trends in the evolving position of groups of countries in the period 
analysed. As already mentioned, stocks are highly concentrated in high income OECD 
countries. However, their participation on the total stocks of assets slightly decreased 
(from 78% in the 70s to 75% in the 2000s); while in relation to stocks of liabilities, their 
participation increased (from 74% in the 70s to 81% in the 2000s). Besides these light 
movements, they have concentrated more than 70% of the total stocks of Portfolio Debt 
since 1970. The US and the UK have held on average during the period analysed 45% 
and 40%, respectively, of the total debt assets and liabilities held by high income OECD 
countries. On extraction of the stocks of the US and the UK from the high income 
OECD group, the tendency is maintained, i.e. the net values remain positive indicating 
that stocks of liabilities held by the rest of the group surpass the stocks of assets. 
Therefore, even though these two countries have a significant impact on the sample, 
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they do not distort the trend. The net positive values (Liabilities>Assets) were confirmed 
even not counting them in the group.  
 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have not only held low stocks of assets and 
liabilities, but also both stocks decreased in percentage terms in relation to total stocks 
(i.e. in the 70s their stocks of assets and liabilities represented on average 12% and 20% 
of total stocks; while in the 2000s their shares of stocks were reduced to 7% and 10%, 
respectively). This signifies that although there was a remarkable growth in the trade of 
debt assets around the world, developing countries did not increase their participation. 
Moreover, unlike the equity stocks (FDI and Portfolio Equity), debt stocks are not 
concentrated in BCIMRS. The group of ‘Other Developing Countries’ composed of 103 
countries have held higher stocks of debt since the 70s than the BCIMRS group. 
Moreover, the developing countries’ more balanced position in terms of assets and 
liabilities might also impact their tax policies. For instance, their preference of methods 
to relieve double taxation might have changed over time since exemption of foreign 
income preserves capital import neutrality, whereas the recognition of credits ensures 
capital export neutrality. 
 
The tax haven group reflects the same trend identified when analysing other stocks: they 
significantly increased their stocks of both assets and liabilities of portfolio debt (in the 
70s their stocks of assets and liabilities represented on average 10% and 6% of total 
stocks; while in the 2000s their shares of stocks considerably increased to 17% and 9%, 
respectively). Focusing on assets, in the 90s tax havens’ stocks surpassed the stocks held 
by developing countries (the former held US$1,516,882 million; while the latter held 
US$941,442 million) and in the 2000s this difference in favour of tax havens became 
even higher (tax havens’ assets reached the average of US$3,896,500 million; while 
developing countries’ figures remained at US$1,691,901 million). In relation to stocks 
of liabilities, even though developing countries still hold higher averages, in the last 
decade the tax havens’ stocks became closer to developing countries’ figures 
(US$2,569,646 million compared to US$2,469,930 million).   
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The graphs illustrate the meaning of the figures discussed above. In the first graph, the 
lines that represent the evolution of stocks of assets and liabilities of high income OECD 
countries are very symmetric, demonstrating that although stocks of liabilities are higher 
than assets; the net values represented by the distance between the lines is less 
significant when compared to the other groups. Therefore, the discrepancy is much more 
relevant for the other groups than for high income OECD countries, when compared to 
the total amount of assets and liabilities held by them. The lines of developing countries 
and tax havens intercepted each other, demonstrating that they changed position as the 
tax havens’ assets and liabilities stocks surpassed stocks held by developing countries. 
The graph illustrates very clearly the slowdown in the developing countries’ position 
through the disposition of the red (liability) and yellow (asset) lines. 
 
Net values (table 3.3.2.4 (c) of this section) of the entire period analysed are positive, 
presenting liabilities higher than assets. On examination of the behaviour of each group 
of countries, different trends are identified. High income OECD countries maintained 
during the period analysed an increasing net positive position, which signifies that they 
kept importing more debt than exporting it. Even though the developing countries’ net 
figures are also positive (liabilities>assets) during the entire period analysed, there is a 
different movement in the last period, since net values of stocks were reduced 
demonstrating that they inverted the trend of importing more than exporting debt. In 
fact, this movement is observed in both groups of developing countries: BCIMRS and 
‘other developing’ countries. Tax havens, on the other hand, present a completely 
different behaviour from the other groups. Their net figures for the entire period 
analysed are negative (liabilities<assets), which shows that they kept exporting debt. In 
terms of growth, the table below shows how much net values increased in each decade 
compared to 1970s data: 
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Table 3.3.2.4. (d) Growth of Net Debt 
Growth of Net Debt 
Groups of Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 1 4 15 33 
Tax Haven 1 6 18 63 
Total developing 
countries 1 4 8 8 
Grand Total 1 4 11 17 
 
Tax havens’ negative net figures presented an overwhelming increase, putting in 
evidence the fact that their position as net exporters of debt is not an occasional situation 
but a trend that was intensified in the 2000s. Having in mind that in terms of equity 
(both FDI and Portfolio) tax havens were identified as capital importers, their position as 
capital exporters of debt allows us to infer that they are transforming equity into debt. 
From a tax perspective, there is an explanation for that since income derived from equity 
investment usually is taxed only after distribution of dividends. Therefore, taxation of 
equity income can be deferred, excepted when the home country of investors has 
enacted Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) legislation. Furthermore, usually, Portfolio 
Equity investment does not trigger the application of CFC rules. So, in practice, from a 
tax perspective, it makes sense for investors215 resident in high tax jurisdictions to make 
equity investment in tax havens and through different vehicles of investment (companies 
or other mechanisms) headquartered there, funds are lent as debt.  
 
The analysis of Portfolio Debt and Other Investments’ stocks highlighted the importance 
of these investments to explain the discrepancy between assets and liabilities reported by 
countries. But why do developing countries and high income OECD countries appear to 
better report portfolio debt liabilities, whereas tax havens adopt the opposite behaviour, 
better reporting portfolio assets? Is there a tax explanation that encourages the situation 
reflected in the figures analysed? Furthermore, assuming that tax havens are mere 
conduits of investment, to which countries do those assets reported by tax havens 
belong? These questions need to be addressed to understand the position of developing 
countries in the international tax system. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Investors can also convert individual investment into corporate investment. 
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Another relevant aspect is that comparing the net values of Total Assets and Total 
Liabilities (provided in section 3.3.2.1.) with the net values provided in this section, we 
will see that the former are lower than the latter. Moreover, values of section 3.3.2.1 are 
also lower than the net values of Portfolio Debt and Other Investments plus Portfolio 
Equity and FDI. The table below illustrates this situation. 
 
Table 3.3.2.4. (e) Sum of net values of stocks of FDI, PI Equity and PI Debt and Other 
investments 
Net of PI (Equity and Debt) and Other Investments + Net of FDI 
Countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High Income OECD 63,994 382,351 1,316,704 2,798,824 
Tax Haven (21,147) (88,358) (277,878) (613,857) 
BCIMRS 80,952 258,559 647,280 1,135,889 
Other Developing Countries 89,305 264,863 840,049 1,095,652 
Total Developing Countries 170,257 523,422 1,487,329 2,231,539 
Total of all groups 213,104 817,416 2,526,155 4,416,507 
 
The net lower values presented in section 3.3.2.1. can be explained by the fact that Total 
Assets and Total Liabilities include not only FDI and Portfolio Investment, but also 
Reserves minus gold216  and Financial Derivatives217. Besides high income OECD 
countries, other countries have not reported well the stocks of Financial Derivatives, 
which signifies that this category of investment cannot justify the reduction in the net 
discrepancy described in section 3.3.2.1. Reserves minus gold, on the other hand, 
represent significant figures, especially for developing countries that in the recent past 
have considerably increased their stocks. The table below illustrates the evolution of 
Reserve assets held by countries since 1970 to 2004. All figures are presented in 
millions of US dollars and they represent the average of each period: 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Reserves minus gold include: foreign exchange, SDR holdings and the reserve position in the IMF. 
Gold holdings were not accounted since they do not represent a liability of another country. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 229. 
217 Among derivative instruments are options on currencies, interest rates, commodities, indices, etc.; 
traded financial futures; warrants; and arrangements such as currency and interest rate swaps. IMF, 
‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 92. 
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Table 3.3.2.4. (f) Evolution of official reserves held by countries 
Total Reserve Assets minus gold (average) 
Groups of countries 70s 80s 90s 2000s 
High income OECD 105,802 291,843 669,491 1,137,028 
Tax Haven 16,889 50,233 169,932 274,402 
BCIMRS 10,723 31,214 160,285 573,769 
Other developing countries 56,494 134,389 357,342 730,833 
Total developing countries 67,216 165,603 517,627 1,304,602 
Total of all groups 189,908 507,678 1,357,050 2,716,032 
 
Since the Asian financial crisis in the 90s, developing countries have accumulated 
significant amounts of Reserves.218 These reserves represent assets held by monetary 
authorities of countries to self-insure their economies against financial instability.  To 
this extent, the figures above prove that whereas high income OECD’s Reserves 
increased 11 times since the 70s, developing countries’ reserves improved 19 times.219 
In addition, in the 70s Reserves held by developing countries represented only 64% of 
Reserves held by high income OECD countries. In the 2000s, the difference between 
their holdings was reverted, the reserves of developing countries becoming 115% of the 
amount held by high income OECD countries.  
 
Even though from a tax perspective, income derived from these assets is exempt, which 
signifies that this income does not increase developing countries’ tax base, it represents 
an important outflow of capital. In other words, the amount of foreign assets held as 
reserves by monetary authorities of developing countries also challenges the profile of 
developing countries as capital importers. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 R. U. Mendonza, ‘International Reserve-Holding in the Developing World: Self-insurance in a Crisis-
prone Era?’ (2004) 5 Emerging Markets Review, 61-82. 
219 It is important to note that while in the ‘other developing countries’ group reserves increased 13 times 
in the period analysed, in the BCIMRS reserves increased 54 times. 
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3.3.3. Outcomes of data analysis 
 
In sum, bearing in mind all the arguments raised by the analysis of flows and stocks, the 
main characteristics of the IIP of high income OECD countries, tax havens and 
developing countries from 1970 to 2004 are: 
 
(i) High income OECD countries concentrate most stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities. Their gross stocks are significantly higher than gross stocks of developing 
countries and tax havens; whereas their net values are lower in percentage terms when 
compared to the total stocks held by them. Their IIP is positive (Liabilities>Assets) due 
to their massive position in Portfolio Debt and Other Investments, which surpasses the 
net values of other stocks, attributing to them the characteristic of debtors. In terms of 
flows, they are exporting equity (FDI and Portfolio Equity) and importing debt 
(Portfolio Debt and Other Investments); 
	  
(ii) Tax havens significantly increased their stocks in the recent past, achieving a 
relevant position in the international trade of foreign assets and liabilities. Different 
from the other groups, tax havens have negative IIP since stocks of assets are higher 
than stocks of liabilities. Therefore, they assumed creditor position and their IIP reduced 
the discrepancy. In other words, whereas in developing countries and high income 
OECD countries liabilities are better reported than assets, in tax havens the opposite 
situation is verified. In terms of flows, tax havens have been importing equity220 and 
exporting debt;  
 
(iii) Developing countries have the lowest gross stocks of assets and liabilities. Even 
though their net stocks have decreased over time, demonstrating the increased 
importance of bilateral flows to their economies, the remaining values are still 
significant. All net values of stocks (FDI, Portfolio Equity, Portfolio Debt and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Except by last decade in which net values of FDI stocks were reduced. This evidence added to the 
information extracted from flows signifies that tax havens might export FDI from 2000 to 2004. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that there might be other facts affecting those figures such as valuation, 
exchange currency rate, etc. 
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Debt) present a positive value, which means that liabilities are higher than assets. In 
terms of flows, there are interesting movements since even though their net values 
indicate a debtor position, recently they have been not only importing capital but also 
exporting it, as occurred to Portfolio Debt and Other Investments for all developing 
countries. In this particular case, their stocks were significantly reduced in the last 
decade, which was confirmed by the movement of flows. 
 
The next tables synthesise the movement of flows and the net position of stocks for each 
group: 
 
Table 3.3.3 (a) Summary table of movements of flows 
Movement of flows 
Groups FDI Portfolio Equity Portfolio Debt plus Other Debts Net flow position 
High Income 
OECD countries Exporting 
Importing (until 
2000); Exporting 
from 2000 onwards 
Importing Importer 
Tax havens 
Importing (until 
2000); Exporting 
from 2000 onwards 
Importing Exporting Exporter 
Developing 
countries Importing 
BCIMRS importing; 
other developing 
countries exporting. 
Importing (until 
2000); Exporting 
from 2000 onwards 
Importer 
 
Table 3.3.3. (b) Summary table of net stock position 
Net position in each category of stocks 
Groups FDI Portfolio Equity Portfolio Debt plus Other Debts IIP 
High Income 
OECD countries Assets>Liabilities Liabilities>Assets Liabilities>Assets Debtor 
Tax havens Liabilities>Assets Liabilities>Assets Assets>Liabilities Creditor 
Developing 
countries Liabilities>Assets Liabilities>Assets Liabilities>Assets Debtor 
 
The tables above provide an overview of the analysis performed in terms of movements 
of flows and net position of stocks for each type of investment. It is important to 
emphasise that stocks’ data was adopted because it is more complete and covers a longer 
period. Thus, it is necessary to bear in mind that changes in stocks are affected not only 
by movement of flows but also by revaluations arising from price changes and/or 
exchange rate changes and other changes in the volume of assets (e.g. write-off claims, 
reclassification of assets). Notwithstanding these limitations of analysing movement of 
129	  
	  
flows through changes in stocks, the analysis of pure flows discussed in section 3.3.1. 
presented figures that are in line with outcomes raised in the stocks’ analysis. Therefore, 
besides all the limitations on the analysis performed, the data allowed a better 
understanding of what is going on in terms of the flows of capital to reconsider the legal 
debate.  
 
The overall picture of the international flow of capital put in evidence how complex the 
national interest of each group in the international taxation is since it is very hard to 
justify their preference between source and residence taxation based on their 
characteristics as capital importers and capital exporters. In a sense, the data proved that 
the flow of capital has become much more bilateral which reduces the importance of 
identifying a country as capital importer or capital exporter for tax purposes. Another 
interesting outcome that has to be considered when analysing countries’ national interest 
in international taxation is the relevance of particular asset group since if a country 
receives very low flows of a certain investment, its interests in that particular category to 
raise tax revenue will be unimportant. However, even in this situation countries would 
need to consider how certain tax policies encourage (or discourage) future investments 
as well as interact with the problem of capital flight, as discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the recent trends identified in the current process of 
globalisation in which countries tend to report better liabilities than assets with the 
profile of the financial flow in the first period of globalisation. This comparative 
analysis will show some differences between these two periods. 
 
3.4. Comparison with the First Period of Globalisation (1870-1914) 
 
The previous sections created a detailed view of the flows of capital from 1994 to 2007 
and the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities from 1970 to 2004. The objective was to 
examine the profile of the flows and stocks of three different groups of countries: high 
income OECD countries, tax havens and developing countries. The analysis pointed out 
three major aspects: (i) difficulty in characterising countries as capital importers and 
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capital exporters; (ii) the discrepancy between stocks of assets and liabilities reported; 
and (iii) the increased participation of tax havens in the international flow of capital. 
 
In order to expand the understanding of the outcomes of the previous analysis, this 
section will complement those results with the analysis developed by Obstfeld and 
Taylor in which they analysed the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities from 1825 to 
1995.221 The long period analysed by them encompasses the first period of globalisation, 
which occurred from 1870 to 1914.222  
 
The main idea discussed by Obstfeld and Taylor’s study refers to the evolution of 
international capital mobility which can be comprehended by examining the differences 
between the net values and the gross values of stocks of assets and liabilities in the pre-
war period (i.e. 1870-1914) and in the period of 1980-1995. Briefly explained, they 
argued that data on gross international asset positions seemed broadly consistent with 
the idea of a U shape in the evolution of international capital mobility since the late 
nineteenth century. Their data demonstrated an impressive drop in capital mobility in 
the interwar period, and a very slow improvement of capital mobility thereafter.223  
 
Focusing on countries’ profile as capital importers and capital exporters, the figures of 
Obstfeld and Taylor showed that until 1914 some developed countries held significant 
positions as ‘creditors of the world’. At that time, the United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, Canada and Japan	  held not less than 100% 
of total stock of assets. On the other hand, most developing countries were colonies of 
those creditor countries, receiving investments from them, which characterised them as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 The database developed by Obstfeld and Taylor is much simpler than the one developed by Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti. Obstfeld and Taylor did not distinguish in their classification different types of stocks; 
they opted for a broad classification between assets and liabilities. This basic classification can be justified 
by the long period analysed by them which includes data with very different characteristics that could not 
be classified in the current categories of assets and liabilities, since some of them did not even exist in the 
nineteenth century (e.g. Financial Derivatives). The advantage of Obstfeld and Taylor’s study is the 
extension of their database which covers the period of 1825 to 1995, using intervals of five years. The 
challenge of finding information about the first period of globalisation is fulfilled by their research. 
Obstfeld and Taylor (n 39) 121-83. 
222 Explanations about the concept of globalisation and its periods can be found in Chapter I. 
223 Obstfeld and Taylor (n 39) 145. 
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debtor countries. It was, therefore, much easier to analyse the IIP of countries, since they 
had a large position in one direction of the flow, it not even being necessary to segment 
the flow by type of investment because the simplicity of the financial market did not 
request that. Consequently, by that time it made sense to think of international taxation 
in terms of countries’ profile as capital importers and capital exporters.    
 
Another aspect reported by Obstfeld and Taylor’s analysis is that assets were better 
reported than liabilities until 1914. This trend is related to the fact that stocks of assets 
were extremely concentrated in a few developed countries, being better accounted and 
reported by them; while liabilities were wide-spread in a large number of countries 
characterised as the ‘developing world’. Comparing this tendency with the findings of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti what is identified is the opposite trend in the current reports, 
i.e. stocks of liabilities are much better reported than stocks of assets, which justified the 
world net foreign assets discrepancy.224  
 
Regarding distribution of stocks, there are also interesting outcomes, comparing data 
from the pre-war period with data from the current process of globalisation. From 1825 
to 1914, stocks of assets were concentrated in a few developed countries, whereas 
liabilities wide-spread around the developing world. In the current process of 
globalisation, stocks remained concentrated in a few countries, i.e. in the high income 
OECD group, which contains the old club of creditor countries. However, nowadays, 
these countries hold not only a massive position in assets but also in liabilities. This 
situation affects not only high income OECD countries but also the other groups. 
Consequently, countries worry about both directions of the flows, since the flow is much 
more bilateral, requesting countries to consider inflows and outflows when defining 
their tax policies.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of distribution, it is not possible anymore to polarise the 
discussion around developed and developing countries. It is necessary to consider the 
influence of tax havens, which assumed an important position in the international flow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 231. 
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of capital. Thus, the difficulty nowadays in classifying countries as capital importers or 
capital exporters is justified not only by countries’ bilateral position on flows but also by 
the interference of tax havens in the direction of these flows.  To this extent, a major 
difference between the analysis performed with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s data and the 
analysis proposed by Obstfeld and Taylor refers to the absence of tax havens in their 
considerations. 
 
In sum, there are significant differences between the first period of globalisation and the 
current one. From 1870 to 1914, it was possible to analyse the flows of investments 
around the world only considering two groups of countries: developed and developing 
ones. Their level of economic development also was associated with their profile as net 
creditor or debtor. In the current process of globalisation these premises cannot be 
assumed anymore. To understand the international flow of capital it is necessary to 
comprehend the position of tax havens as well as to examine the flows considering 
different types of assets. Developed countries cannot be considered anymore simply as 
net creditors; whereas developing countries are not only net debtors. The traditional 
assumptions proved to be out of date.   
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
The data and arguments introduced in each section of this chapter aimed to put in 
evidence current aspects of the international flow of capital and stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities held by countries as well as their evolving characteristics in order to 
provide a new framework to reconsider the position of developing countries in the 
international tax system.  
 
The main contribution of this chapter relies on the adoption of economic data to 
contextualise the debate on international taxation. The analysis proved that it is very 
hard to characterise countries as capital importers and capital exporters. In fact, this 
argument can only succeed when the flows are largely in one direction, as in the first 
period of globalisation. To this extent, considering the bilateral nature of flows, it is also 
133	  
	  
important to note that when net values represent a small fraction of the flows, it does not 
matter for tax purposes if a country is capital importer or capital exporter. Equally, the 
magnitude of an asset group may be important to define countries’ tax interests in 
certain investments. The low level of Portfolio Equity in developing countries could 
make the tax arrangements for these assets relatively unimportant, though this situation 
would also depend on expected future levels, who is investing and also on how these tax 
policies encourage or discourage capital flight, as discussed next. 
 
The analysis showed, therefore, that the current economic profile of countries is much 
more complex than the basic assumptions that guided the discussion of international 
taxation in terms of capital import and capital export. It is not only hard to classify 
countries according to this simplified criterion but also to think in terms of two groups 
of countries only: developed and developing countries. It is necessary to evaluate the 
position of tax havens and how developing and developed countries’ tax systems 
interact with them.  
 
Moreover, there is a tendency for countries to report better financial liabilities than 
assets followed by the increased participation of tax havens in the international flow of 
capital. This situation indicates that there might be other explanations for the 
discrepancy rather than badly reported data. What is going on in the current process of 
globalisation that created this distortion on how countries report their asset position? 
Why this distortion affects Portfolio Investment rather than FDI? 
 
Even though data of only a small group of tax havens were available, the outcomes 
proved that their behaviour might be connected to the unreported outflows from high tax 
jurisdictions (high income OECD countries and developing ones). In a sense, this 
situation makes the picture even more complicated. It is not only the wrong argument to 
think of international taxation in terms of capital import and capital export terms, but it 
is necessary to understand the importance of tax havens and their relationship with 
unrecorded outflows. In the next chapter, the importance of tax havens and their 
relationship with unrecorded outflows are examined.   
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Chapter IV. Tax havens and the problem of capital flight 
 
The previous chapter introduced evidence about the economic profile of three groups of 
contries (high income OECD countries; tax havens; and developing countries) in the 
context of financial globalisation, demonstrating that the international trade of foreign 
assets and liabilities is much more complex than the traditional assumption in which 
developing countries are capital importers and developed countries are capital exporters. 
It was demonstrated that: (i) the North/South assumption cannot explain the behaviour 
of the international flows of capital; (ii) tax havens are important players; and (iii) the 
discrepancy between reported stocks of assets and liabilities has significantly increased 
in the recent past.  
 
In theory, the sum of  all countries’ IIP should be zero since what represents a liability 
for one country, must be an asset for another.  However, recent data of stocks of foreign 
assets and liabilities held by countries have demonstrated a net asset discrepancy, i.e. 
countries tend to better report liabilities than assets, there remaining a significant 
amount of assets unreported.225 In terms of flows, these unreported assets represent 
unrecorded outflows of capital. When focusing on each group of countries’ IIP what was 
verified is that although high income OECD countries and developing countries have 
reported better liabilities than assets, tax havens adopted the opposite behaviour, since 
their stocks of assets were higher than their stocks of liabilities. According to the 
traditional assumption, the tax havens’ position should be balanced since they work as 
intermediaries, i.e. they act as mere conduits of the flows. Therefore, the way tax 
havens’ behaviour explains the discrepancy indicates that there might be other reasons 
for the discrepancy rather than only badly reported data.226  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 It is important to note that even though not all countries of the world were included in the analysis 
performed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, due to the global coverage of the data, they assumed that the 
outcome i.e. the net foreign asset discrepancy represented a world trend. This signifies that even if all 
countries were accounted, a net asset discrepancy would be identified. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The 
External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 231-33. 
226 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti were aware that measurement error in their dataset was substantial, due to: (i) 
missing data, i.e. incomplete reporting of balance of payments and IIP data; (ii) complex financial 
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Assuming that the discrepancy does not signify only badly reported data, the behaviour 
of tax havens represents an important aspect to understand how proper data of the 
international flow of capital might work. In a sense, the analysis of tax havens’ 
behaviour will help to create some alternatives to understand the international flow of 
capital and, consequently, the effective interest of developing countries. To this extent, 
in the previous chapter it was possible to identify tax havens as creditors since they 
better reported assets than liabilities. The outcome reflected the analysis of only 14 tax 
havens.227 Therefore, it will be necessary to examine the behaviour of the missing tax 
havens in order to improve the conclusions of the previous chapter. 
 
But why do countries have difficulty in better reporting outflows of capital? What is the 
relationship between tax havens’ behaviour and the net asset discrepancy? Capital flight 
might be one explanation. Thus, the phenomenon of capital flight will be examined in 
order to evaluate a possible explanation for the current profile of the international flow 
of capital.  
 
How does this analysis relate to the tax debate? Firstly, the impact of capital flight on 
countries’ flows challenges even more the discussion of international taxation in terms 
of countries’ classification as capital importers and capital exporters, and, consequently, 
its association with source and residence taxation. It is not only difficult to classify 
countries as capital importers and capital exporters, but the problem of capital flight 
demonstrates that official figures cannot capture entirely the outflows of capital from 
countries. This signifies that official figures tend to overestimate countries’ positions as 
debtors since the problem of capital flight is not captured. 
 
Secondly, the difficulty in classifying countries as capital importers and capital 
exporters demonstrated that source and residence taxation cannot address properly the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transactions; (iii)  discrepancy between current account transactions and financial flows, captured by net 
errors and omissions (NEO).  
227 Bahrain, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, 
Panama, Singapore and Switzerland and Lebanon.  
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effective interest of developing countries in international taxation. In a sense, source and 
residence taxation cannot properly discuss allocation of taxing rights between developed 
and developing countries, and, consequently, allocation of tax base. However, can 
source and residence taxation explain the behaviour of capital flight? The traditional 
assumption regarding allocation of taxing rights reflects the provisions in tax treaties. In 
a simplified manner, source taxation has been applied to active business income 
(profits), whereas residence taxation has been applied to passive income (e.g. dividends; 
interest). From a practical perspective, this division is supported by the fact that it is 
easier to determine residence of individuals than residence of enterprises, since the latter 
relies on artificial criteria that can be easily manipulated. There has been less agreement, 
in fact, in terms of taxation of passive income, since even though tax treaties aimed to 
eliminate source taxation, in practice some have remained.228 The discussion about 
source versus residence taxation of passive income was centred on countries’ profiles as 
capital importers and capital exporters of portfolio investment. Consequently, 
developing countries have defended source taxation since they were characterised as 
capital importers, whereas developed countries have fought for residence taxation since 
they were presumed to be capital exporters of this type of investment. Does the 
enforcement of source taxation by developing countries followed by the enforcement of 
residence taxation by developed countries encourage capital flight? In other words, is 
the phenomenon of capital flight encouraged by tax policies?  
 
It is not possible to quantify how much of capital flight can be explained by tax policies. 
However, this fact does not reduce the importance of tax policies in understanding the 
phenomenon of capital flight. Thus, tax policies adopted by developing countries, 
developed countries and tax havens will be examined in order to identify how they 
encourage capital flight, and consequently, if the discrepancy is justified by tax policies. 
 
In sum, this chapter aims to analyse the relationship between tax havens’ behaviour and 
capital flight to complement the study of the international flow of capital performed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 R. S. Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (1995-96) 
74 Texas Law Review 1301, 1305. 
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the previous chapter. The objective is to understand what might be distorting the flows 
of capital, causing the trend of developed and developing countries to report their 
liabilities (inflows) better than their assets (outflows). The use of economic concepts 
here is necessary only to set up the meaning and the relevance of capital flight. The 
limitations of the analysis performed consists in availability of data from tax havens and 
capital flight. It was not the scope of this study to improve data of tax havens and capital 
flight. The purpose is restricted to demonstrating the relationship between tax havens’ 
behaviour and capital flight, putting into perspective figures that reveal the importance 
of these arguments to evaluate the interest of developing countries in international 
taxation. 
 
4.1. The net asset discrepancy 
 
The IIP of an economy is obtained by subtracting the external financial assets from the 
external liabilities. It represents the developments and trends in the performance of an 
economy vis-à-vis the rest of the world since it reflects what a country owns in relation 
to what it owes to other nations.229  
 
Adding up the IIP position of the groups analysed (high income OECD countries, tax 
havens and developing countries), a gap becomes evident since stocks of liabilities are 
higher than stocks of assets. Consequently, there is a tendency on evaluating the figures 
to find countries in a debtor position rather than a creditor position. Even though the 
total values of assets and liabilities reported should be equal in theory, since what is a 
liability to one country must be an asset to another one; in practice, the net values of 
assets and liabilities differ from zero.230 This problem reflects the difficulty faced by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 IMF, ‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 6. 
230 As already mentioned, even though not all countries of the world were included in the analysis 
performed by Lane and Miles-Ferretti, due to the global coverage of the data, it can be assumed that the 
discrepancy represents a global trend, i.e. even if all countries were accounted, a net asset discrepancy 
would be identified. 
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countries in accurately reporting their international investment positions. The graphic 
below demonstrates the evolution of the discrepancy since 1970231: 
 
Chart 4.1. Evolution of the discrepancy and the IIP of each group of countries from 
1970 to 2004 
 
The graphic above reveals how the discrepancy (purple line) has increased since 1970. 
The positive net position (Liabilities>Assets) of high income OECD countries (blue 
line) and developing countries (green line)232 shows that they are responsible for the 
positive net figures of the discrepancy; whereas the negative net position 
(Assets>Liabilities) reached by tax havens’ IIP (grey line) reduces the discrepancy. It 
becomes clear, therefore, that tax havens have an opposite IIP to developing countries 
and high income OECD countries since for the former stocks of assets surpass stocks of 
liabilities.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Source of data: P.R. Lane and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised 
and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 -2004’, (2007) 73 Journal of International 
Economics, pp. 231-233.  
232 The drop on the line registered from 2000s onwards reflects the substantial reduction of developing 
countries’ debt position. 
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But why do developing countries and high income OECD countries have difficulties in 
reporting their asset positions? One hypothesis is that a considerable part of the missing 
asset values of developing countries and high income OECD countries that constitute 
the gap, also called net foreign asset discrepancy233 relates to capital flight. Capital flight 
can distort the marginal interest of countries in the international flow of capital since a 
significant part of outflows is probably undermined by this phenomenon. 
 
In the next sections, the relationship between tax havens and capital flight will be 
examined. The meaning and measure of capital flight will be evaluated in order to 
provide a dimension of the importance of this phenomenon when discussing 
international taxation. Studies have used different methods to predict it, depending on 
the kind of question that is being asked. Therefore, there is not only one figure that 
defines the magnitude of capital flight. Besides that, there is no attempt in this study to 
criticise methods and previous estimates of capital flight. The analysis of capital flight 
here serves only to justify a new legal approach of international taxation. The economic 
aspects of capital flight represent only a necessary step of the present analysis. The aim 
is to investigate the phenomenon of capital flight in order to understand the current 
profile of the international flow of capital, and, consequently, the position of developing 
countries. 
 
4.2. The meaning of capital flight adopted in this study 
 
On examining the literature of capital flight it becomes clear that there is no consensus 
about its concept and consequently its definition is directly related to the question being 
investigated. In fact, the discussion is focused on whether capital flight should measure 
only unrecorded flows or measure more broadly including recorded capital which would 
represent all outflow of capital.  
 
Collier and Schneider defended the broad measure, i.e. to include outflows officially 
recorded, based on the argument that all outflow of capital represents a loss of national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 231.  
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utility or welfare, without regard to whether it was a recorded or unrecorded capital. 
However, these authors also explained that when capital flight is measured narrowly, the 
social cost of the outflow of capital is represented by the reduction of the domestic tax 
base since unrecorded flows are not taxed.234 From the narrow perspective, it becomes 
clear that the problem with unrecorded outflows is not the investment being made 
abroad but the fact that the tax authority cannot tax such capital since it does not exist 
officially.  
 
Following the narrow perspective, Epstein measured capital flight based on the 
estimations of unrecorded capital. He defined capital flight as the transfer of assets 
abroad in order to reduce loss of principal, loss of return or loss of control over one’s 
financial wealth due to government sanctioned activities.235  
 
Another way to differentiate capital flight from other outflows is focusing on its 
motivation. While the latter leave a country seeking the best rate of return to invest, the 
former leave a country in order to escape some sort of regulation. In other words, 
whereas reported outflows look for diversification; capital flight tries to avoid some 
attitude of local government, which can be tax regulation. Reported outflows that seek 
diversification are not the problem that we are examining here. Furthermore, there might 
be some part of capital flight that is criminal money, i.e. money derived from illegal 
activities. However, the problem of capital flight examined here is not focused on its 
portion of criminal money, but the fact that they represent unreported outflows from 
countries with low level of development, i.e. countries with shortage of capital.  
 
Since the objective of this chapter is to analyse the phenomenon of capital flight in order 
to better understand the interest of developing countries on residents’ undeclared foreign 
investments, this chapter will adopt the definition of capital flight as the unrecorded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and C. Pattillo, ‘Flight Capital as Portfolio Choice’ (1999) IMF Working Paper 
WP/99/171, 27. B. Schneider, ‘Measuring Capital Flight: Estimates and Interpretations’ (2003) 104 
Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 4. 
235	  G. A. Epstein, ‘Capital Flight and Capital Controls in Developing Countries: an Introduction’ in 
Gerald A. Epstein (eds), Capital Flight and Capital Controls in Developing Countries (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2005), 4. 
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outflows of capital from countries. In other words, this study will adopt the narrow 
perspective of capital flight since it is interested in measuring the reduction of countries’ 
tax base and tax revenue caused by unrecorded capital outflows. Therefore, the focus 
will be on the relationship between capital flight and the net asset discrepancy.236 
 
As already mentioned, capital flight aims to escape some sort of regulation. Tax havens 
provide the perfect environment for capital flight to be allocated since the threshold that 
underpins their concept is also laxity of regulation (e.g. tax regulation, bank regulation, 
etc.). Thus, the problem of capital flight needs also to consider the activity of tax 
havens, since it is very hard to dissociate one phenomenon from the other. 
 
4.3. The behaviour of tax havens 
 
The behaviour of tax havens represents an important instrument in understanding how 
proper data of the international flow of capital might work. In the previous chapter, data 
of 14237 tax havens showed that these countries have higher stocks of assets than 
liabilities, which classified them as creditors. This situation suggests that if more tax 
havens were accounted in the analysis, the discrepancy would be reduced. In other 
words, their behaviour as creditors helps to reduce the net asset discrepancy identified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti were aware of the problem of capital flight. In their previous study about 
external wealth of nations (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations’ (n 171) 266-67, 
they used NEO as a measure of capital flight and added it to the total stocks to estimate countries’ IIP. In 
the database adopted (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 229-
33), however, they did not make systematic use of NEO when calculating countries’ IIP, but reported 
them separately. They understood that NEO values would have been partially captured by some data 
sources used to calculate their database such as BIS and CPIS because in these sources liability positions 
are derived from assets held by other countries. However, in fact these methods cannot capture the 
problem of capital flight since countries have badly reported their assets due to capital flight and, 
therefore, to reconstruct the liability position based on asset position does not exclude the impact of 
capital flight on data. In fact, this method can only capture part of the problem of capital flight if assets 
held by tax havens could be allocated to high tax jurisdictions. Even in this circumstance, there are 
limitations since in most cases tax havens cannot identify the beneficial owner of assets, rendering useless 
the identification of intermediary persons obtained from them. (IMF, ‘The Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey Guide: Second edition’, 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/cpis/2002/pdf/cpis_index.pdf> accessed 27 June 2011, 12.) Thus, 
even though Lane and Milesi-Ferretti tried to improve data with these other sources, the problem of 
capital flight still needs to be addressed.   
237 Bahrain, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, 
Panama, Singapore and Switzerland and Lebanon. 
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through the sum of countries’ IIP. But why can the behaviour of tax havens explain part 
of the discrepancy? 
 
The phenomenon of capital flight might be a possible explanation. As already 
mentioned, capital flight aims to avoid some sort of regulation and tax havens provide 
the perfect environment for its allocation. In the previous chapter, through the analysis 
of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database, 14 tax havens were identified and their IIP 
calculated. The table below synthesises those figures in millions of US dollars:238 
Table 4.3. (a) Evolution of tax havens’ IIP 
Tax havens' net position 
Years 1970 1980 1990 2000 2004 
IIP -13.725 -78.561 -337.746 -608.765 -1.024.532 
(Note: Evolution of tax havens’ IIP, demonstrating their increased position as asset holders) 
 
Regarding the list of 50 tax havens presented in chapter III, it becomes clear that the 
group of 14 tax havens represents only a small sample. The main limitation of 
researching in this area refers to availability of data since most tax havens does not 
report their international investment position. Having in mind the importance of this 
group of countries for the international flow of capital, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
elaborated a complementary study to estimate the stocks of assets and liabilities held by 
‘small international financial centres’. 239  The study elaborated by them provides 
complementary data for jurisdictions not included in their previous database.240	  
	  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti estimated the total amount of assets and liabilities held by 32 
small international financial centres for 2007.	  241	   Comparing this list with the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 It is important to note that figures provided in the table below differ from figures used in the previous 
chapter since here the values of stocks is presented in the years indicated, whereas there the figures 
represented the average of stocks of the periods indicated. 
239 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Cross-Border Investment in Small International Financial Centers’ (n 209) 
1-22. 
240 The adoption of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database is justified by the limited amount of information 
available from these jurisdictions. However, even though data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti represents a 
more complete source of information, they emphasised that data source used were not only incomplete but 
also often indirect. So, the authors made clear that the values estimated provide only a range of magnitude 
for those figures rather than a precise assessment. ibid 3. 
241 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s sample of 32 ‘small international financial centres’ was composed of: 
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman 
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provided in chapter III (tax havens’ list), both lists have in common 31 jurisdictions.242 
Thus, the new figures can complement data analysed in the previous chapter. Moreover, 
comparing the sample of 32 small international financial centres with the group of 14 
tax havens, which data were available from their previous study, there is an overlapping 
of 4 jurisdictions, i.e. countries included in the previous study that were also accounted 
in the new one.243 Excluding these jurisdictions, there is information available for a 
sample of 26 tax havens.244 This signifies that in putting together the previous outcomes 
with these ones, there is information available for 40 tax havens, out of a list of 50. This 
increases the reliability of the results identified in the previous chapter. 
 
The figures of total assets and liabilities of those small financial centres calculated in 
2007 were US$4,204,640 million and US$3,729,210 million, respectively. Adding up 
those figures, the outcome is US$475,430 million, which represents a net asset position 
for those small financial centres in 2007. This outcome is in line with the outcome 
identified for the 14 tax havens in the previous chapter. Carrying back the net asset 
position (US$475,330 million) to 2004 at an annual rate of 9%245, it can be concluded 
that if these jurisdictions were also included in the database adopted, they would reduce 
the discrepancy by more than US$367,119	  million. Thus, the behaviour of tax havens 
can explain, in a sense, part of the discrepancy. 
 
From a different angle, it is also possible to infer that the missing assets of high tax 
jurisdictions, which include high income OECD countries and developing ones, are 
related to tax havens’ behaviour, and, consequently, to the problem of capital flight. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Islands, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Macao, Mauritius, 
Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Palau, Panama, Samoa, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, Vanuatu and British Virgin Islands.  
242 The only jurisdiction accounted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti as a small international financial centre but 
not included in the tax havens’ list provided in chapter III is Palau. 
243 Jurisdictions included in both studies are: Bahrain, Lebanon, Mauritius and Panama. 
244 Cayman was not accounted since the magnitude of its data would distort the analysis performed. 
Furthermore, considering that there are still other tax havens missing, the figures of total assets and 
liabilities in tax havens might be still under-estimated. 
245 Hollingshead analysed the world growth in offshore deposits from 1996 to 2009 and identified a 
compound rate of 9 %. A. Hollingshead, ‘Privately Held, Non-Resident Deposits in Secrecy Jurisdictions’ 
(2010) Global Financial Integrity < 
http://www.gfip.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/gfi_privatelyheld_web.pdf> accessed 07, March 
2011. 
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instance, comparing data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) 
performed by the IMF, which provides information on countries’ liabilities of portfolio 
investment securities-equity based on information from assets held by investor countries 
with data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) compiled also by the IMF, but 
in which the liability position is informed by the country receiving the investment, i.e. 
debtor country, the differences on the measures are significant, as indicated in the table 
below:	  246 
Table 4.3. (b) Portfolio equity liability 
Portfolio Equity Liabilities - 2007 
Tax havens Liabilities by creditor countries (A) 
Liabilities by debtor country 
(B) 
Cayman Islands 753.621 2.200.000247 
Hong Kong 315.691 433.623 
Ireland 407.287 1.155.090 
Luxembourg 1.717.100 2.821.020 
Singapore 127.683 165.137 
Switzerland 604.944 725.644 
Total 3.926.325 7.500.514 
(Note: Portfolio equity liability: difference between values reported by creditor countries and by debtor countries).  
 
Column A shows figures reported by investor countries, whereas column B reflects 
figures reported by countries receiving the investment. In theory, both figures should 
match since what represents an asset for one country is a liability for another one. 
However, in practice what is verified is a significant gap between those forms of 
reporting assets/liabilities. The missing assets in high tax jurisdictions’ reports show up 
as liabilities in tax havens. In terms of flows, the higher value of column B indicates that 
there might be unreported flows coming out from high tax jurisdictions to tax havens.248	  
This situation is in line with the dynamics of capital flight.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti pointed out this situation, using data from Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
United States. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 233. 
247 Due to the fact that the Cayman Islands do not report their IIP to the IMF, US$2,2 trillion at the end of 
2007 is based on information provided by hedge funds. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Cross-Border 
Investment in Small International Financial Centers’ (n 209) 7. 
248 Based on the difference between portfolio equity liabilities reported by destination country and 
investor countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti concluded that while some progress could be made in 
determining where some of underreported assets were held, it was still hard to identify which countries 
resident hold such assets. Lane and Milesi Ferretti, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II’ (n 174) 233. 
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Considering the net asset position of tax havens and the gap identified when cross-
matching figures of assets reported by investor countries with figures of liabilities 
reported by tax havens, it becomes clear that the behaviour of tax havens can explain 
part of the discrepancy and this situation might be associated to the phenomenon of 
capital flight. Of course, there is a substantial error in the database, however the 
arguments developed here create an alternative to explain at least part of the 
discrepancy. 
 
In the next section, the situation identified above will be examined from the perspective 
of tax policies. The objective is to investigate if there is a tax policy justification for the 
behaviour of tax havens and, consequently, for the problem of capital flight. Of course, 
it is impossible either to predict the amount of capital flight that can be justified by this 
argument or to ignore the importance of other factors such as the economic and political 
stability offered by developed countries on the determination of the magnitude of capital 
flight. However, the analysis of the impact of tax policies on capital’s flows will help to 
understand if there are legal arguments that justify the discrepancy. 
 
4.4. Capital flight and the interplay of tax policies 
 
The phenomenon of capital flight might be explained by the incentive induced by the 
interplay of tax policies enacted by countries. There are two principles that underpin 
these tax policies: (i) source taxation and (ii) residence taxation. Source taxation allows 
a given jurisdiction to tax all income generated in its territory, but elsewhere income is 
not taxed at all. Residence taxation, on the other hand, focuses on the person that 
receives the income rather than its origin, which means that all income of a resident is 
taxed wherever earned.249  
 
Countries can freely apply these principles of international taxation. However, in 
practice, standard tax policy behaviour can be identified on how source and residence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 C.E. McLure Jr., ‘U.S. Laws and Capital Flight from Latin America’ (1988) 2687 NBER Working 
Paper 1, 6. 
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taxation are applied. In a simplified manner, provisions of tax treaties establish that 
active income is taxed at source, whereas passive income is preferably taxed at 
residence. These provisions might have induced countries’ tax policy behaviour.250 The 
word ‘preferably’ just mentioned denotes the controversy involving residence taxation 
of passive income. The tax loophole, therefore, that encourages capital flight, arises 
from the interplay of residence and source taxation on certain categories of passive 
income in which there is no worldwide tax policy consensus. In other words, the impact 
of tax policies on capital flight is basically related to passive income (i.e. income from 
portfolio investment), since active income (i.e. profits from FDI) is taxed worldwide at 
source, not offering huge controversies besides the definition of tax base and tax rate.251 
In terms of motivation, capital flight is not leaving the country only to seek the best rate 
of return to invest. Capital flight is leaving the country to avoid some attitude of 
domestic government. 
 
In the past, most developing countries taxed their residents and non-residents only at 
source, leaving foreign income untaxed.252 Nowadays, most developing countries tax 
their residents’ income on a worldwide basis, while non-residents are only taxed at 
source, following the standard tax behaviour adopted by developed countries. In 
practice, the implementation of residence taxation is restrained by administrative 
constraints, since they are unable to control and to levy taxes on foreign income.253 
Consequently, many developing countries still levy taxes on non-residents’ passive 
income earned in their territories in order to compensate for their ineffective taxation of 
residents’ foreign income. Thus, the levy of withholding taxes on non-residents’ passive 
income can be interpreted as a sign of the inefficiencies of developing countries’ tax 
regimes.254  
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In this context, source taxation is justified by the inability of developing countries’ 
governments to enforce their domestic tax laws against capital flight. Developing 
countries understand that they limit their exposure to tax avoidance by taxing capital 
income when it leaves the country.255 Thus, there are two weaknesses in the developing 
countries’ international tax policies: (i) ineffective taxation of residents’ foreign income; 
and (ii) levy of withholding taxes on non-residents’ passive income since in terms of tax 
competition they become less attractive.256 These two drawbacks combined with tax 
policy enacted by developed countries to tax non-residents’ passive income as well as 
the tax policy of tax havens create the perfect scenario for capital flight. Capital flight’s 
motivation is to avoid some sort of regulation and the way tax policies enacted by 
developing countries, developed countries and tax havens interact create the ideal 
situation for it. 
 
Developed countries have been applying worldwide taxation for a long time. In practical 
terms it means that their residents’ incomes are taxed worldwide, independently of 
where the source of income is, while non-residents’ interest is usually exempted. 
Developed countries usually apply ‘pure’ residence taxation, which is not justified by 
the raising of tax revenue but by the inflow of capital that rebalances their Balance of 
Payments.  
 
The United States’ (US) portfolio investment taxation illustrates this argument. The 
United States implemented gradually the exemption of income from portfolio 
investment by first enacting the Foreign Investors Tax Act (FITA) in 1966 and then by 
implementing the Tax Reform of 1984. The FITA established that investment income 
received by foreigners engaged in business in the US would be included in the taxable 
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256 Thus, withholding taxes is not a problem per se, but it becomes a drawback in terms of tax 
competition, when tax policies enacted by developed countries are taken into consideration. In this sense, 
Harris and Oliver argued: ‘The source country’s right to tax is not without limitation. First, it may be 
limited by practical constraints. Capital importing countries find it difficult to tax highly mobile income, 
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income from the business only if effectively connected with such business; however, 
holding securities for investment purposes did not constitute a trade or business, being 
taxed with a reduced tax rate. The Tax Reform of 1984 expanded the benefits offered to 
security investments by exempting interest paid to foreigners for portfolio debt 
obligations.257 These tax policies were enacted in order to rebalance problems in the US 
Balance of Payments since the exemption offered to portfolio investment made the 
inflow of this category of investment soar.  
 
Other developed countries have enacted tax policies that benefit foreign investment in 
securities. For instance, in 1985 Japan repealed a 20% withholding tax levied on interest 
paid to non-resident bondholders; while a tax policy enacted in January 1989 by the 
West German Government which levied 10% withholding tax on interest paid to non-
residents was repealed after only six months (July, 1989) due to its negative impact on 
the German market.258  
 
There is a case study of the impact of the US withholding tax and the use of the 
Netherlands Antilles-US tax treaty that demonstrated the sensitivity of capital flows to 
withholding taxes. This study analysed the impact of the US 30% withholding tax on 
interest income paid to foreign persons, demonstrating that in order to avoid the tax 
costs of borrowing domestically, US parent companies frequently used a tax scheme 
involving the Netherlands Antilles to benefit from its tax treaty.259 
 
The scheme consisted of the US parent company establishing a subsidiary in the 
Netherlands Antilles that acted as a conduit for the parent company to borrow overseas. 
Then, the Antilles company floated a bond issue in a European financial market. The 
borrowed funds passed through the Antilles subsidiary in order to achieve its final 
destination, i.e. the US parent company. Later, interest payments on the bonds made by 
the parent corporation flowed out of the US tax-free through the Antilles to foreign 
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investors. The US-Netherlands Antilles tax treaty granted this tax-free flow of interest 
from US to the Antilles. After the US repealed the 30% withholding tax on interest 
income paid to foreign investors, corporate issues through the Netherlands Antilles 
practically disappeared and US corporate bonds sales to foreigners remarkably 
increased. This case-study proved how sensitive investors are to withholding taxes on 
interest income.260 
 
Another important point highlighted by the same case-study is the responsiveness of the 
flow of capital when the lending country allows a foreign tax credit to offset the 
withholding tax charged by the source country. Foreign tax credits can eliminate the 
impact of withholding taxes on the flow of capital only when the foreign investor can 
claim 100% of tax credits against their domestic income tax. In this situation, the foreign 
tax credit only reallocates income between tax authorities of developed and developing 
countries. However, in other situations withholding taxes still obstruct foreign 
investment. For instance, tax-exempted institutions have no interest in investing in a 
country where withholding taxes are levied since they do not have any domestic tax 
liability against which foreign withholding tax can be credited. Another consequence 
when tax credits do not fully offset the withholding tax levied at the source is the 
increased cost of borrowing since investors will require a higher pre-tax interest rate.261 
In practice, therefore, even though tax credits can offset the increased tax liability 
imposed by withholding taxes on non-residents’ passive income, their effectiveness 
depends on resident countries’ tax policy, which cannot be controlled by source 
countries, limiting this strategy. 
 
Capital flight from developing countries represents unrecorded outflow of capital 
encouraged not only by developed countries’ tax policies that do not tax non-residents’ 
income at source but also by the economic and political stability inherent in developed 
countries’ markets. However, with the adoption of residence taxation by developing 
countries, taxpayers can only keep their zero marginal tax rates on foreign investments if 
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they do not report their foreign income to the developing countries’ tax authorities. In 
practice, it is hard for developing countries’ tax authorities to track this illegal flow 
since investors usually make triangular operations, using a ‘tax haven’ that inputs 
asymmetric information in the flow, curbing the identification of the beneficial owner of 
the investments. Therefore, the adoption of residence taxation by developing countries is 
inefficient without complementary administrative measures (e.g. exchange of 
information and transparency of tax havens). As a consequence, in order to offset this 
flaw of their tax systems, developing countries levy withholding taxes on non-residents’ 
interest and other types of passive income, reducing even more the attractiveness of their 
domestic markets to foreign investors. 
 
The taxation imposed by developing countries, therefore, is asymmetric, discouraging 
both domestic and foreign investments. Domestic investments are prevented due to 
unbalanced taxation: while domestic passive income is fully taxed; foreign passive 
income is exempted by developed countries’ tax policies. For example, if an investor 
lends capital domestically, the interest received will be taxed; whereas when lent abroad, 
it will be exempted. From the perspective of foreign investors, on the other hand, the 
levy of withholding taxes signifies an increase on their total tax burden (assuming that 
tax credits cannot completely off-set withholding taxes), added to the extra risk inherent 
of developing countries’ financial markets. 
 
Capital flight is also a problem to developed countries, however its dynamics is different 
which might facilitate its curb, as explained. Developed countries usually adopt 
residence taxation to tax their residents’ income which signifies that not only income 
generated in the country, but also abroad, needs to be reported by residents to be taxed 
by them. In order to avoid tax, unreported outflows from them as well as income 
sourced abroad that would have to be reported are maintained in tax havens. Tax havens 
work as offshore parking of income. This unreported capital located in tax havens could 
be invested in developed and developing countries. If invested in developing countries 
this capital would be taxed at source, reducing the rate of return of the investment. On 
the other hand, if invested in their own jurisdictions (round tripping), this ‘non-
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residents’ income’ is not taxed at all since developed countries do not tax non-residents’ 
income at source and as this investment is located in tax havens, it will not be taxed at 
the residence either. There is, therefore, an incentive for capital flight from developed 
countries to be invested in their own economies. This facilitates the procedure of its 
identification since in this case developed countries represent the source country, being 
able to require further information of the capital invested in their economies.262  
 
The situation described in the previous paragraph made clear that capital flight from 
developed countries starts as a situation of tax evasion, i.e. illicit outflows and then it 
turns up as a case of tax avoidance, i.e. ‘foreign’ capital not taxed at source due to the 
enforcement of the residence principle by developed countries. 
 
At this point, the current analysis made clear that there is a tax policy basis that can 
explain the phenomenon of capital flight. The enactment of source or residence taxation 
of passive income (i.e. income derived from portfolio investment) by countries does not 
generate per se the problem of capital flight, however the interplay of these policies 
creates a breach for capital to avoid taxation. In this sense, the incentives usually offered 
by developing countries to attract FDI compared with their source taxation of non-
residents’ passive income encourages the round tripping of capital flight via tax havens, 
i.e. unrecorded outflows returning as non-residents’ FDI. 
 
It is not possible to predict exactly how much of the discrepancy can be explained by 
capital flight nor the amount of capital flight that can be justified by tax policies enacted 
by countries. This is a limitation of the analysis performed. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the argument developed showed that there is a tax policy justification for 
capital to leave developing countries and to be invested in developed ones, through tax 
havens.  
 
In the next section, estimates of capital flight will be examined in order to provide 
further evidence of its relevance. There are only few methods available to measure the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 This idea will be discussed further in Chapter VIII. 
152	  
	  
narrow approach of capital flight, in which capital flight represents only unrecorded 
outflows of countries, as discussed next. 
 
The arguments developed in the next section will bring once again to the discussion the 
question of whether it still makes sense to debate international taxation in terms of 
allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries, regarding developing 
countries as capital importers and developed countries as capital exporters. The 
relevance of capital flight will challenge this approach, emphasising the importance of 
unrecorded outflows. The limitation of source taxation might not be the main issue 
hampering developing countries’ tax base. 
 
4.5. The importance of capital flight 
 
4.5.1. Method adopted to calculate capital flight 
  
Before analysing some figures of capital fight, the method selected (the Hot Money 
method) will be briefly explained as well as the reasons that other methods could not be 
adopted. 
 
According to the Hot Money method, the Net Errors and Omissions (NEO) account of 
the BOP is used as the only estimation of unrecorded capital outflows. The NEO is an 
account designed to balance the other accounts in the BOP since even though, in 
principle, every recorded transaction in the BOP is represented by two entries with equal 
values and opposite signs (one of these entries is designated a credit and the other is 
designated a debit), in practice, the sum of all credit entries usually differs from the sum 
of all debit entries due to different sources of data.263 Consequently, there may be a 
summary net credit or net debit. The NEO is then used to balance the accounts, i.e. its 
value is equal to the unbalanced amount with the sign reversed. For instance, if a current 
account surplus is not offset by a financial account deficit and/or reserve deficit, there 
will be a negative NEO, representing capital flight. There are shortcomings in assuming 
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that a negative NEO represents capital flight since its negative sign can be justified by 
other problems in the accounts, not only from unrecorded outflow of capital. This is the 
usual critique of this method of measuring capital flight.  
 
The NEO is therefore an indicator of capital flight of relative accuracy. Despite that, a 
large, persistent negative NEO that is not reversed should cause concern.264 Such NEO 
might jeopardise the interpretation of BOP figures. In fact, a large negative NEO may 
also have implications for interpretation of the IIP. Thus, although there are some 
shortcomings in interpreting the NEO values as a measure of capital flight, a long period 
evaluation of its sign and value might be a critical indicator of the reliability of the IIP 
of countries reflected in official statistics. Furthermore, there are data available to 
calculate capital flight based on NEO for a significant number of developing countries, 
developed countries and tax havens. Therefore, even though there are other methods that 
can estimate capital flight more accurately, the NEO represents the method with more 
data available for the three groups of countries analysed.  
 
There are two different measures of NEO available: NEO from BOPS and NEO from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database. Considering that the objective of analysing capital 
flight is to compare it with the discrepancy between the stocks of assets and liabilities 
held by countries, NEO from BOPS will be accumulated from 1994 to 2004, since 
before 1994 there is a lot of data missing from developing countries and the year 2004 
represents the most recent year of the discrepancy calculated by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti. The NEO from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database represents accumulated 
figures, which means that 2004 NEO figures represent accumulated values from 1970 to 
2004. However, it will be necessary to identify the evolution of the NEO based on its 
annual evolution since only negative figures can be accounted as capital flight through 
this method. The 2004 negative NEO signifies that when putting together NEO from 
1970 to 2004 negative figures were higher than positive ones.  
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Regarding the size of each group, the group of developing countries is composed of 86 
countries.265 The group of developed countries is composed of 22 countries,266 classified 
as high income OECD countries, following the same parameters explained in the 
previous chapter. The group of tax havens is represented by 14 countries.267 The IIP of 
those countries reflect figures from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database. 
 
Due to the fact that this study adopted the narrow approach of capital flight, the other 
indicated method would be the Dooley’s method268 since it attempts to identify only 
unrecorded private outflows of capital. However, nowadays its use is limited due to the 
fact that the standard components of the fifth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual 
(BPM5) do not require capital flows to be compiled by date of maturity which means 
that information required to adopt this method is no longer available.269 Thus, even 
though this method was the most appropriate one to identify unrecorded outflows of 
capital, and, consequently, to adjust countries’ IIP, in practice this method could not be 
adopted. 
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The method mostly used in the literature to calculate capital flight is the World Bank 
Residual method. The main idea of this method is that sources of funds exceeding use of 
funds represent private outflow of capital, i.e. capital flight. Sources of funds are 
represented by (i) increases in net external indebtedness and (ii) net flow of foreign 
investment; whereas use of funds is represented by (i) current account deficit and (ii) net 
value of Reserves.270 In a sense, capital flight captured by the World Bank Residual 
method represents the sum of identified private flows plus the net errors and omissions 
from BOPS.271 Thus, the World Bank Residual method adopts the broader approach of 
the definition of capital flight, including not only unrecorded flows but also recorded 
private flows officially reported in the Balance of Payments. That is the reason that this 
method will not be adopted.  
 
Thus, considering the limitations of the data available and the fact that the Dooley’s 
method could not be applied in practice, in the next section, the only method used to 
estimate capital flight, understood as unrecorded private flows, is the Hot Money 
method. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that there was no effort made to improve the 
original data used, if there was any problem such as missing information or even 
inaccurate estimates. There were, therefore, neither adjustments nor attempts to 
complete the unrecorded values in the official figures provided by the IMF. The analysis 
of capital flight figures restricts itself to providing a measure of relevance of these 
outflows in order to understand its importance for the international tax debate, involving 
developed countries, developing ones and tax havens. 
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4.5.2. Analysing the data 
 
  4.5.2.1. The Hot Money method 
 
The magnitude of capital flight using the Hot Money method is estimated in the table 
below (all values are in millions of US dollars): 
 
Table 4.5.2.1. Hot Money and Capital Flight  
Estimating Capital 
Flight (KF) I. Hot Money Method 
II. Countries’ 
IIP III. IIP (+) NEO 
Groups 1994-2004 N. of countries 
(A) NEO from 
BOPS (1994-2004) 
(B) NEO Lane 
and Milesi (1970-
2004) 
(C) Stocks of 
Liab. – Assets 
(1970-2004) 
Net = (A) + 
(C) 
Net = (B) + 
(C) 
High Income OECD 22 -381,153 -1,300,476 2,473,641 2,092,488 1,173,165 
Tax Havens      14 -59,751 -91,295 -1,024,532 -1,084,283 -1,115,827 
BCIMRS 6 -244,954 -398,669 536,716 291,762 138,047 
Other Developing 
Countries 80 -185,792 -283,663 1,095,400 909,608 811,737 
Total Developing 
Countries 86 -430,746 -682,332 1,632,117 1,201,371 949,785 
Total of all groups 122 -871,650 -2,074,103 3,081,226 2,209,576 1,007,123 
(Note: Analysis of the impact of accumulated flight capital calculated through the Hot Money method on 
countries’ IIP). 
 
The table provides a general picture of the evolution of accumulated flight capital272 
calculated through the Hot Money method from 1970 to 2004 based on NEO from 
BOPS and from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database. To calculate ‘accumulated’ NEO 
from BOPS, annual values were simply added up. No further adjustments were 
accounted such as inflation and interest earnings, which produced a very conservative 
measure of flight capital. There is, however, one fact that justifies the differences 
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between NEO from BOPS and NEO from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database: the 
difference in the periods analysed since whereas Lane and Milesi-Ferretti compiled all 
data available since 1970, BOPS’ data reflect only figures from 1994 onwards. Besides 
this shortcoming, the availability of data to apply the Hot Money method allowed the 
comparison of estimates among three different groups of countries: high income OECD 
countries, tax havens and developing countries. Developing countries are divided in two 
groups: (i) BCIMRS273 and (ii) other developing countries. 
 
The structure of the table is underpinned by the idea of comparing estimates of 
accumulated flight capital with the net values of stocks of foreign assets and liabilities. 
The first part (I.) provides estimates of accumulated flight capital calculated through the 
Hot Money Method; the second part (II.) provides figures of net values of stocks (i.e. 
countries’ IIP); and the third part (III.) demonstrates the impact of accumulated flight 
capital over countries’ IIP by adding part (I.) to part (II.).  
 
It is important to understand the sign of figures provided in the table before focusing on 
the analysis of the outcomes. Only negative NEO represents capital flight. That is the 
reason that part (I.) provides only negative figures.274 The second part, on the other 
hand, provides positive and negative figures; the reason for that is the fact that stocks of 
assets are reduced from stocks of liabilities, which means that whether liabilities are 
higher than assets, the figure is positive; whereas if assets are higher than liabilities, the 
figure is negative. Consequently, in order to verify the impact of accumulated flight 
capital calculated through the Hot Money method (part III.), it was necessary only to 
add column (A) and column (B) to column (C). In other words, capital flight represents 
assets held abroad by non-residents, therefore, considering the convention adopted in 
this study that liabilities are represented with a positive sign (due to the fact that in terms 
of flows they represent inflows of capital) and assets are represented with a negative 
sign, in order to adjust countries’ IIP with figures of accumulated flight capital, it was 
necessary only to add NEO (column A & B) to countries’ IIP (column C). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia and South Africa. 
274 Positive figures were not accounted since they did not represent capital flight. Therefore, NEO of each 
group is composed by only negative values identified when analysing each countries’ figures. 
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On examining the estimates of accumulated flight capital through the Hot Money 
method, at first glance, considerable differences are identified between NEO from 
BOPS (A) and NEO from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database (B). In a sense, estimates 
of accumulated flight capital from developing countries through NEO from BOPS and 
from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database should be higher. One justification for that is 
the fact that there is a lot of data missing before 1994. Therefore, even though columns 
(A) and (B) refer to different periods, in practice most data from developing countries 
are available only from 1994 onwards even in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s database. In 
contrast, NEO from BOPS and NEO from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti in relation to High 
Income OECD countries are substantially different since there is a significant amount of 
information available for this group since 1970, which means that the difference is 
justified by the length of period analysed for each variable. Despite these limitations, the 
analysis of constant negative NEO might be interpreted as a conservative measure of 
accumulated flight capital. 
 
Focusing on the figures from column (B), the first outstanding evidence is the fact that 
even though high income OECD countries concentrate most stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities, in terms of accumulated flight capital, calculated through the Hot Money 
method, their estimates (US$1,300,476 million) are only twice the value of accumulated 
flight capital from developing countries (US$682,332 million), even considering the 
limitation of data available for developing countries before 1994. In a sense, considering 
NEO from BOPS during the period that there is substantial amount of information for 
these both groups of countries, what is interesting to note is the fact that is the total 
value of NEO from developing countries (US$430,476 million) is slightly higher than 
high income OECD figure (US$381,153 million), suggesting that if information from 
developing countries were better reported since 1970, the value of accumulated NEO of 
these two groups would have the same magnitude.  
 
The figures of accumulated flight capital from tax havens are significantly lower 
(US$91,295 million) when compared to the other two groups. The outcomes from tax 
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havens are consistent with their tax policies that encourage non-residents to hold assets 
in their jurisdictions. Therefore, it is not useful to measure accumulated flight capital 
from tax havens. In fact, regarding the dynamics of the flows, capital flight should be 
allocated in their jurisdictions. This conclusion is based on the argument that even 
though tax havens work as intermediaries in the international flow of capital, when 
comparing assets reported by investor countries with their internal reports of liabilities 
held by them, the latter figures are higher indicating that the missing assets of high tax 
jurisdictions may be allocated there. 
 
The outcomes presented in column (III.) of the table represent low net values of stocks 
of liabilities and assets held by developing countries and high income OECD countries 
since the sum of column (A) and (B) to column (C) aimed to add up a portion of assets 
that were missing from countries’ official figures. However, the analysis cannot explain 
the entire value of the discrepancy. 
 
Thus, considering the limitations of applying other methods to calculate the accumulated 
flight capital followed by the flaws in assuming that NEO represents only unrecorded 
outflows of private capital, it is very hard to prove that the discrepancy represents only 
capital flight since there might be also an error i.e. unexplained values. However 
considering that (i) the discrepancy significantly increased during the period analysed; 
(ii) the difference between assets reported by high tax jurisdictions and liabilities 
reported by tax havens based on CPIS data; and (iii) the increased participation of tax 
havens in the international financial flow, it can be assumed that there is a considerable 
amount of capital flight affecting countries’ IIP. NEO can help to estimate capital flight, 
however capital flight cannot explain the total value of the discrepancy.  
 
Having in mind the limitation explained in the previous paragraph, in 2004, developing 
countries’ net stocks of portfolio investment, which include portfolio equity, debt and 
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other investments, corresponded to US$1,116,183275 million, i.e. stocks of liabilities 
surpassed stocks of assets in this amount. It should be remembered, however, that this 
figure reflects assets and liabilities held by the private and the public sectors. The 
definition of capital flight adopted in this study refers to private unrecorded outflows of 
capital, i.e. figures that official statistics cannot capture. Thus, in order to identify the 
effective impact of capital flight measured through the Hot Money method (US$682,332 
million), it would be necessary to segregate the public from the private amount. In 
practice, however, the data do not allow this separation. Despite this constraint, it can be 
concluded that the impact of capital flight is relevant since if not reversing their position 
of debtor to creditor, in relation to the private amount, their position would become 
more balanced, affecting the assumption that developing countries are capital importers 
of portfolio investment. Thus, even a very conservative estimation of capital flight, 
based on NEO, contributes to the argument that it is very hard to validate the traditional 
assumptions in the current scenario. The understanding of the impact of tax evasion 
(capital flight) on the legal debate brings up the effective interest of developing 
countries in international taxation.  
 
In sum, this section aimed to show that there is evidence in the data that demonstrates 
the relevance of capital flight to high tax jurisdictions. Capital flight needs to be 
considered when discussing international taxation. Consequently, notwithstanding the 
difficulty of classifying countries as capital importers and capital exporters in the 
context of financial globalisation, the problem of capital flight makes this aspect even 
more complicated since it distorts the position of countries, overestimating their debtor’s 
position.  
 
But what is the implication of capital flight for taxation? Capital flight represents loss of 
tax base, since income derived from assets held abroad is not reported, and, 
consequently, countries cannot tax it. However, to predict how much of capital flight 
would increase tax revenue is very speculative. It is very hard to foresee a confident 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 The difference between this figure and the one presented in Chapter III refers to the fact that here it is 
presented as the value of net stocks of portfolio investment in 2004, whereas there the tables reflect the 
average of net stocks per period analysed (1970-79; 1980-89; 1990-99, 2000-04). 
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figure because it relies on taxpayers’ behaviour. Therefore, even though the exact 
amount of tax revenue is difficult to predict, we can assume that additional income 
would be raised. Furthermore, another interesting aspect that also needs to be considered 
is the fact that not all income reported could be taxed by countries. There are also 
internal inefficiencies that constrain countries’ tax bases. Thus, added to the difficulty of 
predicting the behaviour of capital flight, it is also necessary to remember the fact that 
other problems also restrict countries’ tax bases (e.g. administrative limitations), and 
consequently, the amount of tax revenue raised by them. The ideal situation would occur 
if unreported assets could become part of countries’ tax bases. To this extent, the values 
predicted in the next paragraph only aim to provide a dimension of the capital flight 
problem in terms of taxation. If countries would be able to effectively raise that amount 
of tax revenue is another issue. 
 
According to estimates of Tax Justice Network, the value of assets held offshore by the 
world’s high net-worth individuals in 2005 lay in the range of US$11 – US$12 
trillion.276 Hence, the amount of accumulated flight capital estimated in this section 
would represent only 19% (US$ 2 trillion - total column B) of total assets held offshore. 
It is a conservative estimate; however it already represents a significant amount of 
wealth. To this extent, if we follow the methodology adopted by Cobham to calculate 
the loss of tax revenue that these assets (US$682,332 billion –column B for developing 
countries) might represent, we find out that on applying an interest rate of return of 
7.5% per year, these assets could generate an income of US$51.2 billion and, 
consequently, the annual tax loss would be approximately US$15.4 billion (income tax 
rate of 30%).277 In 2004, developing countries received from OECD countries as 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements of US$79.8 billion.278 The 
comparison of the loss of tax revenue with ODA disbursements (20%) in 2004 made us 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 The range of US$11–US$12 trillion is based on data from Boston Consulting Group, McKinsey’s, 
Merrill Lynch and the Bank for International Settlements. Tax Justice Network, ‘The Price of Offshore’, 
<http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Briefing_Paper_-
_The_Price_of_Offshore_14_MAR_2005.pdf> accessed 24 July 2011. 
277 A. Cobham, ‘Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Development Finance’, 129 Working Paper Number 
<http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps129.pdf> accessed 18 October 2010. 
278  OECD, ‘Statistics: DAC2a ODA Disbursements’, 
<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A> accessed 18 October 2010. 
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realise that developing countries would need much less financial assistance if they could 
tax the income generated from capital flight, even based on very conservative figures. 
 
Comparing the figures of accumulated flight capital estimated through the Hot Money 
method with the values of assets held offshore by the world’s high net-worth 
individuals, it becomes clear that the former represents a very conservative figure. One 
possible explanation for this difference is the fact that capital flight estimated here 
reflects mainly illegal flows, i.e. unrecorded outflows of capital, whereas the amount of 
private non-resident deposits held in secrecy jurisdictions encompasses legal and illegal 
flows of capital. Due to the behaviour of tax havens, situations of tax evasion (illegal 
flows) are mixed up with tax avoidance (legal flows). Even though most tax havens are 
also developing countries, they are jeopardising other developing countries’ tax base.  
 
Following this line of reasoning, it is interesting to note, as debated in Chapters VII and 
VIII, that there is much more control to combat capital flight in the developed world 
rather than in developing countries. In these circumstances, tax evasion might be 
replaced by tax avoidance (i.e. more sophisticated mechanisms to escape taxation). 
 
As discussed in the body of this chapter, there are many different ways to estimate 
capital flight. A lot has been written about the importance of tax havens and the amount 
of assets held offshore. However, the discussion was not clear about what is the 
effective problem. In a sense, studies have provided different estimates of the problem 
represented by the behaviour of tax havens without making clear what they are referring 
to. Therefore, the objective of this section was not to calculate better estimates of capital 
flight than the ones predicted by previous studies. The main idea here was only to 
explain the problem of capital flight and how it is affecting developing countries, from a 
tax perspective.  
 
Finally, the analysis of capital flight proved that it is even harder to characterise a 
country as capital importer and capital exporter. Capital flight needs to be considered in 
order to avoid overestimates of countries’ debtor position. The classification of countries 
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as capital importers and capital exporters in terms of flows has left aside the problem of 
capital flight. Consequently, if the discussion about international taxation remains 
focused on allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries based on 
the old assumptions, the effective interest of developing countries will not be addressed. 
In other words, to increase developing countries’ tax base, the importance of capital 
flight needs to be regarded. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
The relevance of capital flight to developing countries proved that the crisis of residence 
taxation faced by developed countries is also affecting them since it became evident that 
developing countries do need instruments to tax income derived from foreign assets held 
abroad by their residents. The enlargement of source taxation is not the correct measure 
to improve the tax base of developing countries. This means that it is not limited source 
taxation that jeopardises developing countries’ tax base, but the amount of capital flight 
that remains untaxed. 
 
Developing countries need to understand their effective interest in international taxation. 
To this extent, assuming that a significant amount of accumulated flight capital might be 
invested as portfolio investment, as suggested by the figures of Chapter III, the analysis 
of the principles that have underpinned taxation of income derived from portfolio 
investment as well as developing countries’ experience in this area represents the next 
step of this study. 
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Chapter V. Taxation of Portfolio Investment 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Before the current process of globalisation, foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
significantly higher than portfolio investment. Consequently, portfolio investment was a 
secondary issue in the international tax debate. It was not necessary to distinguish the 
flow of cross border investment between FDI and portfolio investment.279 The increased 
importance of portfolio investment in the global economy changed this scenario. Figures 
of the international flow of capital can easily demonstrate this new reality: in 2007, in a 
sample of 151 countries,280 inflows of FDI corresponded to 2,298,280 millions of 
dollars; while inflows of portfolio investment reached the value of 3,577,740 millions of 
dollars.281  
 
Despite economic evidence of the increased importance of portfolio investment, only a 
few legal studies in the current literature have addressed taxation of portfolio income in 
this new context.282 Moreover, the studies available approached the subject only from 
the perspective of developed countries. One reason for that might be the fact that this 
type of investment is still concentrated in these countries.283 However, the concentration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 As previously discussed, FDI is defined as an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which a 
direct investor, who is resident in another country, owns 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting 
power (for an incorporated enterprise) or the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise). On the other 
hand, portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities that corresponds to less than 10% of the 
ownership of the foreign entity made by individuals or corporation, plus debt securities, including bonds 
and notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives. IMF, ‘BOPS Manual’ (n 152) 6. 
280 The sample of 151 countries is composed of 22 High Income OECD countries, 29 tax havens and 100 
developing countries. Further details of these data are available in Chapter III. 
281 IMF, International Financial Statistics (2009). ESDS International. University of Manchester. 
282 D. J. Frisch, ‘The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches’ (1990) 47 
Tax Notes, 1-17; M. J. Graetz and I. Grinberg, ‘Taxing International Portfolio Income’ (2002-03) 56 Tax 
Law Review, 537-86; A. Schindel and A. Atchabahian, ‘General Report’ in International Fiscal 
Association (ed.), Source and Residence: New Configuration of their Principles, (vol. 90a, Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international, Sdu Fiscale & Financiële Uitgevers 2005) 21-99;  
283 Graetz, based on the US Treasury Report on Benchmarked Survey of US Ownership of Foreign 
Securities (1998), argued that: ‘Although US portfolio investments are widespread throughout the world, 
two-thirds of such investment is in 10 countries, with 5 countries (UK, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands 
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of this type of investment in developed countries should not lead to the misguided 
conclusion that taxation of portfolio investment is of limited interest to developing 
countries. As the figures analysed in Chapter III suggest, a substantial amount of capital 
flight might be probably invested as portfolio investment. Therefore, the relevance of 
portfolio investment and, consequently its taxation, cannot be underestimated for 
developing countries. Even though the current debate has not yet addressed this issue, to 
understand where we are in relation to taxation of portfolio investment, three different 
approaches will be examined:  (i) economic theory; (ii) legal debate; and (iii) practical 
aspect. Even though it seems that these three approaches do not fit together, their 
analysis will provide a broader perspective to understand where we are in terms of 
taxation of portfolio investment. In a sense, they are not complementary arguments, 
which means that each one of them does not need to be understood in relation to the 
other, but they input additional information on taxation of portfolio investment in an 
autonomous way.284 
 
The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to analyse taxation of passive income, i.e. 
income derived from portfolio investment and classified as interest, dividends or capital 
gains, from three different angles. Despite the assumption that developing countries are 
mainly interested in FDI, until now it has also been presumed that developing countries 
are better off by enforcing source taxation of non-residents’ portfolio investments 
through the levy of withholding taxes; whereas developed countries prefer to apply 
residence taxation on income derived from portfolio investment. These assumptions, 
which are also associated to countries’ economic profile as capital importers and capital 
exporters, have been used in the economic and legal discourse, as demonstrated next.  
 
The analysis performed through those three different approaches will show different 
problems affecting taxation of portfolio investment. In a sense, it will highlight the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Germany) attracting more than $100 billion each of such investment’. M. J. Graetz, ‘The David R. 
Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and 
Unsatisfactory Policies’ (2001) 54 Tax Law Review 261, 315. 
284 I. Roxan, (‘Understanding International Taxation in the Age of Globalisation’. Seminar delivered at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science on the 24th November, 2010). Quotation authorised by 
the author. 
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that income derived from portfolio investment is very hard to tax due to the mobility of 
this type of investment.  
 
Regarding economic theory, taxation of portfolio investment will be examined through 
the criterion of economic efficiency. The criterion of economic efficiency is the 
cornerstone element of neutrality policies, which analyses international taxation in terms 
of the distortions it causes on the international flow of capital. Neutrality policies are 
based on the idea of identifying countries as capital importers and capital exporters since 
it examines taxation in terms of incentives created for inbounds and outbonds of 
investment. As demonstrated previously, nowadays we need to distinguish between FDI 
and portfolio investment, in addition to the fact that flows are much more bidirectional. 
Considering these new assumptions, neutrality policies will be tested in order to verify 
whether they can still justify tax policies applied to portfolio investment.  
 
In relation to the legal debate, the standard tax policy behaviour adopted by countries to 
tax portfolio investment is verified on the allocation of taxing rights provided in tax 
treaties.285 The analysis of the allocation of taxing rights in tax treaties will help to 
understand how the legal debate has evolved between developed and developing 
countries. As a consequence, problems affecting taxation of portfolio investment in tax 
treaties will be revealed; showing how hard it is to tax this type of income. 
 
Finally, current tax policies enacted by developing and developed countries will be 
evaluated in order to demonstrate what is going on in practice (pragmatic approach). 
The objective here is to understand how countries have taxed income derived from 
portfolio investment. In a sense, the difference between tax policies enacted in practice 
and the arguments adopted by the economic theory and the legal debate will become 
clear. 
 
In sum, this chapter will analyse how taxation of portfolio investment has been justified 
by economic, legal and pragmatic arguments. The comparison of these different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (n 228) 1305. 
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approaches will put in evidence the difficulty on taxing portfolio income and, 
consequently, some limitations that might also affect taxation of capital flight invested 
as portfolio investment.  
 
5.2. Economic aspect: neutrality policies 
 
Most analysis of international income tax policy is underpinned on economic efficiency, 
particularly on neutrality policies. Neutrality policies were developed by Musgrave 
when: (i) the international flow of capital was basically represented by FDI; (ii) the flow 
of capital was unidirectional making the identification of capital import and capital 
export countries easy; (iii) there was a clear association between development and flow 
of capital, which means that developed countries were capital exporters, while 
developing countries were capital importers.286 
 
Nowadays these premises that underpinned her economic theory have changed, making 
it more difficult to justify international taxation through neutrality policies. Thus, in the 
next paragraphs, the arguments of different authors will be examined in order to 
reconcile new premises brought by the current process of globalisation with the 
economic theory developed by Musgrave. 
 
According to the neutrality policy, the connection between methods for preventing 
double taxation and the level of incentive to invest abroad creates different ‘neutralities’. 
The term neutrality applied by Musgrave means whether tax systems are neutral when 
choosing between investing at home or abroad. In fact, neutrality is an economic 
concept based on the assumption that productivity will increase if producing factors are 
distributed by market forces without the interference of taxation. There are three types 
of neutrality: Capital Export Neutrality (CEN), National Neutrality (NN), and Capital 
Import Neutrality (CIN).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 P. B. Musgrave, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis (John Hopkins Press, 
1963). 
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The objective of CEN policy is to prevent taxation from distorting an investor’s decision 
on the place of investment (i.e. home or abroad). CEN is achieved when residents of a 
country pay the same amount of tax, whether they have domestic or foreign income. 
CEN would work perfectly in a world where only residence taxation was applied. 
However, countries usually tax income at source and to promote CEN, the residence 
country should recognise tax credits for the amount of tax paid abroad. Theoretically, to 
maintain CEN, there should be no limit on foreign tax credit, since the total amount of 
tax paid by a taxpayer with foreign income should not exceed the total tax that would be 
payable according to the taxation imposed at the residence country. In this context, if the 
taxation of income was higher abroad, the residence country would have to reimburse 
the taxpayer to promote CEN. Based on these arguments, economists have concluded 
that CEN promotes worldwide economic efficiency. In practice, CEN has been adopted 
by developed countries, which tend to favour residence taxation.287 
 
NN is based on the argument that governments are not indifferent to which government 
collects tax revenue, since only taxes collected at home maximise the national welfare. 
Therefore, investors should only invest abroad if both the investor and the government 
benefit from such investment. NN is achieved when the tax revenues of the country of 
residence and the after-tax returns of its residents are equal.288 In this context, investors 
can only deduct foreign tax from their domestic taxable income.289  
 
The aim of CIN policy is to ensure that the tax levied on domestic or foreign investment 
should be the same, i.e. CIN ensures that the total tax imposed on investments in a 
certain country is the same whether the taxpayer is a resident or a foreigner. CIN can be 
promoted when all countries levy identical tax rates on all income produced within their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 T. Dagan, ‘National Interests in the International Tax Game’ (1998-99) 18 Virginia Tax Review 363, 
367-69. 
288 ibid 370. 
289 Even though NN represents an alternative tax policy that can be enacted by countries, in practice 
countries do not use it, opting for CEN or CIN policies. The reason for countries not applying NN is 
connected to an economic theory described as ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy. Based on this theory, 
countries would not adopt NN due to the fact that a foreign government would be likely to react to it, 
enacting a similar policy. The aftermath of most governments using NN policy would represent a loss to 
the world welfare. Therefore, the following discussion will focus only on CEN and CIN policies. Frisch (n 
282) 5. 
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territories. However, in practice countries also adopt residence taxation and the 
achievement of CIN depends on residence countries recognising tax exemptions on 
income produced abroad. Even though not promoting worldwide welfare, developing 
countries have opted for CIN policy due to the assumption that they are capital 
importers and this policy tends to benefit their economic situation, (i.e. to balance the 
distortion in the allocation of capital).	  290 
 
These methods of efficient allocation of capital have been applied based on methods to 
relieve double taxation between source and residence countries, focusing on active 
income i.e. business profits. As already mentioned, globalisation has remarkably 
increased the flow of capital around the world, which includes FDI and portfolio 
investment. The flow of capital needs to be distinguished in two categories, which have 
different impact on countries’ economies. The former is connected to entrepreneurial 
investment, while the latter is not being classified as non-entrepreneurial investment.291  
From this new perspective, the debate involving methods of efficient allocation of 
capital, i.e. the use of neutrality policies needs to be reviewed considering both types of 
income: active business income and passive income. This new context provides a 
different interpretation for the adoption of CEN by developed countries and CIN by 
developing countries. Some authors have already updated the discussion about 
neutralities with the new characteristics of the flow of investments from the perspective 
of developed countries. The outcome of the debate involving developed countries will 
help to understand the situation in developing countries.  
 
Expanding the understanding of tax neutralities to this new scenario in which there are 
two different types of investments with economic value, a question arises: Can a country 
promote more than one type of neutrality, i.e. is it possible for a country to adopt CIN 
policy for one type of investment and CEN policy for another one?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Dagan, ‘National Interests in the International Tax Game’ (n 287) 370. 
291  K. Vogel, ‘World-Wide Versus Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Revaluation of 
Arguments’ in Influence of Tax Differentials on International Competitiveness: Proceedings of the VIIIth 
Munich Symposium on International Taxation (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1990), 144. 
170	  
	  
From a theoretical perspective, the core issue to answer this question is to understand 
whether neutrality is an absolute and indivisible concept or whether neutrality is a 
relative concept that allows division. The doctrine has assumed different positions: there 
are authors who accepted a relative concept of neutrality whereas others did not. 
Professor. Vogel argued in favour of an absolute concept of neutrality by defending that 
neutrality applied only to certain economic processes would always represent less than 
full neutrality; in fact, for him, partial neutrality represents a non-neutral situation.292  
 
Jeffery, on the other hand, analysed neutrality from a different perspective, looking at 
the nature of the problem that needs to be solved. He emphasised the fact that one kind 
of neutrality cannot solve all types of complexities brought by international tax 
arrangements. Thus, Jeffery defended the argument that the international economy 
requires a flexible concept of neutrality and the best approach is not to see neutrality as 
an absolute ideal. On this basis, there can be different types of neutrality considerations 
depending on what neutrality goals are being compared.	  293 The argument developed by 
Jeffery justifies the adoption of CIN and CEN for different types of income by the same 
country, even though CEN and CIN cannot be applied simultaneously for the same type 
of income. This line of reasoning has guided the current debate about economic 
efficiency. 
 
Assuming that a country can apply CIN and CEN to different types of income, there is a 
current discussion on whether CIN should be applied to active business income and 
CEN to passive income.  
 
Frisch argued in favour of the application of these different neutralities based on 
economic and political arguments. For this author, the advantage of applying CIN to 
active business income is that the competitiveness of an enterprise operating in a 
country with low or non-taxation is not affected by the level of taxation enforced in the 
multinational’s home country (political argument). The diminished competition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Vogel (n 291) 140. 
293 Jeffery (n 28) 8-9. 
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multinationals affects the world economy and not only a multinational’s home country. 
On the other hand, he defended that CEN may work better with passive income, since it 
makes sense to tax investors equally whether they invest at home or abroad.294 	  
 
Avi-Yonah initially defended the argument that CEN is still the best alternative for 
taxing cross-border investment and it should be applied equally to portfolio and foreign 
direct investment. He pointed out the following arguments in favour of CEN: (i) even 
though portfolio investment is higher than FDI, it does not mean that the latter is not 
important in the allocation of investment; (ii) the application of CEN to portfolio 
investment does not preclude its application to FDI; (iii) taxation impacts 
multinational’s decisions and the adoption of CIN will provide incentive for companies 
to move to lower tax jurisdictions; (iv) taxation of dividends might justify the lighter 
taxation of corporate profits, however this situation is better solved by integration 
between corporate and shareholders’ taxation rather than by relief at corporate level; and 
(v) political argument based on competitiveness of multinationals ignores the possibility 
of solving this conflict by enacting cooperative policies, such as CEN by all OECD 
members. In sum, Avi-Yonah’s arguments were based on the main concept that cross-
border income should not be taxed less than domestic income, independent of the type 
of income that is produced abroad.295   
 
However, recently, Avi-Yonah published an article recognising the fact that the US and 
the rest of the developed world have moved toward territorial taxation of corporate 
income, decreasing their emphasis on Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules.	  He 
justified this trend by economic and political reasons. From an economic perspective, 
tax competition has led multinationals to move their headquarters to countries that do 
not tax their foreign business income. From a political perspective, multinationals’ 
representatives have pressured local governments to change their corporate tax rules in 
order to protect the domestic industry, enhancing their capacities to compete in the 
international market. It seems, therefore, that even though, in terms of economic 
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295 Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’, (n 122) 110. 
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efficiency, CEN is supported by economists, in practice, CIN might be the best 
alternative for active business income due to economic and political interests.	  296  
 
Graetz went a step further in the discussion by pointing out the inadequacy of thinking 
of international taxation only in terms of economic efficiency. He first published an 
article arguing that: (i) the best way to structure taxes on international investment 
income is to focus on maximising the US national welfare rather than global welfare 
which signifies that CEN might not correspond to the interest of a country in 
international taxation; (ii) the tax systems of countries adopt different tax bases and tax 
rates which lead the US to adopt tax policies that represent a compromise between CEN 
and CIN; (iii) economic efficiency is only one aspect of international tax policy, other 
aspects (e.g. fairness, revenue needs, compliance costs, administrative burdens) also 
need to be regarded when discussing international taxation; (iv) the neutrality policy 
developed by Musgrave did not consider the benefits of inbound investments, which 
represents a serious flaw in her theory when applying it to the current profile of the 
international flow of investment between developed and developing countries; and (v) it 
is necessary to draw a sharp distinction between tax policy applied to FDI and to 
portfolio investment. In sum, Graetz demonstrated that the traditional debate involving 
CEN and CIN is surpassed based on the analysis of the US economy.297 
 
Later, Graetz and Grinberg introduced new arguments on the debate of neutrality 
policies, by examining if CEN or CIN could justify the US policy for taxing income 
from portfolio investment. First, they defined the premises of their analysis by 
demonstrating: (i) the increased importance of portfolio investment in the international 
flow of capital; (ii) the fact that tax policy debate has focused only on FDI, leaving 
portfolio investment aside; and (iii) while FDI is made by corporations, portfolio 
investment is earned by both individuals and corporations. Then, Graetz and Grinberg 
examined if CEN or CIN could justify the taxation of portfolio income. They concluded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 R.S. Avi-Yonah, ‘Back to the Future? The Potential Revival of Territoriality’ (2008) University of 
Michigan Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 08-012 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1185423> 
accessed 5 January 2010. 
297  Graetz, ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
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that both CEN and CIN are inapt for portfolio income given the wide variation in both 
corporate and individual tax rates, as well as the variety of portfolio income which 
would require impractical case by case distinctions by residence countries for 
investment in specific foreign countries. Moreover, the bilateral adjustments required to 
achieve CEN for portfolio investment would conflict with the principle of non-
discrimination, which requires that foreigners and domestic residents have to be treated 
similarly. Considering the problems for the enforcement of CEN and CIN, Graetz and 
Grinberg suggested a deduction rather than a credit for taxes levied abroad on portfolio 
income since this strategy would serve the national interest of the US. This measure 
would imply the adoption of NN for portfolio income. After demonstrating the 
complexities of enforcing CEN, CIN and NN for portfolio income, Graetz and Grinberg 
argued that the US goal on international taxation should be the elimination of source-
based taxes on portfolio income and the enforcement of residence taxation of this type 
of investment. Thus, at the end, Graetz and Grinberg concluded that neutrality policies 
could not fully justify the allocation of taxing rights regarding portfolio income. The 
simple alternative that would solve the problem that neutrality policies could not solve 
would be the elimination of source taxation of portfolio income.298 
 
The arguments presented in the previous paragraphs demonstrated the evolving debate 
about international taxation and neutrality policies. It became clear that the new profile 
of the flows of capital brought by globalisation were included in the discussion 
involving international taxation. Consequently, it became harder to justify tax policy 
adopted by developed countries through neutrality policies. Despite these difficulties, 
there is a tendency in tax policies adopted by developed countries: the adoption of 
source taxation for FDI and residence taxation for portfolio investment. 299  The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Graetz and Grinberg, ‘Taxing International Portfolio Income (n 282) 558-86. 
299 The preference for residence taxation of portfolio investment in developed countries is confirmed by 
the enactment of the following tax policies: the US exemption of portfolio interest income in 1984 (Inland 
Revenue Code §§871 (h), §881); the 2001 US-UK tax treaty that: allocates the taxation of interest entirely 
to the state of residence of the beneficial owner and limits to 5% the withholding tax levied on dividends 
paid to a beneficial owner that owns shares representing directly or indirectly 10% of the voting power of 
the company paying the dividends; the EC Savings Directive (Council Directive 2003/48/EC) that 
disposes that withholding taxes on interest paid to an individual resident in a Member State will only be 
levied if there was not a mechanism for exchange of information to grant the taxation exclusively at the 
state of residence; and the EC Interest and Royalties Directive (Directive 2003/49/EC) which abolishes 
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movement toward territorial taxation of corporate income can be justified by the 
preservation of domestic firms’ competitiveness in foreign markets; while residence 
taxation of portfolio income can be justified by fairness on taxing individuals resident in 
the same country as well as its incentive for the inflow of capital.300 The situation is not 
so clear in relation to developing countries. 
 
In the traditional debate, developing countries were associated with CIN policy, even 
though economists defended that CEN would better preserve the worldwide economic 
welfare. CIN policy has been used to justify the taxation of FDI based on the assumption 
that these countries are capital importers and the inflow of capital was much more 
important than the outflow. However, with the increase of portfolio investment, the 
adoption of CIN policy by developing countries needs to be evaluated separately for this 
type of investment.  
 
The first consideration about portfolio investment, as already argued, refers to the 
concentration of this type of investment in developed countries. However, this situation 
cannot underestimate the importance of this type of investment to developing countries. 
As already mentioned, there might be a significant amount of portfolio investment from 
developing countries represented as capital flight invested in developed countries. The 
allocation of capital flight as portfolio investment is encouraged by the mobile 
characteristic of this type of investment as well as the difficulties in taxing it. In this 
context, the endorsement of CIN policy by developing countries leaves aside the 
importance of capital flight, since benefits derived from outflows are not captured by 
CIN policy. The fact that developing countries are interested not only in inflows but also 
in outflows makes CIN policy inadequate for their purposes. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
taxation of interest and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States 
in the Member State at source. The last section of this chapter will contribute with further examples that 
support the assumption that developed countries are eliminating the levy of withholding taxes on portfolio 
income.  
300 There are also other arguments that justify the preference for residence taxation of portfolio income in 
developed countries: (i) the necessity to attract investment to finance fiscal deficits; and (ii) the absence of 
capital control which makes the levy of withholding taxes on portfolio investment difficult. 
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The adoption of CIN policy needs also to be evaluated in terms of the incentive created 
on the location of this flow of investment. In other words, another problem affecting the 
endorsement of CIN policy by developing countries refers to the interaction of this 
policy with CEN policy endorsed by a developed country.  
 
The adoption of CIN by developing countries signifies that all investments made in their 
territory will be taxed, independent of whether the investor is resident or non-resident. 
In practical terms, it means that only source income is taxed, foreign income earned by 
residents, is exempt.301 On the other hand, CEN policy works in the opposite way: its 
basic premise is the fact that residents will be taxed equally, independent of the source 
of their income. CEN policy is entirely focused on residents’ income, which signifies 
that the exemption of non-residents investing in their territory does not compromise 
their objectives; in fact it is 100% consistent with its aims.  
 
The problem arises when CIN and CEN policies interact: the adoption of CIN policy by 
developing countries creates the perfect incentive for residents investing abroad which is 
enforced by CEN policy adopted by developed countries that grants the full non-taxation 
of foreign income of residents in developing countries. The outcome of the adoption of 
CIN policy by developing countries contradicts with their interest in attracting foreign 
capital, creating the perfect scenario for outflows of capital, especially capital flight. On 
the other hand, CEN policy enforces the right of developed countries to tax the income 
of their residents without interfering with their competitiveness to attract foreign 
portfolio investments.  
 
Besides that, the levy of withholding taxes not only disincentivises the inflow but also 
makes developing country reliant on developed countries’ tax policy since the inflow of 
investment in developing countries is dependent on the recognition of foreign tax credits 
by developed countries. In the case of capital flight, tax credits do not even matter 
because these investments are never reported in the residence state. This signifies that 
the chance of capital flight being invested in countries that tax foreign portfolio 
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investment at source is very low. Consequently, the interaction of CIN and CEN policies 
creates the perfect incentive for capital flight to be invested as portfolio investment in 
developed countries.   
  
Different problems arise in order to justify neutrality policies in the current scenario. 
The distinction of FDI and Portfolio Investment added to the fact that the flows are 
much more bidirectional makes it difficult to classify countries as capital importers or 
capital exporters, and, consequently, to define their tax policies in terms of this 
dichotomy. Furthermore, addressing taxation of portfolio investment only from the 
perspective of inflows leaves aside the importance of capital flight to developing 
countries.  
 
5.3. The taxation of portfolio investment in Double Tax Conventions 
 
Double Tax Conventions302 try to divide the allocation of taxing right between source 
and residence countries based on classification and assignment rules that classify 
income according to its economic character.303 This signifies that taxable income is 
arranged in categories and taxing rights over them are distributed to one or both 
contracting states. To this extent, active business income is taxed at source country; 
whereas passive income (i.e. income derived from portfolio investment such as 
dividends, interest and capital gains) is taxed at residence state, but the source state can 
levy a reduced withholding tax. According to Avi-Yonah, low withholding tax rates on 
portfolio income represent a compromise between the desire of a source country to levy 
some tax on income derived from foreigners and the primary right of a residence 
country to tax such income.304 
 
The preference for source or residence taxation is also justified by countries’ 
classification as capital importers and capital exporters. To this extent, developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 The expression Double Tax Convention (‘DTC’) is also referred as tax treaty in the body of this study, 
suggesting the same meaning. 
303 Rohatgi (n 56) 13-21 and 32-75. 
304 Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (n 228)1308. 
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countries have fought for source taxation; whereas developed countries have defended 
residence taxation of passive income. This debate is shown by differences in the DTC 
Models: whereas the UN model tries to enlarge provisions on source taxation, the 
OECD and US models try to eliminate it or even to reduce it to the minimum. 
 
The analyses of Articles 10, 11 and 13 from the OECD Model Tax Convention, UN 
Model Tax Convention and the US Model Tax Convention that provide rules for 
taxation of dividends, interest and capital gains illustrates the debate about allocation of 
taxing rights between source and residence countries:305 
 
Table 5.3.  Distribution of Taxing Rights in DTC Model Convention306 
DTC Model 
Convention 
Dividends 
(Article 10) 
Interest 
(Article 11) 
Capital Gains 
on immovable 
property 
(Article 13) 
Capital Gains on 
movable property (e.g. 
shares) 
(Article 13) 
2008 OECD 
Model 
Convention 
Tax sharing 
(withholding tax 
of 5% to 15%) 
Tax sharing 
(withholding tax 
of 10%) 
Tax sharing Taxation at alienator’s residence 
2001 UN 
Model 
Convention 
Tax sharing (no 
cap on 
withholding 
rates) 
Tax sharing (no 
cap on 
withholding rates) 
Tax sharing 
(i) Source Taxation if (…) 
% of participation is sold; 
or (ii) Taxation at 
alienator’s residence if 
participation sold is less 
than the percentage 
disposed in (i). 
2006 US 
Model 
Convention 
Tax sharing 
(withholding tax 
of 5% to15%) 
Residence State 
Taxation Tax sharing 
Taxation at alienator’s 
residence 
 
The table above made the battle for distribution of taxing rights between source and 
residence states in relation to passive income clear. At first glance, the outcomes are: (i) 
the difference between the allocations of taxing rights in these three categories of 
income; and (ii) the tendency to restrict source taxation and benefit residence 
taxation.307  
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306 K. Van Raad, Materials on International & EC Tax Law (n 58), 502-17. 
307 Even though the UN Model tries in a very modest way to allocate more rights to source state. 
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The dividend Article in all three models adopts tax-sharing provisions, which allow the 
levy of a withholding tax by the source state. In the US and the OECD Model there is a 
tendency of applying a reduced withholding tax (5%) when the beneficial owner of the 
dividend is a company that owns directly at least 10% and 25%, respectively, of the 
voting stock of the company paying the dividends. This rule is in line with domestic 
policies enacted by developed countries that exempt intra-company distribution of 
dividends (e.g. EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive). The OECD Commentary on the Model 
Convention has also explained that there is no reason to tax at source payments of 
dividends between companies.308  
 
The interest Article of the OECD and the UN models allows source taxation, while the 
US Model Convention permits only the taxation of interest at the residence state of the 
creditor. The OECD Model limits the withholding tax at 10%. The UN Model leaves the 
tax rate to be determined by bilateral negotiation. The US allocates the right to tax 
interest entirely to the state of residence. This rule is in line with the US domestic tax 
laws that exempt non-residents’ interest originated from portfolio investment. As 
presented in the next section, the taxation of interest in practice is very limited since 
most countries already exempt this kind of income to attract foreign investors and not to 
increase the cost of investment.  
 
The capital gain Article of the three Model Conventions in relation to immovable 
properties allows both source and residence states to tax; while in relation to movable 
properties the right to tax is allocated to the residence of the seller with the exception of 
a minor case provided in the UN Model that allows only the source state to tax when a 
certain percentage (determined in bilateral negotiations) of participation is sold. 
Different from the taxation of dividends and interest that a limited withholding tax is 
established, the capital gains Article in the three Model Conventions does not provide 
for the tax rate that can be levied by the state of source when both countries share the 
right to tax. The taxation is determined by domestic tax policies without a cap. The 
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reason for that might be the fact that the taxation of capital gains varies considerably 
from country to country. 
 
Even though the effective allocation is subject to individual negotiation between 
contracting states, the Model Conventions have many differences not only between them 
but also among taxation of dividends, interest and capital gains. The differences between 
the Model Conventions reflect the economic interest that guided their development, 
whereas the differences between the taxation of dividends and capital gains can only be 
justified by political reasons rather than by economic motives since from an economic 
perspective it does not make sense to treat them differently as provided in the Model 
Conventions. 
 
From an economic perspective, both dividends and capital gains represent earnings from 
a company. Dividends correspond to retained and current earnings, while capital gains 
reflect the present value of future earnings. Thus, it does not make sense to tax them 
differently. Nevertheless, tax treaties apply different tax rules to them creating an 
opportunity for taxpayers to choose the way they will be taxed. For instance, if a non-
resident receives dividend from a country, dividends will be taxed at source, according 
to the standard rule provided in the OECD Model Convention. If the same non-resident 
opts for selling the shares that pay the dividends before its payment, the capital gain will 
be taxed in his country of residence.309   
 
Another way to avoid source taxation of dividends is by using total equity swaps. This 
financial instrument allows the investor to receive the same return as investing in shares 
by entering into a swap with a bank that pays as a return the same value of the shares but 
with the legal nature of interest. What an equity swap does is simply to change the 
category of income received as a return, aiming to exploit tax benefits disposed in the 
domestic legislation or tax treaty.310  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 Y. Keinan, ‘The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing 
Countries’ (2008) 9 Florida Law Review 1, 20-7. 
310 ibid. 
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These examples demonstrate how much inconsistency there is in the allocation of taxing 
rights between dividends and capital gains, making the taxpayer interested in 
manipulating the category in which his income might be classified. The economic 
substance of the income needs to be considered when defining the allocation of taxing 
rights. Otherwise loopholes will bar the proper taxation of income at source, the levy of 
withholding tax becoming a meaningless provision.  
 
The problems explained in the previous paragraphs derive from the fact that the rules 
provided in the Model Conventions are formal rather than economic rules. According to 
Keinan, formal rules do not rely on the economic source of income, being easy to 
administrate because they are based on bright lines that simply require one single 
determination such as residence of payer to determine the source of income. Economic 
rules, on the other hand, try to define the economic source of income, requiring further 
examination such as to determine where a copyright is actually used.	  Thus, economic 
rules are harder to avoid but formal rules are easy to administer.311 
 
Considering this scenario, policymakers have two alternatives: (i) to maintain the 
current formal rules but harmonising the taxation of Articles 10 and 13; or, (ii) to 
replace the formal rules of Articles 10 and 13 with economic rules that define the 
economic substance of the income classified in each Article. Both measures can reduce 
the chances of manipulation of income by taxpayers. Nevertheless, the first alternative is 
easier to administer and to implement. 
 
Besides all the alternatives inherent in tax treaties that allow taxpayers to control in a 
certain way the tax burden of a transaction, there is another fact that threatens even more 
the source taxation of portfolio income: investments made by pension funds, charitable 
institutions and collective investment funds. Usually pension funds and charitable 
institutions are exempt from tax, while collective investment funds are often not subject 
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to tax.312 This signifies that a considerable amount of dividends is already not taxed at 
source, the levy of withholding taxes remaining applicable only for dividends earned by 
individuals and corporations. In the case of corporations, there is also the tendency to 
exempt the payments of dividends between associated companies. In practice, therefore, 
withholding tax is levied on dividends paid to individuals only. 
 
In sum, this section aimed to demonstrate that the traditional debate about allocation of 
taxing rights in DTC between source and residence countries and its association with 
developing and developed countries is still based on their classification as capital 
importers and capital exporters. Negotiating treaties, therefore, does not get an effective 
result in taxing portfolio investment. Besides the loopholes that allow taxpayers to 
manipulate the classification of income that they receive, and consequently, the amount 
of tax paid, the discussion does not address the actual problem affecting portfolio 
investment, which refers to finding an effective way to tax it. Whether developed and 
developing countries keep discussing taxation of portfolio investment in terms of 
allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries, a significant amount 
of income will remain untaxed.  
 
5.4. Tax Policies adopted by Developed and Developing Countries 
 
After examining economic and legal arguments about taxation of portfolio investment, 
this section will focus on tax policies adopted by developed and developing countries. 
The aim of this section is to identify tendencies that escape from the theoretical debate. 
In other words, while economists have been trying to find a way to validate neutrality 
policies and lawyers have been struggling to justify the allocation of taxing right 
between source and residence states in tax treaties, this section will look straight forward 
to what is going on in practice by analysing tax policies enacted by countries to tax 
portfolio income, i.e. dividends, interest and capital gains. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 S. van Weeghel, ‘Dividends (Article 10 OECD Model Convention)’ in M. Lang et al, Source versus 
Residence: Problems Arising from the Allocation of Taxing Rights in Tax Treaty Law and Possible 
Alternatives (Wolters Kluwer 2008), 66. 
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The next tables summarise the information provided in the annex where tax policies 
adopted by 116 countries were analysed. Countries were classified in two groups: 
developing countries; and OECD countries. For each group the following information 
was provided: (i) tax policies (i.e. worldwide or territorial taxation) adopted by countries 
to tax their individual residents; (ii) exemptions applied to dividends, interest and capital 
gains when paid to individuals and companies non-resident; and (iii) number of tax 
treaties signed and actually in force by each country.313  The purpose of putting these 
data together is to build up a framework to answer from a pragmatic approach the 
questions on: whether countries are interested in taxing their residents’ foreign portfolio 
income; whether countries enforce source taxation of portfolio income; and whether 
countries rely on tax treaties to allocate taxing rights between source and residence 
countries. Whereas data described in (i) and (iii) do not require further explanation and 
could be easily compiled in the next tables, data on tax rates applied to dividends, 
interest and capital gains (ii) need further details, before presenting the synthesised 
results of the analysis performed.  
 
The present analysis is interested in identifying tax incentives offered by countries that 
exempt dividends, interest and capital gains. However, countries can adopt a general 
exemption, applying to all categories of dividends and interest (very unusual in 
practice), or a restrict exemption that applies only to certain circumstances, for example, 
non-taxation of interest from government bonds, corporate bonds, bank deposits, etc. To 
this extent, there is a myriad of situations in which exemptions can be offered in these 
three categories of income. Even though the original data used to feed the tables in the 
annex provided a reasonable amount of information to perform the aimed study, there 
were not enough details to classify the data in more specific categories, i.e. per type of 
assets as the OECD did in the past for interest paid on bank deposits, government bonds 
and corporate bonds, illustrated below.314  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 The sources of information provided in Annex I are: (i) Worldwide Tax Summaries provided by 
Pricewaterhouse&Cooper <http://www.taxsummaries.pwc.com/uk/wwts/wwts.nsf?Open> accessed 20 
February 2010; and (ii) Tax Surveys published by the International Bureau Fiscal Documentation  
<http://www.ibfd.org>  accessed 20 February 2010.  
314 OECD, Taxation and Household Savings (OECD 1994) 177. 
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Table 5.4. (a) Withholding taxes applied by OECD countries on interest 
Withholding taxes on interest on selected assets paid to non-residents. 
Country Bank deposits Government Bonds Corporate Bonds 
Australia 10 10 10 
Austria - - - 
Belgium 10 10 10 
Canada 25 - - 
Denmark - - - 
Finland - - - 
France - - - 
Germany - - - 
Greece 10 10 10 
Iceland - - - 
Ireland - - 27 
Italy 30 12.5 12.5-30 
Japan 15 20 20 
Luxembourg - - - 
Netherlands - - - 
New Zealand 15 15 15 
Norway - - - 
Portugal 20 20 25 
Spain 25 - 25 
Sweden - - - 
Switzerland 35 35 35 
Turkey 10 15 10 
United Kingdom - 25 25 
United States - - - 
 
The OECD’s table provides detailed information that allows us to conclude about 
specific aspects of the tax policies adopted by OECD countries in relation to each asset. 
Then, it is possible to argue that a considerable number of OECD countries do not tax 
interest on bank deposits, government bonds and corporate bonds. However, the data 
available are restricted to OECD countries. The present study aimed to develop a 
broader analysis involving not only OECD countries but also a significant number of 
developing countries in order to compare the similarities and differences between their 
tax policies. This fact increases the difficulty on finding data as detailed as the one used 
by the OECD. Thus, in order to have a significant sample of countries, it was necessary 
to sacrifice accuracy in the information displayed. In practice, this signifies that a 
limitation was imposed on the data analysed, i.e. in the table provided in the annex 7, the 
withholding taxes are not classified by type of assets, but only as tax rates applied to 
dividends, interest and capital gains paid to non-resident individuals and companies. 
Nevertheless, in the annex, when besides the general rate applied to dividends, interest 
and capital gains there were specific data available about tax rates applied to certain 
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assets, this information was incorporated in the table and displayed in the format of a 
range. For instance, the range 0%-30% is displayed in the field of interest withholding 
taxes paid to individual non-resident in the US. This signifies that there is an exemption 
being offered to certain interest besides the general rate of 30%.  
 
The compilation of all withholding taxes on dividends, interest and capital gains in the 
same table below limited the accuracy of information extracted but allowed the design 
of the profile of countries offering tax incentives to portfolio income. Thus, if a country 
offered any kind of exemption to a certain category of assets that paid portfolio income, 
the incentive was accounted in order to identify the number of countries that renounce 
source taxation in a certain way. Consequently, the way withholding taxes is analysed 
allowed the identification of the number of exemptions being offered on portfolio 
income by the group of countries selected. However, further information is necessary to 
understand the magnitude of the exemptions being offered since the intrinsic 
characteristics of each exemption do not matter, all of them are accounted in the same 
way as one even if offered with a broader scope. To deal with this limitation of table 
5.4.(c), in the body of the text, the major characteristics of the exemptions applied by 
each group of countries and accounted in the tables will be explained in detail. Having 
in mind these aspects, the tables summarising the results are presented: 
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Table 5.4. (b) Worldwide taxation and territorial taxation adopted by countries 
Summary 
(I) 
Tax policy on resident individuals 
Groups of 
countries 
Total 
number of 
countries 
% adopting Worldwide 
taxation 
% adopting 
Territorial taxation 
% with no income tax 
system 
Developing 
countries315 86 71% 22% 7% 
OECD 
countries316 30 100% - - 
TOTAL 116 78% 16% 5% 
(Note: Analysis of the adoption of worldwide taxation and territorial taxation by countries. Percentages 
reflect the number of countries in each group adopting worldwide taxation and territorial taxation) 
 
Table 5.4. (c) Exemptions offered on the levy of withholding tax by the source country 
Summary 
(II) 
PAID TO NON-
RESIDENT 
INDIVIDUALS 
PAID TO NON-RESIDENT 
COMPANIES  
Groups of 
countries 
Total 
number of 
countries 
% offering 
some kind of 
exemption 
on dividends 
% offering 
some kind 
of 
exemption 
on interest 
% offering 
some kind of 
exemption on 
dividends 
% offering 
some kind of 
exemption on 
interest 
% offering 
exemptions 
on K gains on 
sale of shares 
Developing 
countries 86 37% 33% 47% 41% 43% 
OECD 
countries 30 20% 73% 
77% 
 70% 57% 
TOTAL 116 33% 43% 54% 48% 47% 
(Note: Analysis of exemptions offered on the levy of withholding tax by the source country. Percentages 
are based on the number of countries offering exemptions in each group. The total reflects the total sum of 
exemptions offered by both groups divided by the total number of countries) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, China, Colombia,Congo, Dem. Rep. Of, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, French Guyana, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
Vietnam and Zambia. 
316  Australia, Austria, Belgium,  Canada,  Chile,  Czech Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  
Germany, Greece,  Hungary,  Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,  Slovak Republic,  Slovenia,  Spain, Sweden, Turkey,  the United 
Kingdom and  the United States. 
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Table 5.4. (d) Number of tax treaties signed by countries 
Summary 
(III) 
Tax Treaties317 
Group of countries 
Minimum number of 
tax treaty signed by a 
country of the group 
Maximum number of 
tax treaty signed by a 
country of the group 
Average of tax treaties in the 
group per country 
Developing countries 0 89 24 
OECD countries 20 120 68 
(Note: Analysis of the number of tax treaties signed by countries. The last column reflects the average of 
tax treaties per country, which is based on the division of total tax treaties signed by the number of 
countries in each group) 
 
To facilitate the comprehension of the data provided in the tables above, they are 
segregated in three categories (taxation of resident individuals; taxation of portfolio 
income paid to non-resident individuals and companies; and tax treaties signed by 
countries), indicated by numbers (I, II, III) and colours (grey, green and pink). In the 
first category (I) (table 5.4.(b)), the percentage of countries that adopt worldwide, 
territorial taxation and no-income tax system to tax resident individuals is indicated. The 
second category (II) (table 5.4.(c)) displays the percentage of countries offering some 
kind of exemption on dividends, interest and capital gains. The third category (III) (table 
5.4.(d)) presents the number of tax treaties signed by countries, i.e. the minimum 
number of tax treaties signed by a country classified in the group, the maximum number 
of tax treaties signed by another country classified in the group and the average of tax 
treaties signed by the group (total number of tax treaties divided by the total number of 
countries). The structure of the tables will help to identify the results discussed in the 
next paragraphs. 
 
Starting with ‘Tax policy on resident individuals’ (aspect (I), in grey, table 5.4.(b)), the 
first evidence is the fact that nowadays most countries adopt worldwide taxation of their 
resident individuals’ income. In the sample analysed, 91 countries out of 116 apply 
worldwide taxation, which represent 78% of the sample. Only 16% of countries still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 Besides information from Pricewaterhouse&Coopers and IBFD (n 313), to verify which tax treaties 
were in force, data from the research performed by Drevet and Thuronyi were also analysed. S. A. Drevet 
and V. Thuronyi, ‘The Tax Treaty Network of the U.N. Member States’ (2009) June Tax Notes 
International, 783-87.  
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adopt territorial taxation of residents’ income. Focusing on the two groups, the data also 
demonstrate that all OECD countries adopt worldwide taxation to tax their residents’ 
income; whereas there are still a few developing countries adopting territorial taxation 
(22% of developing countries) to tax their individual residents. This evidence supports 
the argument that the interest of developing countries in international taxation has 
evolved from a restricted concern on the levy of withholding taxes on foreign 
investments that come into the country to the taxation of foreign investments made by 
their own residents abroad.  Whether the enforcement of residence taxation by 
developing countries is feasible is another question; however the data showed that the 
provision to tax residents’ foreign portfolio income was already enacted by most of 
them. 
 
The second aspect described in the tables refers to taxation of dividends, interest and 
capital gains paid to non-resident individuals and companies (aspect (II) in green, table 
5.4.(c)). The segregation between individuals and companies was necessary to payments 
of dividends and interest due to the fact that most countries apply different tax policies 
depending on the receiver of the income. Each cell of the table presents the percentage 
of countries offering some kind of exemptions in each situation. In relation to capital 
gains originated from the sale of shares, there was no separation between gains earned 
by individuals and by companies since most countries apply the same tax policy, 
independently of the characteristics of the receiver of the gain. Thus, the capital gains 
column presents only the percentage of countries levying 0% withholding taxes on 
capital gains stemmed from sale of shares plus the percentage of countries that do have 
capital gains tax rules to apply to this situation.  
 
Examining the figures, at first glance, what was verified is the fact that the two groups 
offer some exemptions on portfolio income. Nevertheless, any inference from the 
sample needs to be considered very carefully since the number of countries in each 
group differs as well as the magnitude of the exemption offered. Therefore, the best 
alternative is not to focus on the simplified data provided in the table above for 
examining the exemptions, but to examine the detailed data provided in the annex 7. The 
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first piece of evidence that comes out is the fact that while in OECD countries, which 
includes the European Union countries, most exemptions derived from harmonised tax 
policies applied to interest paid to individuals (Savings Directive) and to dividends and 
interest paid to companies (Parent Directive and Interest and Royalty Directive, 
respectively); in developing countries exemptions on dividends and interest are based on 
individual measures with particularities that complicate their comparison. Furthermore, 
the exemptions offered by developing countries are not sophisticated enough to 
differentiate between the individual characteristics of beneficial owners. They are still 
focused, in most cases, on the characteristics of the asset from which portfolio income is 
derived. This might be explained by the fact that it is easier to verify the asset from 
which income is derived than to identify the effective beneficial owner of each 
transaction.  
 
Analysing the exemptions offered by developing countries on dividends what we see is 
the fact that many countries offer general exemptions on dividends; whereas interest is 
usually taxed, i.e. there is a general tax rate on interest but some exemptions are offered, 
the most common exemptions being on interest derived from government bonds, 
corporate bonds, bank deposit and foreign currency deposits. There are also specific 
exemptions offered on dividends and interest related to investments and loans in 
strategic economic sectors, as for example the exemption offered by the Democratic 
Republic of Congo on mining projects.  
 
On the other hand, OECD countries offer more exemptions on portfolio income than 
developing countries since besides the exemptions offered on government bonds, 
corporate bonds, bank deposit and foreign currency deposits which most countries 
already offer, there are harmonised tax policies that exempt interest and dividends paid 
by agents located in the European Union and received by beneficial owners resident 
(companies and individuals) in this area. These tax policies relieve portfolio income 
from withholding taxes based on the assumption that there is information being 
exchanged that ensures that the income paid by one country will be taxed in the other 
one.  
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Another interesting aspect that came out when comparing the tax policies enacted by 
OECD countries and developing countries is the fact that the former avoid general 
exemptions, while the latter offer them more frequently, specifically in the case of 
dividends. According to Avery Jones, the remaining withholding taxes enforced in 
domestic tax policies might represent an instrument of power when a country is 
negotiating a tax treaty.318 In his words: ‘The more outrageous the provisions of internal 
law, the better the starting position for negotiating treaties’.319 Thus, the difference 
between their tax policies might also be connected to the fact that OECD countries have 
a higher number of DTCs signed. So, the levy of withholding taxes provided in the 
domestic legislation is probably limited by DTC provisions.  
 
The difficulties found in analysing exemptions levied by countries on dividends and 
interest also apply to capital gains. In fact, the analysis of capital gain policies is even 
more complicated due to peculiarities of the domestic rules involved. The problem 
pointed out by different authors is that there is neither a definition of capital gain nor a 
standard rule for its taxation.320 Simontacchi demonstrated that there is no general rule 
for taxation of capital gains by examining the tax law of OECD countries. Through this 
analysis he identified different reasons for the variation of the taxation of capital gains 
among OECD countries: (i) capital gains are not deemed to be taxable income in some 
countries; (ii) capital gains accrued to companies are taxed, whereas capital gains earned 
by individuals are not if made outside the scope of their trade or business; and (iii) 
capital gains earned by individuals are taxed only in certain cases, leaving many cases 
not taxed.321 Due to these circumstances, the situation analysed is restricted to capital 
gains earned on sale of shares. Furthermore, the total number of countries offering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318 Avery Jones, ‘The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Are Tax Treaties Necessary? (n 32) 3. 
319 ibid. 
320 Y.Neeman, ‘General Report’ in International Fiscal Association (ed.), The Definition of Capital Gains 
in Various Countries (vol. LXIb, Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Sdu Fiscale & Financiële Uitgevers 
1976), 18 et seq. 
321 S. Simontacchi, ‘Capital Gains (Article 13 OECD Model Convention)’ in M. Lang et al, Source versus 
Residence: Problems Arising from the Allocation of Taxing Rights in Tax Treaty Law and Possible 
Alternatives (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 130. 
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exemptions per group also includes countries that do not tax capital gains due to the 
absence of a capital gain tax policy.  
 
Another aspect that also needs to be evaluated when analysing the outcomes provided in 
the annex 7 is the fact that there are some countries with incomplete information about 
capital gains tax. These countries were simply not accounted. Focusing on the 
percentages displayed in the table 5.4. (c), the two groups of countries presented a 
significant number of exemptions on capital gains earned on sale of shares, however 
there is no coordination between the taxation of dividends and capital gains in the 
domestic tax policies, even though both are earnings with similar economic substance. It 
is very peculiar, therefore, how countries worry more about how to tax dividends, and 
sometimes, how to exempt such income, while leaving aside the taxation of capital 
gains.  
 
Finally, the third category (III, in pink, table 5.4.(d)) presents the number of tax treaties 
signed by countries. The first column displays the minimum number of tax treaties 
signed by a country classified in the group; the second column presents the maximum 
number of tax treaties signed by another country classified in the group; and the third 
column displays the average of tax treaties signed by the group (i.e. the total number of 
tax treaties divided by the total number of countries classified in the group).  
 
Focusing on the minimum number of tax treaties signed by each group of countries, 
while there are a significant number322 of developing countries that have no DTC; all 
OECD countries have DTCs in force and the OECD country with the lowest number of 
DTCs (Chile with 20 DTC) corresponds almost to the average of DTCs signed by the 
group of developing countries.  
 
In relation to the maximum number of treaties signed by countries, the OECD’s group 
presents the highest score with 120 tax treaties signed by France. In the developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Countries that have no DTC in force: Angola, Cambodia, Congo Dem Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Tonga. 
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countries’ group the country with the highest number of DTCs is China with 89. It is 
interesting to note that China is among a few developing countries that have received 
significant amounts of portfolio investment since 2000.  
 
The last piece of information in relation to tax treaties provided in the table is the 
average of tax treaties signed by countries in each group. OECD countries scored the 
highest average, represented by 68 tax treaties per country. Developing countries’ 
average is just 24 DTC per country.  
 
In sum, the figures of table 5.4.(d) demonstrate that tax treaties are much more 
important to OECD countries than to developing countries. The absence of a significant 
number of tax treaties makes these countries rely entirely on the provisions of their 
domestic laws to enforce taxation of residents’ foreign portfolio income. If developing 
countries are interested in implementing more exemptions of withholding taxes on 
portfolio income, they will have to recognise the necessity of other legal instruments to 
ensure taxation of their residents’ foreign income.  
 
Finally, remembering the questions presented at the beginning of this section, the 
analysis performed contributed to the following answers: (i) both OECD and developing 
countries adopt worldwide taxation of residents’ income, having taxing rights over 
residents’ foreign income; this means that the assumption that developing countries are 
only interested in taxing investments that come into the country is out of date; (ii) there 
are different types of incentive being offered on portfolio income and they do not 
represent a trend restricted to OECD countries even though these countries have already 
implemented harmonised tax policies that allow further exemptions not only based on 
the characteristic of the asset from which portfolio income is derived but also in relation 
to the characteristics of the beneficial owner; and (iii) OECD countries rely much more 
on DTCs to tax foreign income than developing countries.  
 
Therefore, what the analysis of tax policies demonstrated is that developing countries 
have no clear understanding of the entire picture of what is going on in terms of taxation 
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of portfolio investment. They have already adopted worldwide taxation of residents’ 
income, even though they do not have the instruments to enforce it in practice. On the 
other hand, they have already given some exemptions on portfolio income earned by 
non-residents. In sum, the mix of positions adopted by developing countries reveals that 
these countries have a blurred perspective on how to implement taxation of portfolio 
income, ignoring the importance of capital flight as well as the fact that taxation of 
portfolio investment is very hard to implement. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed taxation of passive income, i.e. income derived from portfolio 
investment, such as dividends, interest and capital gains. Three different approaches 
were developed in order to demonstrate how the debate has evolved from the 
perspective of developing countries, considering not only the economic (neutrality 
policies) and legal (allocation of taxing rights in DTCs) aspects, but also a pragmatic 
approach (the analysis of tax policies enacted by countries in practice).   
 
The economic and legal approach contributed to reveal several difficulties in discussing 
taxation of portfolio investment based on the classification of countries as capital 
importers and capital exporters. Moreover, arguments developed by both approaches 
could not capture the problem of capital flight.  The pragmatic approach, on the other 
hand, puts in evidence the mix of tax policies adopted by developing countries, 
demonstrating that they do not have a clear understanding of the importance of portfolio 
investment and how to enforce its taxation.  
 
As demonstrated, developing countries offer different types of exemptions to dividends, 
interest and capital gains at the same time that they adopt worldwide taxation of their 
residents’ income. They expect, therefore, to tax foreign income of their residents. From 
this perspective derives the question on whether developing countries are able to tax in 
practice the foreign income of their residents and how mechanisms in force and used by 
developed countries would work for them. In other words, considering the economic 
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interest of developing countries on taxing residents’ foreign income and the fact that 
developed countries have relied on DTCs and other instruments to exchange information 
in order to ensure taxation of portfolio income at residence, how can these mechanisms 
of exchange of information help developing countries to tax foreign income of their 
residents? This question is addressed in the next chapters. 
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Chapter VI. Updating the legal debate 
 
Since the beginning of the discussions about international taxation, double taxation and 
tax avoidance and evasion have been treated together. The association between them 
and the increased importance attributed to double taxation over tax avoidance and 
evasion are the key issues to understand the position of developing countries in the 
international tax system. It is essential to keep in mind, therefore, the tension between 
eliminating double taxation and combating tax avoidance and evasion, since whereas the 
elimination of double taxation has a positive effect on the international flow of capital, 
the combat of tax avoidance and evasion can lead to the implementation of mechanisms 
to control the international flow of capital, restricting it.  
 
Globalisation has changed the balance between the importance of double taxation and 
tax avoidance and evasion. The international flow of capital has substantially increased 
and, consequently, opportunities for international tax avoidance and evasion. The 
structure of financial markets nowadays relies on tax havens. Consequently, the flows of 
capital through them became a regular route. In light of these facts, it is necessary to 
reconsider the importance of tax avoidance and evasion. To this extent, a historical 
approach will shed some light on how double taxation and tax avoidance and evasion 
have been dealt since the development of tax treaties.323  
 
Initially, the perception of the League of Nations, when this organisation started to deal 
with the aspects of international taxation, was that international double taxation was the 
cause of tax avoidance.324  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 It is worth noting that some documents refer to the problem of tax evasion whereas others make 
reference to tax avoidance. It is very difficult to draw the line between tax evasion and avoidance. 
Considering that it is not the objective of this study to define these terms, both situations will be addressed 
together. Furthermore, as explained next, the dynamic of capital flight requires attention to both situations. 
324 M. A. Grau Ruiz, Mutual Assistance for the Recovery of Tax Claims (Kluwer Law International 2003) 
104. 
195	  
	  
As already mentioned in Chapter I, the global initial effort that dealt with the problem of 
double taxation and tax evasion was started in the 1920s by the League of Nations. One 
of the initial steps taken by the Financial Committee of the League of Nations was the 
request for a theoretical study of Double Taxation to four economists, G. W. J. Bruins, 
L. Einaudi, E. R. A. Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, whose report was published in 
1923.325 This report focused on the technical aspects of double taxation and the 
principles that could guide the allocation of taxing rights among nations. 
 
In April 1922, the International Economic Conference held at Genoa recommended that 
the League of Nations should also examine the problem of the flight of capital, which in 
other words involves the problem of tax evasion. In the Genoa Conference it was 
recommended:  
 
We have considered what action, if any, could be taken to prevent the 
flight of capital in order to avoid taxation, and we are of the opinion 
that any proposals to interfere with the freedom of the market for 
exchange, or to violate the secrecy of bankers’ relations with their 
customers are to be condemned. Subject to this proviso, we are of the 
opinion that the question of measures of international co-operation to 
prevent tax evasion might be usefully studied in connection with the 
problem of double taxation which is now being studied by a 
Committee of experts on behalf of the League of Nations. We 
therefore suggest that the League of Nations should be invited to 
consider it.326 
 
From the quotation above it becomes clear that since the beginning of the development 
of double tax convention studies, the measures to counteract tax evasion were limited by 
the interest in the international flow of capital, which, on the other hand, was supported 
by the elimination of double taxation. Elimination of double taxation is one prerequisite 
to encourage the free flow of capital. The final paragraph of the quotation confirmed the 
association between tax evasion and double taxation by proposing that both issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation submitted by the Financial Committee’ (1923) 
1923.2.4 Economic and Financial Series 1. 
326 League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion presented by the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (1927) doc. C. 216.M.85.1927.II, 40 Economic 
and Financial Series 1, Introduction, footnote 2, and 4-31. 
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would be dealt by the same Committee of experts. From the way the argument was 
developed, it can be inferred that treating the two measures together was a strategy to 
limit measures of tax evasion to the removal of double taxation.  
 
In June 1922, the Financial Committee of the League of Nations entrusted a study about 
administrative and practical aspects of double taxation and tax evasion to a group of 
high officials of the fiscal administration of various countries (also referred as the 
Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion).327 This group of 
high officials submitted a general report to the Financial Committee of the League of 
Nations in 1925. It is worth noting what the report says about the relationship between 
capital flight and tax evasion:  
 
Capital is exported abroad for many reasons. Some investors think 
that the rate of interest abroad is more attractive or suppose that 
their capital will be better managed abroad; some seek to protect 
themselves against risks of ultimate expropriation and yields to 
fears of political nature; others desire in general to minimise their 
risks by dividing up their wealth in a number of different 
countries. Finally – and there have been many and striking 
instances of this fact in recent years – nationals of a country whose 
budget shows a deficit, and whose issues of paper money become 
more and more numerous, fear above all the definitive 
depreciation of their currency, which in that case is the cause of 
the export of capital abroad and its failure to return to the owner’s 
own country. In this flight of capital due to these various reasons, 
consideration of taxation play only a secondary part. The matter on 
which we have been working has been taxation evasion, that is to 
say evasion which, particularly by means of the fight of capital, 
enables the interested persons to escape taxation which is legally 
due. (…) 
We recognise that the extent to which evasion of taxation occurs 
differs greatly in different countries and that the nature of this 
evasion also differs widely. In some countries evasion is due 
mainly to fraud, but there are others in which evasion due to fraud 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 From Belgium: C. Clavier, Director-General of Direct Taxation and Land Survey in the Ministry of 
Finance; from Czechoslovakia: Dr. V. Valnicek, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Finance; from France: 
M. Baudoin-Buget, Director-General of Direct Taxation; from Great Britain: P. Thompson, Deputy 
Chairman, Board of Inland Revenue; from Italy: Prof. Pasquale d’Aroma, Vice Governor of Bank of Italy; 
from the Netherlands: S. S Damaste, Director-General of Taxation; and from Switzerland: H. Blau, 
Director of the Federal Taxation Department. 
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is almost negligible and the evasion which exists is mainly due to 
the other reasons that we mentioned.328 
 
The quotation above demonstrates that since the initial work of the League of Nations, 
the phenomenon of capital flight has been associated to the problem of tax evasion. 
From a tax perspective, capital flight involves not only capital derived from illegal 
activities, but also any kind of outflow that allows individuals to escape taxation that is 
legally due. Furthermore, the quotation also makes clear that the expression tax evasion 
does not exclude the idea of tax avoidance since it refers to all situations that enable 
individuals to escape taxation, not restricting itself to cases of fraud. 
 
Although the Financial Committee in its later report in 1925 expressed its agreement 
with the main lines of the Experts’ Resolutions, the Financial Committee in 1927 
emphasised the importance of taking into consideration ‘the disadvantage of placing any 
obstacles in the way of the international circulation of capital, which is one of the 
conditions of public prosperity and world economic reconstruction’. 329  The experts also 
suggested the enlargement of the Committee for the progress of the work regarding 
double taxation and tax evasion. So, the Financial Committee adopted the position that 
the interest in the flow of capital must prevail over possible restrictions to control tax 
evasion. Tax evasion was regarded as a secondary issue. The main consideration was to 
ensure that no obstacle would hamper the international flow of capital. 
 
In 1927, the enlarged Committee of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion presented draft conventions based on the resolutions developed by the technical 
experts in 1925.330 Double taxation and tax avoidance were treated in four separate 
conventions: (i) Draft Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation; (ii) Draft 
Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation in the special matter of Succession 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 League of Nations, ‘Reports and Resolutions on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion submitted by the 
Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations’ (1925) doc. F.212 1925 22, 12 
Economic and Financial Series 1. Emphasis added here. 
329 League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion presented by the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (n 326) Introduction. 
330 High officials of the fiscal administration of the following countries joined the Committee of Technical 
Experts: Argentina, Germany, Japan, Poland, United States of America and Venezuela. 
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Duties; (iii) Draft Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation; and 
(iv) Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance in the Collection of Taxes.331 The Draft 
Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation established rules for 
exchange of tax information, which represents the way proposed to combat tax 
avoidance and evasion.  
 
An issue heavily debated by the Committee of Technical Experts was whether the 
Conventions above mentioned should be multilateral or bilateral. The ideal solution 
would be multilateral conventions. Nevertheless, the Committee was not convinced in 
recommending this strategy. Regarding double taxation, the Committee was aware that 
the tax systems of countries had substantial differences that would curb the adoption of a 
multilateral convention, unless drafted in general terms. In this case, however, the 
drafted convention would not have practical value. In the matter of tax evasion also, the 
adoption of a multilateral convention was avoided due to the complexity involved in its 
negotiations. The Committee understood that a bilateral model would immediately 
satisfy the legitimate interests of taxpayers and contracting states. 332  Bilateral 
conventions were adopted for practical reasons rather than because they represented the 
best solution to the problem of double taxation and tax evasion. 
 
The Commentary of the 1927 Draft Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters 
of Taxation explained the terms and conditions established in the Draft and the reasons 
behind them. The first explanation referred to the fact that the Committee agreed that 
double taxation and tax evasion should be treated in a coordinated way. The reason for 
that was based on the assumption that eliminating double taxation would also solve the 
problem of tax evasion. However, we know nowadays that, even though the two issues 
are related, the elimination of double taxation does not solve the problem of tax evasion. 
Another interesting argument refers to the fact that when a relief was provided to avoid 
double taxation, countries should have been able to assess the amount of tax paid in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion presented by the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (n 326) 4-8. 
332 ibid. 
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other country, which can only be done through the exchange of information.333 Today 
this awareness has been forgotten, since most tax relief is granted without further 
consideration of what really happens in the other country of the taxpayer.   
  
In 1928, the report presented by the Technical Experts in 1927 was examined by 
Government Experts of 68 States whether members or not of the League of Nations. The 
General Meeting of Government Experts added to the draft Convention for the 
Prevention of Double Taxation prepared by the technical experts two new texts of model 
bilateral Conventions which draw no distinction between impersonal and personal taxes, 
the first applying to countries in which domicile taxation dominated, and the second one 
to countries which different tax systems. The significant differences between the 1928 
texts of model bilateral convention for the prevention of double taxation referred to the 
allocation of taxing rights between the state of residence and the state of source. This 
tension between source and residence taxation in the convention for the prevention of 
double taxation did not affect the Bilateral Convention on Administrative Assistance in 
Matters of Taxation. In fact, the Government Experts did not introduce any substantial 
modification in the Convention on Administrative Assistance presented by the Technical 
Experts.334 The new models for the prevention of double taxation, which increased the 
allocation of taxing rights to the state of residence, did not raise the interest in exchange 
of information, even though its enforcement relied on this matter. The absence of 
interest in exchange of tax information might also be explained by the fact that at that 
time most countries had exchange controls, which means that countries had information 
on capital going in and out of their borders.  
 
During the Second World War, two regional tax conferences were held under the 
auspices of the Fiscal Committee in Mexico City in June 1940 and July 1943. Later, in 
1946, another meeting was held in London. The outcome of those meetings was the new 
Models of Tax Conventions. In the Mexico and London Model Conventions each one of 
the subjects below was treated in a different convention: Prevention of the double 
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334 League of Nations, ‘Report presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double 
Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (1928) doc. C.562.M.178.1928.II., 49 Economic and Financial Series 1, 25-8. 
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taxation of income and property; Prevention of the double taxation of estates and 
successions; Reciprocal administrative assistance for the assessment and collection of 
taxes on income, property, estates and successions. Therefore, they differed from the 
reports presented by the Technical Experts in 1927 and by the Government Experts in 
1928, which included four separate models of convention; the Mexico and London 
Drafts gathered the administrative assistance and the collection of taxes in the same 
instrument, reducing the number of conventions to three rather than four.335 This 
measure might be seen as an initiative to simplify the number of models required to 
eliminate double taxation and combat tax evasion. Actually, this tendency was 
confirmed in the next models, which went further, gathering all subjects in a single 
instrument. Therefore, currently, clauses to eliminate double taxation and to curb tax 
avoidance and evasion (i.e. clauses for exchange of tax information) are included in the 
structure of the OECD Model Convention.  
 
Based on the historical aspects examined above, we can conclude that since the initial 
effort to develop a tax treaty, the interest in eliminating double taxation has prevailed 
over the interest in combatting tax avoidance and evasion. Countries have worried much 
more about how to protect and to enhance the international flow of capital rather than on 
how to control it in order to eliminate tax avoidance and evasion. To this extent, the 
elimination of double taxation has been dealt through the allocation of taxing rights 
between source and residence countries; whereas the combatting of tax avoidance and 
evasion has been through clauses for exchange of tax information. Even though double 
taxation could be solved through unilateral measures, i.e. domestic tax policies that 
allow tax credits or exempt income tax abroad, countries have preferred to deal with this 
issue at the international level, which might be explained by the legal protection that tax 
treaties make certain.  
 
Allocation of taxing rights has been the dominant argument discussed in the literature 
regarding the interest of developed and developing countries in international taxation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 League of Nations, ‘Fiscal Committee: London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and 
Text’ (1946) doc. C. 88. M. 88. 1946. II.A., II. Economic and Financial Series 1. 
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As already argued, source taxation was associated to developing countries’ interests, 
whereas residence taxation to developed countries. There are several studies addressing 
the problem of international taxation from this angle, i.e. from the perspective of 
allocation of taxing rights. There are studies that investigated this issue from its 
historical aspect, i.e. considering the division of taxing rights since the development of 
the initial idea of a tax treaty and, consequently, the dominant interest of developed 
countries in residence taxation.336 Other studies preferred to examine the allocation of 
taxing rights, focusing on the economic allegiance doctrine337 and neutrality policies338 
in order to try to validate the allocation though economic theories. Even game theory 
has been used to examine the interest of developed and developing countries regarding 
residence and source taxation. In this sense, Dagan performed a study focused on the 
effect of tax treaties and unilateral policies on the allocation of taxing rights between 
developing and developed countries, assuming that the former are capital importers, 
while the latter are capital exporters. She concluded that source countries (developing 
countries) better preserve their taxing rights by adopting unilateral policies, instead of 
by enacting tax treaties. 339  The differences between the OECD and UN Model 
Conventions are also based on allocation of taxing rights between source and residence 
countries and, consequently, their benefits to developed and developing countries.  
 
But why have developing countries defended source taxation? What are their effective 
interests behind this argument? Examining the arguments adopted by developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336  Avery Jones, ‘The History of the United Kingdom’s First Comprehensive Double Taxation 
Agreement’ (n 48); M. J. Graetz and M. M. O’Hear, ‘The “Original Intent” of U.S. International 
Taxation’ (n 36). 
337 According to the economic allegiance doctrine, income should be taxed: (i) where the result is 
physically or economically produced; and (ii) where the income is consumed or disposed of. Referring to 
problems on the economic allegiance doctrine: R. S. J. Martha, The Jurisdiction to Tax in International 
Law: Theory and Practice of Legislative Fiscal Jurisdiction (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers 1989); 
A. A. Skaar, Permanent Establishment: Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers 1991); D. Pinto, ‘Exclusive Source or Residence - Based Taxation: Is a New and Simpler 
World Tax Order Possible?’ (2007) 61 Bulletin for International Taxation 277; Tadmore (n 40).  
338 Neutrality policies were explained in detail in Chapter V. To recap briefly, they adopt a different 
approach to justify source and residence taxation, based on methods to prevent double taxation and the 
level of incentive to invest abroad, i.e. the neutrality of the tax system depends on the choice of investing 
at home or abroad. For further reference: P. B. Musgrave, ‘Sovereign, Entitlement, and Cooperation in 
International Taxation’ (2000-01) 26 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 1337; Frisch (n 282); Graetz 
and Grinberg, ‘Taxing International Portfolio Income’ (n 282); Jeffery (n 28); Vogel (n 291). 
339 T. Dagan, ‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ (1999-00) 32 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 941. 
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countries, the answer becomes evident: the debate is in fact about allocation of tax base. 
To this extent, the preference for source taxation can be justified by developing 
countries’ administrative constraints to tax foreign income of their residents added to the 
absence of knowledge of the relevance of capital flight in terms of potential tax revenue. 
Developing countries have assumed a defensive position rather than an offensive one in 
terms of international taxation since they have preferred to collect a limited amount of 
source taxation by levying withholding taxes on non-residents’ local income than to 
enforce taxation of residents’ foreign income.  
 
The economic premises that have validated the defensive position assumed by 
developing countries have been challenged by globalisation. The international flow of 
capital is much more complex, the North/South assumption that justified the adoption of 
source taxation by developing countries is not verified anymore. It is necessary to 
examine the flow, regarding the differences between FDI and Portfolio Investment. In 
this regard, it was demonstrated that even though developing countries sustain a net 
debtor position derived from their past as capital importers, the flows have become more 
bidirectional. Thus, developing countries have also exported FDI and Portfolio 
Investment. Developed countries, on the other hand, have assumed a net debtor position, 
importing capital from other groups of countries. In terms of FDI, they still have a 
creditor position, however, considering the amount of FDI that circulates among their 
economies, it became evident that only a reduced amount is exported to developing 
countries. Regarding Portfolio Investment, developed countries have assumed a debtor 
position. This situation has been confirmed by the direction of the flows received by 
them. Furthermore, even though it has no impact in terms of tax base, the increased 
accumulation of reserves by developing countries’ monetary authorities since the Asian 
crisis in 1997 also highlights the fact that the flow of capital does not follow anymore 
the North/South assumption.  
 
In sum, even though developing countries have a past of capital importers reflected in 
their net debtor position, this trend has been changed in the current process of 
globalisation due to the increased outflows of FDI and Portfolio Investment as well as 
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their enlarged reserves of foreign assets held by their monetary authorities. On the other 
hand, developed countries have not only reversed their position as creditors of the 
world, but they have also sustained a substantial net inflow of capital, confirming their 
new trend as debtors.340 
 
Moreover, it is not possible any longer to understand the flow of capital in terms of only 
two groups of countries: developed and developing ones. It is essential to consider the 
position of tax havens. These countries became part of the route of the international flow 
of capital in the current process of globalisation. Consequently, the problem of tax 
avoidance and evasion achieved a different dimension since capital can easily flow out 
of a country. The phenomenon of capital flight illustrates this situation since it 
represents unrecorded outflows from countries. As a consequence, countries’ debtor 
positions have been overestimated. In this regard, the relevance of capital flight to 
developing countries also proved that the crisis of residence taxation faced by developed 
countries is also affecting them since it became evident that developing countries do 
need instruments to tax income derived from foreign assets held abroad by their 
residents. From this angle, it is revealed that international tax avoidance and evasion 
cannot be treated as a secondary issue by developing countries. 
 
Allocation of taxing rights, therefore, should not be seen as the problem faced by 
developing countries regarding international taxation. Limitation of source taxation is 
not the key issue. The point is how to enlarge their tax base. From this angle, what 
became clear is that to enlarge their tax base they will have to deal with the problem of 
international tax avoidance and evasion. In this sense, the analysis of the current profile 
of the international flow of capital complemented by the study of capital flight put in 
evidence the effective interest of developing countries regarding international taxation: 
developing countries need to be able to tax residents’ foreign income. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Detailed information about the international flow of capital as well as stocks of assets and liabilities 
accumulated by countries is provided in Chapter III. 
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Even though initially the debate about international taxation has focused on the 
prevention of double taxation in terms of allocation of taxing rights rather than the 
elimination of tax avoidance and evasion in order to encourage the international 
financial flow, the initiative promoted by the OECD since 1998 regarding harmful tax 
competition has demonstrated the increasing consciousness of the developed countries 
with this ‘secondary’ aspect of international taxation.  
 
Initially, the work developed by the OECD to combat harmful tax competition identified 
the problem of international tax evasion and avoidance with tax havens and preferential 
tax regimes. However, as demonstrated, tax havens and preferential tax regimes have no 
technical meaning and the factors used to identify them have changed over time. An 
overview of the evolving concept of tax havens showed how the OECD’s position has 
modified, i.e. starting from a more radical approach, suggesting changes in tax systems 
and ending with a discourse focused on transparency and exchange of information. The 
evolution of the criteria to identify tax havens also contributes to understanding the 
position of the OECD countries in relation to international tax avoidance and evasion: 
developed countries want to have mechanisms that can protect their tax base, however, 
they do not want to eliminate tax havens and offshore financial centres since they ensure 
how the global financial market works, i.e. they are part of the world finance structure.  
 
Until now, the involvement of developing countries with initiatives to enhance 
transparency and exchange of tax information as mechanisms to combat tax avoidance 
and evasion has been very limited. Developing countries need to get involved with the 
work developed to combat international tax avoidance and evasion since this is the 
effective issue that will allow them to enlarge their tax base. 
 
To this extent, it will be necessary to understand where we are in terms of mechanisms 
to combat tax avoidance and evasion. The international community, initially through the 
initiative of the OECD and later through the Global Forum, has chosen measures that 
enhance transparency and instruments for exchange of tax information as the answer to 
combat tax avoidance and evasion. Therefore, the advantages and flaws of these 
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instruments will enlighten whether the measures taken until now have really contributed 
to combatting tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
It is also important to make clear that both tax evasion and tax avoidance should be 
targeted by those instruments since even though the first outflow of capital flight from 
developing countries (or from developed ones) represents an illegal flow, and 
consequently the problem of tax evasion, later, when this capital is further invested in a 
different jurisdiction, this movement might represent only tax avoidance. Thus, 
considering the fact that these two aspects are so connected and it is very difficult to 
disentangle them, tax policies need to address both situations.  
 
After verifying how the current instruments for exchange of tax information work 
(Chapter VII), different scenarios will be examined in order to understand how these 
instruments would help developing countries to deal with the problem of capital flight 
(Chapter VIII). 
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Chapter VII. Current mechanisms for exchange of tax information 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to assess how the current instruments of exchange of information help 
developing countries to tax residents’ foreign income. Until now the debate involving 
developing countries and international taxation has been focused on the taxation of 
domestic investments of non-residents. The trade-off between the raising of tax revenue 
and attraction of foreign investment conflicts with this approach. To make things more 
complicated most developed countries largely exempt non-residents’ portfolio income. 
These policies adopted by developed countries can be better reconciled with the 
necessity to raise tax revenue and attract foreign investment. In this context, developed 
countries do need to have mechanisms to enforce residence taxation of their residents’ 
foreign income. The essential mechanism to enforce residence taxation is exchange of 
information, which can be implemented by different legal bases; e.g. bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements, supranational laws or domestic laws. Developed countries, 
therefore, have structured different instruments to secure the effectiveness of the 
principle of residence taxation on their residents’ foreign income. 
 
The taxation of residents’ foreign income has not received too much attention in 
developing countries. The focus on non-residents’ local income has overridden the 
significance of residents’ foreign income. The evolution of the international flow of 
capital as well as the adaptation of their tax systems to the international economy by 
moving from territorial taxation to worldwide taxation of their residents’ foreign income 
demonstrate that developing countries aim also to tax residents’ foreign income. The 
strategy of enforcing taxation of residents’ foreign income could be better reconciled 
with the problem of tax competition since developing countries would raise tax revenue 
that they need to promote development without curbing foreign investment.  
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The discussion on how to tax residents’ foreign income has been established on the 
choice between the levy of a withholding tax by the source country and the 
implementation of mechanisms for exchange of information by the residence country, 
which in fact relies on the provision of information by source countries. These two 
strategies on how to enforce residents’ foreign income taxation have been considered 
substitutable in the literature even though there is no theoretical background to support 
such argument. Keen and Ligthart demonstrated that the substitutability between the 
levy of withholding tax and the implementation of mechanisms for exchange of 
information might derive from countries’ practical experience. 341  These authors 
exemplified the importance of practical experience by quoting two studies. The first 
study quoted by them was developed by Gordon and Hines342 in which the reduction of 
withholding taxes in double tax treaties was associated with the inclusion of information 
exchange provisions that could also prevent tax evasion and help to enforce residence 
taxation.343 The second study was developed by Huizinga and Nicodeme and the 
question investigated was whether information exchange and withholding taxes were 
complementary or substitutable regarding bank interest in 1999. These authors 
examined 440 pair-relationships between developed countries and they found out that in 
the sample of 440 pair-relationships only 17 had both information exchange and non-
zero withholding taxes on interest income. These 17 entries with joint information 
exchange and withholding taxation all pertained to Australia. Based on this evidence, 
Huizinga and Nicodeme concluded that apart from Australia, information exchange and 
withholding taxes were substitutable instruments to grant residence taxation rather than 
complementary strategies.	  344 However, it is important to note that those studies were 
based on developed countries’ data; developing countries’ experience was not 
considered by both studies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 M. Keen and J. E. Ligthart, ‘Information Sharing and International Taxation’ (2004) CentER 
Discussion Paper N. 2004-117 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=639021> accessed 2 September 2009, 10. 
342 R.H. Gordon and J.R. Hines, ‘International Taxation’ in A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds), 
Handbook of Public Economics, (vol. IV, Elsevier Science 2002). 
343 Keen and Ligthart (n 341) 10. 
344 H. Huizinga and G. Nicodeme, ‘Are International Deposits Tax Driven?’ (2004) 88 Journal of Public 
Economics 1093. 
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Therefore, the conclusion brought by the studies used by Keen and Ligthart to justify the 
substitutability between levy of withholding tax and exchange of information is clearly 
applicable to developed countries. To developing countries other assumptions need also 
to be considered, as discussed in Chapter V. The chapter on taxation of portfolio income 
demonstrated that developing countries are offering tax incentives on this type of 
income by not levying withholding tax on a significant number of cases. On the other 
hand, the data analysed in that chapter also pointed out that developing countries have a 
very limited number of tax treaties when compared to developed countries. Thus, while 
withholding taxes and exchange of information are substitutable mechanisms according 
to developed countries’ experience, there is less evidence in developing countries that 
confirms this hypothesis because their renunciation of source taxation is not rebalanced 
by mechanisms (e.g. tax treaties) that secure exchange of information. Another issue is 
if the mechanisms in force for exchange of information were adopted by developing 
countries would they work properly, providing the necessary information that these 
countries need. This argument is examined in this chapter. 
 
Another fact that contributed to the argument about the substitutability between 
withholding taxes and exchange of information in developed countries was the EU 
Savings Directive in which EU Member States exchange information automatically 
about individuals’ interest income from debt-claims.345 During a transitional period, 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg opted for levying a withholding tax of which 75% of 
the tax revenue raised had to be remitted to the residence country of the taxpayer.346 The 
EU Savings Directive provided not only additional evidence about the substitutability 
between the levy of withholding tax and exchange of information but also added 
information about the preference of developed countries for exchange of information 
policy. The preference of developed countries for exchange of information can also be 
verified in their double tax conventions. Most tax conventions made between developed 
countries opted for a zero-withholding on certain types of income, e.g. dividends, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Keen and Ligthart (n 341) 10. 
346 EU Savings Directive will be discussed again in the following sections. 
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interest and royalties, relying on tax information provided by mechanisms for exchange 
of information provided in tax treaty. 
 
One possible explanation for the preference for exchange of information in developed 
countries might be the fact that the levy of withholding tax also requires information 
exchange between tax administrations to verify taxpayers’ liability in the residence 
country. Thus, the levy of withholding tax needs also to be complemented by the 
process of exchange of information. Furthermore, there is also the traditional 
assumption that developed countries are capital exporters and they would raise more tax 
revenue focusing on residents’ worldwide income rather than non-residents’ local 
income. However, as already demonstrated in the previous chapters, these assumptions 
are too simplistic regarding the current profile of the international flow of capital. Even 
though in the past their preference for exchange of information over the levy of 
withholding tax could be explained by the international flow of capital, nowadays the 
complexity of the flow and the phenomenon of tax competition to attract foreign 
investment need also to be considered to understand developed countries’ preference for 
exchange of information. 
 
Regarding developing countries, the substitutability between withholding tax and 
exchange of information is not so evident due to the different allocation of tax revenue 
that these strategies cause. While withholding tax allows the source country to collect 
part of the tax revenue on non-residents’ income; exchange of information allocates the 
entire tax revenue to the residence country. Whether countries are net capital importers 
or not, they would benefit from the levy of withholding taxes on non-residents’ income. 
However, this does not mean that they do not need to have mechanisms to enforce 
worldwide taxation of their residents’ income. As already demonstrated in the previous 
chapters, due to the current profile of the international flow of capital as well as to the 
phenomenon of capital flight, developing countries also need to have mechanisms to 
enforce taxation of residents’ foreign income. Moreover, the levy of withholding taxes 
by developing countries is not as simple as assumed by the literature. The levy of 
withholding taxes can create distortions on the classification of income, which also 
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requires an effective tax administration to control it. Even though the levy of 
withholding taxes by developing countries is a sensitive issue, the approach adopted 
here will focus on taxation of residents’ foreign income by developing countries, based 
on the enforcement of mechanisms for exchange of information. It is important to keep 
in mind, however, that in any case taxation of residents’ foreign income depends on the 
cooperation of the source country, whether providing information or levying a 
withholding tax. 
 
This chapter will evaluate how successfully developing countries can tax residents’ 
foreign income based on the analysis of existing instruments for exchange of 
information (i.e. bilateral and multilateral agreements – Double Tax Conventions 
(DTC), Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA), the Joint Council of 
Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(CMAATM); and supranational laws (Council Directive 77/799/EEC; Council Directive 
2003/48/EC; Council Regulation EC 1798/2003)), including mechanisms available 
exclusively for certain developed countries. The analysis of developed countries’ 
experience with instruments for exchange of information available exclusively for them 
will enrich the analysis with additional information of their implementation and the 
difficulties that they faced. However, regarding the effectiveness of extraterritorial tax 
information, i.e. statistical data of information exchanged, there are few studies 
available which makes it difficult to understand how exchange of information works in 
practice. Consequently, the analysis will present more theoretical information about how 
the instruments available for exchange information work rather than outcomes of their 
effectiveness in practice. Of course whenever data are available; they will be examined, 
being aware of intrinsic limitations. 
 
A critical analysis of each instrument for exchange of information will be performed, 
demonstrating the amendments that occurred in their evolving process, their advantages 
and limitations as well as the relationship among them (i.e. when there is more than one 
instrument available, which one should prevail).  
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It is important to make a disclaimer about the fact that the protection of taxpayers’ rights 
is not deeply analysed in this chapter. The reference to the protection of taxpayers’ 
rights is restricted to the general rules provided in the existing mechanisms for exchange 
of information that limit exchange of information. It should not be assumed that less 
importance is attributed to them. On the contrary, the reason for not extending the 
analysis to the protection of taxpayers’ rights is based on the fact that it would require a 
detailed analysis which is outside the scope of this section. Another way to explain the 
limits of the current analysis is based on the argument that first we need to understand 
what type of information can be effectively exchanged and only after that, i.e. when we 
are able to identify what kind of information can be successfully exchanged, the issue of 
taxpayers’ rights can be dealt with in a more pragmatic way. 
 
7.2. Mechanisms for Exchange of Information 
 
In this section, instruments for exchange of information (i.e. bilateral and multilateral 
agreements – Double Tax Conventions (DTC), Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEA), the Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (CMAATM); and supranational laws (e.g. Council Directive 
77/799/EEC 347 ; Council Directive 2003/48/EC 348 ; and Council Regulation EC 
1798/2003349)) will be critically examined, exploring the amendments that occurred in 
their evolving process, their advantages and limitations as well as the relationships 
among them (i.e. when there is more than one instrument available, which one should 
prevail). 
 
The contribution of this analysis relies on the understanding of whether the evolution of 
instruments for exchange of information enlarged or not the rights of tax administrations 
to obtain extraterritorial tax information and whether developing countries can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation, OJL 336, 15. 
348 Council Directive n. 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments, OJEC L157, 38. 
349 Council Regulation (EC) n. 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of 
value added tax, OJEC L264, 1.  
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implement them. This enlargement of tax administrations’ powers is essential in the 
current process of globalisation since financial transactions are not restrained by 
countries’ borders. It is undeniable that in an integrated global economy taxpayers have 
enhanced their abilities to invest in any part of the world; however the power of tax 
administrations to access such transactions relies on such instruments for exchange of 
information. A critical comprehension of whether the current instruments have enlarged 
tax administrations’ power to verify taxpayers’ liabilities is crucial for countries to 
enforce taxation of their residents’ foreign investments. 
 
7.2.1. Bilateral Agreements 
 
A bilateral agreement is a contract made by two parties, specifying their reciprocal 
rights and obligations. Different from multilateral agreements in which parties adhere to 
a standard agreement without amending the pre-defined clauses, a bilateral agreement 
usually involves   negotiation of its clauses and the two parties are only bound by the 
exact terms that they agree. This argumentation leads to the false impression that 
multilateral agreements are easier to make since parties just need to accept a standard 
agreement. However, it is very difficult to develop a model of multilateral instrument 
that satisfies the different interests of contracting parties regarding exchange of 
information. So, in practice, it was easier to establish a network of bilateral agreements 
for exchange of information than a multilateral one. This is the main reason that has 
justified the implementation of exchange of information through bilateral instruments 
rather than a multilateral one. 
 
In the next sections, models of bilateral agreements that provide exchange of 
information are examined. These models have been elaborated by different 
organisations, however, as demonstrated next, they also have many aspects in common 
since there was a certain kind of interaction among them, resulting is some similar 
characteristics. An important distinction when analysing the models is to keep in mind 
that some of them have a broader scope, including other subjects besides exchange of 
information; while others were specifically developed to implement exchange of 
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information. The idea is to examine the main characteristics of these models, pointing 
out their advantages and shortcomings in relation to developed and developing 
countries’ perspectives.  
 
 7.2.1.1. The evolution of exchange of information’s clause in the OECD 
Model Conventions350 
 
During the initial work of the League of Nations, prevention of double taxation and 
administrative assistance in tax matters were treated in separate conventions. In fact, in 
1927, the Financial Committee of the League of Nations presented four Draft 
Conventions, treating the following issues separately: prevention of double taxation, 
succession duties, administrative assistance in tax matters and judicial assistance in the 
collection of taxes.  
 
The 1927 Draft Convention on Administrative Assistance in Matters of Taxation was 
structured in the following way: Article 1: how the scheme of assistance should work in 
practice; Article 2: persons and type of income which were subjected to the procedure of 
exchange of information; Article 3: limits to administrative assistance; and Article 5 to 
8: measures of execution. 351  Even though it would require complementary 
understanding between two contracting states signing it, the Draft covered a broad range 
of issues, including automatic exchange of information, as discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Later, in 1943 (during the Fiscal Committee in Mexico) and in 1946 (during the Fiscal 
Committee in London) new Model Conventions were published. The outstanding 
structural difference between the Mexico and London Drafts and the previous Model 
Conventions was the treatment of administrative assistance and collection of taxes in the 
same instrument. Even though the same structure was adopted by the Mexico and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350  The expressions ‘Double Tax Treaty’, ‘Double Tax Convention’, ‘Tax Treaty’ and ‘Model 
Convention’ will be used in an interchangeable way in the body of this text. These terms will be used to 
refer to bilateral agreements signed between contracting states in order to prevent double taxation and 
combat tax evasion. 
351 League of Nations, ‘Report on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion presented by the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion’ (n 326) 8. 
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London Draft, examining the rules we can identify substantial differences among them. 
An important variation refers to exchange of readily available information (Article III). 
While the London Draft included explicitly a provision that allowed automatic exchange 
of information between the competent authority of each contracting state in the ordinary 
course of each year; the Mexico Draft incorporated only a provision that allowed the 
transmission of tax information in concrete cases on special request.352 The Fiscal 
Committee of the League of Nations compared those provisions in 1946 and argued that 
the divergence might be attributed to the fact that automatic exchange of information 
between tax authorities would work satisfactorily only when countries had a well-
established and developed tax system and tax administration. This argument was used to 
justify the absence of an automatic exchange of information clause in the Mexico Model 
Convention. However, another possible explanation might be connected to the fact that 
the Mexico Model Convention allocated more taxing rights to the source country rather 
than to the residence country. From this angle, extraterritorial exchange of tax 
information is less crucial for the enforcement of source taxation than for the grant of 
residence taxation. Thus, the inclusion of a provision for automatic exchange of 
information in the London Draft might reflect a coordinated act between the adoption of 
the residence principle in the Model Convention to Prevention of the double taxation of 
income and property and the necessity of extraterritorial tax information established in 
the Model Convention on Reciprocal administrative assistance for the assessment and 
collection of taxes on income. This kind of coordination has been lost in the evolving 
process of double tax treaties with the increased allocation of taxing rights to the 
residence state not being followed by improved clauses of exchange of information.  
 
Between 1958 and 1961 the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations prepared four 
reports about double taxation and tax evasion. Only in 1963, a final report was 
presented, entitled ‘Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital. The 
1963 Draft was later revised and resulted in the publication in 1977 of a new Model 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 League of Nations, ‘London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text’ (n 335) 102-
03. 
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Convention and Commentaries.	  353 There were substantial structural changes comparing 
the Mexico and London Model Conventions to the 1963 Draft and 1977 Model 
Convention. The first change refers to the presentation of a single instrument to deal 
with the problems affecting double taxation and tax evasion. So, the three instruments 
included in the Mexico and London Model Conventions were synthesised in a single 
treaty. However, administrative assistance for the recovery of tax claims was left apart. 
This issue was left outside the scope of the 1963 Draft and 1977 Model Convention 
based on the argument that recovery of tax claims was usually dealt with in a separate 
bilateral agreement. Nevertheless, contracting states might introduce an Article dealing 
with it, if they preferred, as there was no objection to that.	  354 
 
In fact, the inclusion of clauses dealing with the prevention of double taxation of income 
and exchange of information in the same instrument might create a problem. The 
objective of double tax treaties is to eliminate duplicated taxes on the commercial 
transactions between contracting states, which leads to the conclusion that tax treaties 
have a higher probability to be made between countries with a strong commercial 
relationship and a large flow of cross-border investment.355 However, the necessity of 
extraterritorial tax information might not match with the commercial interest. In this 
circumstance, a country can solve the problem of double taxation using unilateral 
measures since the volume of commercial transactions might not justify the signature of 
tax treaties. The described situation is more complicated in relation to exchange of 
information since there is no unilateral measure that can substitute the absence of 
information provided by tax treaties. In fact, there is a gap left by the absence of a tax 
treaty. This gap inhibits the flow of exchange of information required to combat tax 
evasion. So, even though treating double taxation and exchange of information together 
can simplify the process of implementing tax treaties, it might create problems when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital: Condensed Version July 2008 (OECD 2008), 8 
354 K. van Raad, 1963 and 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Treaties and Commentaries (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers 1990). 
355 S. A. Dean, ‘The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information’ (2008) 49 Brooklyn Law School 
Legal Studies Research Papers-Accepted Paper Series n. 107 1, 45. 
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there is a disparity between interest to avoid double taxation and interest to combat tax 
evasion through exchange of tax information. 
 
The second considerable change introduced by the 1963 Draft and the 1977 Model 
Convention refers to the substance of Article 26 that incorporated exchange of 
information provisions in the treaty for the prevention of double taxation. Both Articles 
26 of the 1963 and 1977 Model Convention are quite similar in terms of structure and 
substance, so they will be analysed together. The first interesting point refers to the 
change in the type of clause included in the last Models compared to the previous ones. 
While the 1927, 1928, 1943 and 1946 Models concerned practical measures to 
implement exchange of information, the 1963 Draft and 1977 Model Convention 
established only general principles.356 This tendency has been followed in the next 
Model Conventions.  
 
Another aspect refers to specific mention of forms of exchange of information. In the 
1963 Draft and 1977 Model Convention, the ways to exchange information were 
expressly mentioned only in the Commentary. In the body of the Model Convention, 
there was no single explanation on whether exchange of information might be automatic 
or only by request, for instance. Nevertheless, both Commentaries made clear that the 
manner in which exchange of information would be performed relied on the 
understandings between the contracting states.357 There was no pre-defined form of 
exchange of information suggested in the Models.  
 
Since 1963, Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention has provided rules for exchange 
of information. The revisions that updated the Model Conventions periodically to reflect 
current country practices have adjusted the text of Article 26 as well as the interpretation 
of the rules established in the Commentary. In this sense, from 1963 to 2009, the 
structure of Article 26 has suffered very light modifications, excepted by the inclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 ibid 39. 
357 League of Nations, ‘London and Mexico Model Tax Conventions: Commentary and Text’ (n 335) 314-
15. 
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of paragraphs 4 and 5 in 2005. Paragraph 4358 of Article 26 deals explicitly with the 
obligation to exchange information in situations where the requested information is not 
necessary to the requested state for domestic tax purposes,359 that is, contracting states 
should exchange tax information independently of whether or not they need that 
information. This signifies that domestic tax interest should not bar exchange of 
information. Paragraph 5360 of Article 26 granted that the limitations to exchange 
information established in paragraph 3361 could not be used to prevent the exchange of 
information held by banks, other financial institutions, nominees, agents, fiduciaries as 
well as ownership information,362 which means that a contracting state cannot excuse 
itself from providing information on grounds of bank secrecy or ownership information 
when this is treated as a secret by domestic laws. 
 
Even though paragraphs 4 and 5 changed the structure of Article 26 of the OECD Model 
Convention, the Commentaries on this Article suggested that these modifications should 
not imply that the previous versions of the OECD Model Convention did not authorise 
the exchange of such information. In fact, the Commentary wants to make clear that the 
inclusion of these new paragraphs only reflects the current practice already adopted by 
the vast majority of OECD member countries. The argumentation developed by the 
OECD in the Commentary of the 2005 Model Convention tries to avoid the necessity of 
amendments on tax treaties already in force in order to grant the application of those 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 ‘Article 26(4) If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the 
other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the requested information, 
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contained in the preceding sentence is subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such 
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institution, nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates to 
ownership interests in a person.’ ibid 40. 
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state which signifies that a requested state is not bound to provide information to the requesting state if in 
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rules. The Commentary attempts to justify the provisions in paragraph 4 and 5 as merely 
new interpretations of current practice.	  363 Nevertheless, reservations on Article 26 made 
clear that countries in which these provisions could have a major impact reserved the 
right not to include paragraphs 4 and 5. For instance, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg reserved their rights not to include paragraph 5 in their conventions.364 
 
The recent modifications introduced in Article 26 are focused on the issue of which 
information a government should obtain automatically from third parties such as banks 
and other financial institutions. However, to develop a system where information can be 
exchanged effectively it is also necessary to examine the mechanisms in force that 
promote the transmission of the tax information between countries. In other words, the 
Revision of Article 26 focused only on the first level of requirements to implement a 
system where tax information can be effectively exchanged. Spencer highlighted this 
point by examining the following conditions: (i) whether the source-country government 
is only obligated to exchange information on request; (ii) whether the source-country 
government does not receive information by a system of automatic reporting; and (iii) 
whether the residence-country government has enough information to request 
information from the source-country. Thus, despite the fact that the revision of Article 
26 has improved some aspects of exchange of information in tax treaties, the source-
country government might not be able to effectively exchange information. Spencer 
characterised such situation as ‘de facto bank secrecy’, which signifies in practical 
matters that the Revised Article 26 might have a limited impact on promoting effective 
exchange of information. Spencer concluded that, for exchange of information under 
Revised Article 26 to be effective, the source-country government generally must have a 
system for the automatic reporting of information.	  365 This argument will be considered 
again when examining the structure on how mechanisms for exchange of information 
work in a situation where there is a tax haven interposed between two contracting states. 
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364 OECD, ‘Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital Model Tax Convention on Income and on 
Capital: Condensed Version July 2008’ (n 353) 361. 
365 D. E. Spencer, ‘Tax Information Exchange and Bank Secrecy (Part 1)’ (2005) 16 Journal of 
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Furthermore, it is important to understand that Article 26 of the OECD Model 
Convention is not a ground-breaking innovation. As debated next, the US Model Income 
Tax Convention of November 2006 [Article 26(5)]366; US Tax Information Exchange 
Agreement [Article 4(b)] and OECD Model TIEA had already established rules to 
override bank secrecy laws.367  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that an Article regarding mutual assistance for the 
recovery of tax claims was included in the OECD Model Convention only in 2003 when 
a structural change implemented Article 27. From the 1963 OECD Draft to the 2000 
OECD Model Convention, there was only a brief mention in the Commentary of Article 
26 about the possibility of extending administrative assistance to cover collection of 
taxes. During that period, assistance in the collection of taxes was treated in a separate 
treaty, i.e. in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, a 
multilateral convention that entered into force in 1995.368 The explanation for having (i) 
mutual assistance for exchange of information and (ii) assistance for the recovery of tax 
claims treated in different conventions is based on the assumption that the latter could be 
extended to cover all public debts, and States would be reluctant to agree with that.369 
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The current version of Article 26 has improved some aspects of exchange of information 
regarding domestic interest; bank secrecy as well as ownership identity. However, we 
are still far away from a model that can promote effective exchange of information. 
There are still some strategic issues that will have to be tackled by the OECD which 
include: (i) enforcement of mandatory automatic exchange of information from source 
countries; (ii) disclosure of certain tax information to third countries; and (iii) the 
identification of the beneficial owner of a chain of companies established in different 
countries. The necessity of dealing with these issues will become clear when analysing 
the problem of exchange of information from a dynamic perspective in the next chapter. 
 
The analysis of the evolution of the OECD Model Convention aimed to demonstrate 
arguments that shaped the structure and substance of the current Article 26 on exchange 
of information. On focusing on structural adjustments in the OECD Model Convention, 
the main change was the inclusion of rules to avoid double taxation and to exchange 
information in one single treaty. The substance of the OECD Model Convention has also 
evolved, incorporating general understandings previously established in the 
Commentary as well as practices among most OECD Member States, even though there 
are still many issues to be solved in order to have an Article that really provides 
effective exchange of information. Nevertheless, the OECD Model Convention can 
provide tax information only when there is a commercial relationship between countries 
that required the signature of a treaty to relieve double taxation.370 The disconnection 
between double taxation and tax evasion makes things more complicated, requiring 
other instruments to improve exchange of information when the signature of a DTC is 
not the appropriate solution.  
 
 7.2.1.2. United Nations Model Conventions 
 
Before investigating the United Nations (UN) rules about exchange of information, it is 
important to understand the function of this institution regarding international taxation. 
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The UN’s work will shed some light on the problems and challenges affecting the UN 
Model Convention.  
 
As explained previously in this chapter, the initial work on international taxation was 
coordinated by the League of Nations. In 1945, after the World War II, the UN took 
over the role of the League of Nations, including matters of taxation, though, in practice, 
the work of the League of Nations continued for a short time. In this sense, in 1946, 
even though the UN should have assumed the League’s functions, the League’s Fiscal 
Committee met in London to review the Mexico Draft. The outcome of their work was a 
new draft, also called the London Draft. Despite the development of the Mexico and 
London Drafts in the 1940s, the UN only established the Ad Hoc Group of Experts to 
tackle international tax matters in 1967. The Ad Hoc Group received far less 
institutional support and status than the League’s Fiscal Committee. Consequently, the 
Ad Hoc Group played a limited role in establishing an international consensus on tax 
matters compared to the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations.	  371  
 
One possible explanation for the reduced institutional support received by the Ad Hoc 
Group of the UN might be the fact that parallel to its development, another organisation 
was also established whose interests overlapped with the Ad Hoc Group in relation to 
international taxation. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 
was formed in 1947 to manage American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan for 
the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War.372 International taxation was 
among the subjects dealt by the OEEC. In practice, the work of the League’s Fiscal 
Committee was continued by the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC. Later, in 1961, the 
OECD took over from the OEEC and international taxation remained as an issue of 
great importance. In 1963, the OECD published its first Draft Convention and 
subsequently in 1977 it published the first OECD Model Convention. Thus, the fast 
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development of a Tax Model Convention put the OECD in evidence and it took over the 
position of guide in the debate on international taxation. 
 
The first UN Model Convention which was published in 1980 followed the same line 
established by the OECD Model Convention.373 There were small variations regarding 
the allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries, however the 
substance and the structure were similar to the OECD Model Convention. In practice, 
therefore, the work of the Ad Hoc Group consisted in adjusting the OECD Model 
Convention to the perspective of developing countries, based on the assumption that 
those countries were capital importers and would benefit from a better allocation of 
taxing rights to the source country. The matter of mutual assistance was particularly 
influenced by this assumption, since developing countries saw no urgent need for 
mutual assistance given that withholding taxes on non-residents’ local income appeared 
to solve the problem.374 At that time, the importance of residents’ foreign income was 
ignored. 
 
Since the beginning, the Ad Hoc Group of the UN adopted as a parameter the OECD 
Model Conventions to the development of its own Model Convention. Consequently, 
the periodical revision of the OECD Model Convention has also caused updates in the 
UN Model Convention, though with less frequency. The last condensed version of the 
UN Model Convention was published in 2001. Article 26 of the 2001 UN Model 
Convention followed the 2000 OECD Model Convention. There are, of course, some 
small variations in the text, but the core provisions remain the same. In fact, the main 
difference appeared in the Commentary in which a guideline regarding the 
implementation of appropriate exchange of information was included. The guideline 
provided possible arrangements from which the competent authorities of contracting 
states could select the particular ones that they would like to implement in the treaty. In 
fact, the guideline consisted of suggestions on how to implement exchange of 
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information in practice. For instance, regarding automatic exchange of information, the 
guideline suggested sources of income to be covered and general operational aspects to 
be considered by the transmitting and by the receiving country.	  375  
 
The necessity of clear rules on how to implement the general principles of exchange of 
information provided in Article 26 is undeniable. However, the rules established in the 
guideline are so broad that they cannot support an effective improvement in the 
implementation of exchange of information. There is no awareness of the fact that there 
has to be some consistency in the type of information exchanged by countries in order to 
achieve an effective exchange of information. More specific mandatory rules for the 
implementation of exchange of information would represent a better approach.  
 
In 2005, the OECD published a new consolidated version of its Model Convention with 
substantial changes in Article 26. These changes were analysed by the UN and 
incorporated in a document. This new document presented a revised version of Article 
26 and respective Commentary for inclusion in the next version of the UN Model 
Convention.376 Even though the substantial modifications adopted followed the OECD’s 
position, there are few issues that deserve a special mention.  
 
The first aspect refers to the recognition in the general considerations of the 
Commentary of Article 26 that exchange of information represents an important and 
necessary instrument to curtail capital flight.377 Thus, the initial position that exchange 
of information would be useful only for a limited number of cases and withholding taxes 
were enough for taxing foreign income was overcome. Developing countries do need to 
have instruments that enable them at least in theory to combat capital flight. The 
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absence of exchange of information in developing countries represents not only a 
loophole in their tax policies but also an incentive for capital flight.  
 
The second aspect refers to the importance of practical measures. This argument was 
already introduced in the previous version of the UN Model Convention as a guideline 
in the Commentary of Article 26. In the 2008 revised version of Article 26, however, 
this matter is also treated in the body of the Model Convention as paragraph 6.378 The 
OECD Model Convention has no particular paragraph regarding practical measures of 
implementation. This initiative taken by the UN is clearly positive, but it has a limited 
effectiveness due to the broad scope of its text as well as to the arrangements provided 
in the guideline, which remained as part of the Commentary of Article 26. 
 
The third aspect refers to the reciprocity principle derived from the text of paragraph 3 
of Article 26. Paragraph 3 (a) determines that a contracting state is not obligated to carry 
out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative practice of the 
other contracting state. From the perspective of the UN, the problem of reciprocity 
arises when a tax treaty is made between a developed and a developing country. In this 
case, the UN made clear in its Commentary of Article 26 that reciprocal obligations on 
the contracting states do not allow a developed country to refuse to provide information 
to a developing country on the grounds that the developing country does not have 
administrative capacity comparable to the developed country. Following this line of 
argument, the UN added two reasons for defending the point that different levels of 
administrative capacity do not preclude exchange of information: first paragraph 3 does 
not require reciprocal benefits; and second the principle of reciprocity must be viewed 
from the perspective of the convention as a whole.379  
 
Even though the argument of the UN led to the assumption that the OECD had argued in 
the opposite direction, on analysing the OECD Commentary of Article 26 what we see 
is also the awareness of the problem of countries with different levels of tax 
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administration capacities. The OECD Commentary expressed that too rigorous 
application of the principle of reciprocity could frustrate effective exchange of 
information and the reciprocity should be interpreted in a broad and pragmatic matter. 
The OECD recognised that different countries will have necessarily different 
mechanisms for obtaining and providing information. Therefore, variations in practice 
and procedures should not be used as a basis for denying a request. The condition 
established by the OECD for the refusal referred to the situation where the effect of the 
variations would limit in a significant way the requesting State’s overall ability to obtain 
and provide the information if the requesting State itself received a legitimate request 
from the requested State. However, the OECD made clear that the condition just 
described did not apply when the legal system or administrative practice of only one 
country provides for a specific procedure. In this situation, the exception would be the 
case where the requested information itself is not obtainable under the laws or the 
normal course of the administrative practice of the requesting State, a requested State 
may decline such a request.380 In other words, when there is a significant difference 
between two legal systems, including their tax administration, the absence of a 
procedure does not justify a refusal by the requested country to provide the information. 
In this case, the refusal would only be valid if based on a different argument, i.e. if 
underpinned by the fact that information could not be obtained under the laws or in the 
normal course of administrative practice in the requesting state. Thus, the essential 
difference consists of the absence of a law/procedure versus the existence of a 
law/procedure that prohibits the provision of the information.  
 
Comparing the UN with the OECD’s approach on the application of the principle of 
reciprocity, the conclusion is that both organisations wanted to make clear that the 
absence of a law or an administrative procedure could not preclude the requesting state 
from obtaining information from the requested state.  
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In sum, the UN Model Convention did not go further from what was suggested by the 
OECD in terms of exchange of information. In fact, the OECD Model Convention has 
guided the development of Article 26 of the UN Model Convention. Thus, both Model 
Conventions adopted the same line of argument which led to the same shortcomings in 
Article 26. The importance of exchange of information for developing countries has 
become clearer recently, due to its connection to the problem of capital flight. However, 
the argument of capital flight needs to be taken further, i.e. it must be considered when 
examining which type of arrangement would effectively improve exchange of 
information between developed and developing country. The UN has not addressed 
mechanisms for exchange of information from this point of view. This point needs to be 
considered by the UN if this organisation wants to adopt a proactive behaviour in the 
promotion of mechanisms for exchange of information, not only following once again 
the ideas developed by the OECD. 
 
 7.2.1.3. Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) 
 
The main reason for the signing of an income tax treaty is the prevention of double 
taxation that could arise if both contracting states do not agree on how to allocate taxing 
rights in relation to economic transactions that both states have enough connection that 
justifies the levy of their income tax. However, there are also situations where financial 
transactions are performed between two contracting states but only one has an income 
tax system. In this case, the signing of an income tax treaty does not make sense since 
double taxation will not occur. This example illustrates the situation in which double 
taxation is disconnected from tax evasion. In other words, the absence of double 
taxation does not signify that tax evasion will not happen. Consequently, another 
instrument is required to establish the legal basis for exchange of information. The 
appropriate instrument to set up exchange of information between countries with 
different income tax systems is the Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA).  
 
It is important to clarify that even though the current idea is the signing of a TIEA 
between an income taxing jurisdiction and a tax haven, this instrument can also be 
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enacted in other situations, for instance, when countries cannot find an agreement on 
terms of an income tax treaty, or even when countries just want to enhance the 
cooperation of their tax administrations in order to combat tax evasion. The first 
situation can be illustrated by the TIEA signed between Brazil and the United States in 
2001, neither country is a tax haven but they opted for signing a TIEA due to conflicting 
interests in the negotiation of an income tax treaty. The second situation refers to the 
signing of TIEAs by Latin American countries, following the CIAT Model. 
 
There is not only one single model of TIEA. Due to globalisation that increased the 
international flow of capital among countries and the limitations inherent of an income 
tax treaty regarding exchange of information between countries with different income 
tax systems, the TIEA has increased its importance recently. In the next subsections, the 
main characteristics of models of TIEA elaborated by the OECD, the United States and 
the Inter-American Center of Tax Administration (CIAT) will be examined in order to 
identify their advantages and shortcomings. The idea is to include in the analysis the 
perspective of developing countries on TIEA. 
 
The OECD TIEA  
 
In 2002, the OECD published a model agreement for effective exchange of information 
(TIEA) as part of their work on the combatting of harmful tax practices. The OECD 
TIEA has been already discussed in Chapter II, however from the perspective of harmful 
tax competition. Here the analysis is tackled from a different angle, focusing on the 
intrinsic characteristics of this instrument for exchange of tax information. Thus, even 
though some arguments will overlap, the approach is different, which makes the analysis 
complementary rather than repetitive. 
 
The OECD TIEA is part of the report elaborated by the OECD’s Global Forum on 
Taxation, which includes both OECD and non-OECD members381. The report examined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 By that time the non-OECD delegation was composed of Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, 
Mauritius and San Marino. 
228	  
	  
what was required to achieve a global level playing field in the areas of transparency 
and effective exchange of information in both civil and criminal tax matters.382 The 
standards set in the report and incorporated in the OECD TIEA represent measures 
suggested to be adopted by financial centres around the world, not only tax havens.  
  
The OECD TIEA can be signed in two different versions, i.e. as bilateral or multilateral 
instrument. The multilateral instrument is not a ‘multilateral’ convention in the 
traditional sense i.e. that allows later parties to adhere to its terms, binding all parties 
(initial and later participants) together without later consent of the first parties. Instead, 
it provides the basis for an integrated collection of bilateral treaties. A party to the 
multilateral TIEA would only be bound by the Agreement vis-à-vis the specific parties 
with which it agrees to be bound. Thus, a party wishing to be bound by the multilateral 
Agreement must specify in its instrument of ratification the party or parties vis-à-vis 
which it wishes to be so bound. The Agreement then enters into force, and creates rights 
and obligations, only between those parties (which can be more than two) that have 
mutually identified each other in their instruments of ratification.	   383  In fact, the 
multilateral version of the OECD TIEA is quite similar in substance and structure to the 
bilateral version. The difference relies on the possibility of including more than two 
parties in the agreement. Moreover, in the bilateral version there are some more issues to 
be negotiated, such as the taxes which are the subject of the agreement, the meaning of 
competent authority and any other clause that they want to amend.  
 
According to the understanding of the OECD’s Global Forum of Taxation, there are 
three major aspects for ensuring transparency and effective exchange of information: (i) 
the existence of mechanisms for exchange of information; (ii) the appropriate level of 
access to the information; and (iii) the availability of information. These three aspects 
were incorporated in the OECD TIEA. The first aspect refers to the necessity of a legal 
basis for countries to exchange information for tax purposes. To this extent, the OECD 
TIEA complements the bulk of instruments already available for exchange of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 OECD, ‘2006 Report on Tax Co-operation’ (n 70) 7. 
383 OECD, ‘Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters’ (2002) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf > accessed 08 October 2009, 2.  
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information (e.g. double tax conventions, Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, domestic laws, etc.).384 
 
The second aspect refers to devices incorporated in the OECD TIEA that not only 
enforce access to information on a standard basis but also include safeguards and 
limitations that work as a check and balance mechanism. The appropriate access to 
information is reflected in the fact that information exchange is not limited to criminal 
tax matters but also extended to information requested by civil tax matters. Moreover, 
under the dual criminality principle, domestic tax interest information held by financial 
institutions and ownership identity cannot cause restrictions for information exchange. 
On the other hand, the access of information needs to be balanced by the interests of 
both requested states and third parties. For this purpose, the OECD TIEA allows only 
the exchange of information upon request and when the information is foreseeably 
relevant for the requesting state, which disallows fishing expeditions. There are also 
limitations which give the right to the requested state to decline the required 
information.385 At least, appropriate access to information also encompasses some 
confidentiality requirements which signifies that governments would not engage in 
information exchange without ensuring that the information provided would only be 
used for the purposes established in the Agreement. One limitation derived from the 
confidentiality requirement is the prohibition of disclosing information received to third 
countries. Third countries can only have access to information exchanged if the 
Agreement expressly permits it.386  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 OECD, ‘2006 Report on Tax Co-operation’ (n 70) 9-14. 
385 These limitations established that the requested state can decline to provide tax information when: (i) 
the requesting state would not be able to provide such information under its own laws for purpose of 
administration and enforcement of its own laws, including the case of self-incrimination; (ii) the request is 
not made in conformity with the agreement; (iii) the request would disclose any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial or professional secret or trade process; (iv) the requested information is protected by the 
attorney client privilege; (v) the disclosure of information would be contrary to public policy; and (vi) the 
requested information would be a discrimination against nationals of the requested party. For further 
details see Article 7 of the OECD TIEA. OECD, ‘Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters’ (n 383) 25-28. 
386 OECD, ‘2006 Report on Tax Co-operation’ (n 70) 10-11. 
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In sum, there are two types of limitation imposed by the OECD TIEA model: (i) from 
the perspective of the requesting state: the proof that the tax information requested is 
foreseeably relevant; and (ii) from the point of view of the requested state: the 
possibility of declining a request whether one of the conditions for that refusal is 
presented. For exchange of information to work, therefore, both requesting and 
requested states need to demonstrate the fulfilment of certain requirements. 
 
The limitations imposed here to protect the requested state and third parties can have a 
broader impact on the TIEA signed between developing countries and tax havens than 
on the TIEA entered into by developed countries and tax havens. The criteria that 
information can only be provided upon request and when foreseeably relevant makes a 
country able to request information only when it has access to enough previous details 
of the information being requested. Assuming that a considerable amount of capital 
flight is invested in developed countries, developed countries can fulfil the requirements 
to request information from tax havens. They have enough information to track it down. 
Developing countries, however, are in a difficult position. The difficulty derives from 
the fact that most capital flight is probably invested in developed countries through a tax 
haven and developing countries have no information at all on this capital. Thus, even if 
a developing country signed an OECD TIEA with a tax haven, the effectiveness of such 
instrument would be very limited. Probably, most developing countries will not be able 
to fulfil the requirement to request information established in the OECD TIEA.387 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 The OECD TIEA establishes in Article 5 the information that the requesting state needs to provide to 
the requested state in order to demonstrate that the information required is foreseeably relevant: ‘5. The 
competent authority of the applicant Party shall provide the following information to the competent 
authority of the requested Party when making a request for information under the Agreement to 
demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the information to the request: (a) the identity of the person 
under examination or investigation; (b) a statement of the information sought including its nature and the 
form in which the applicant Party wishes to receive the information from the requested Party; (c) the tax 
purpose for which the information is sought; (d) grounds for believing that the information requested is 
held in the requested Party or is in the possession or control of a person within the jurisdiction of the 
requested Party; (e) to the extent known, the name and address of any person believed to be in possession 
of the requested information; (f) a statement that the request is in conformity with the law and 
administrative practices of the applicant Party, that if the requested information was within the jurisdiction 
of the applicant Party then the competent authority of the applicant Party would be able to obtain the 
information under the laws of the applicant Party or in the normal course of administrative practice and 
that it is in conformity with this Agreement; (g) a statement that the applicant Party has pursued all means 
available in its own territory to obtain the information, except those that would give rise to 
disproportionate difficulties. 
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exception would be when capital flight is invested in their jurisdictions, i.e. capital 
illegally flows out of the developing country to a tax haven and then returns as foreign 
investment. Only in this case the TIEA signed between a developing country and a tax 
haven might work. An alternative would be that the developed country, where the 
capital is invested, requires that foreign investors identify themselves in order to invest 
their capital. The identification of investors would be sent automatically to the 
respective country of residence. In this situation the signing of the OECD TIEA between 
a developing country and a tax haven would make sense since the developing country 
would have enough data to demonstrate that the information requested was foreseeably 
relevant and not a mere fishing expedition, which is prohibited.388  
 
In order to understand the reason why the OECD enacted exchange of information upon 
request rather than automatic exchange of information in the OECD TIEA model, 
Spencer analysed the framework of exchange of information between an OECD member 
and a tax haven. According to him, the objective of the OECD TIEA was for OECD 
members to be able to obtain tax-related information from tax havens despite bank 
secrecy and other confidentiality laws. However, due to the fact that most tax haven 
jurisdictions neither levy income taxes nor have an income tax administration, payers of 
income, including banks and other financial institutions do not need to report payment 
transactions to the tax authority. Consequently, the tax authorities do not have the 
necessary information to implement a mechanism for automatic exchange of 
information. This is the reason that justifies exchange of information upon request in the 
OECD TIEA model.389 Thus, even though exchange of information upon request was 
not the ideal solution, according to Spencer, a realistic approach of the limitations 
inherent in the tax havens’ tax systems led to the adoption of this mechanism for 
exchange of information. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388Whether investments are made through legal entities, the source state would have to require 
information in order to identify the effective beneficial owners behind those structures. It would be even 
more complicated if a chain of legal entities headquartered in different tax havens are used. 
389 D. E. Spencer, ‘Tax Information Exchange and Bank Secrecy (Part 2)’ (2005) 16 Journal of 
International Taxation 1, 2-3. 
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Another contradictory aspect of the implementation of exchange of information upon 
request by the OECD TIEA model refers to its relationship to the OECD’s previous 
work on exchange of information. Spencer explained this aspect by pointing out that 
since 1997 the OECD has recommended the use of tax identification numbers and the 
use of the revised standard OECD magnetic format for automatic exchange of 
information.390 Thus, even though the OECD TIEA is assumed to have high standards of 
transparency and effective exchange of information, its comparison with OECD’s 
previous work demonstrates that its structure has some flaws, especially regarding the 
preference for exchange of information upon request. 
 
Notwithstanding the requirements to exchange information upon request, there are also 
some limitations that attribute to the requested state the possibility of declining a 
request. So, even though the requirements to request information might be fulfilled by 
the requesting country, the requested state still has the possibility of declining the 
request if one of the conditions established in Article 7 is presented. Paragraph one of 
Article 7 deserves a special commentary. This paragraph establishes that the requested 
state does not need to provide information that the requesting state would not be able to 
obtain under similar circumstances under its own laws for purposes of the administration 
or enforcement of its own tax laws.391 This might work well when you have two 
contracting states with similar tax systems however in the case of the OECD TIEA 
usually we will have a taxing jurisdiction and a tax haven. In this case, the content of 
this paragraph becomes quite controversial since if a tax haven requires any information 
from a taxing jurisdiction, the latter will not need to provide it, excused by the fact that 
the requesting state, i.e. the tax haven, would not be able to obtain it under similar 
circumstances under its own laws for purposes of the administration or enforcement of 
its own tax laws. Thus, this clause in the OECD TIEA creates in practice a situation 
where information can only flow one way, i.e. from the tax haven to the taxing 
jurisdiction but not the other way around. The OECD and UN Income Convention 
Model related this limitation with the reciprocity principle, making clear exceptions for 
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391 OECD, ‘Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters’ (n 383) 25. 
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cases where one of the contracting states does not have a specific mechanism since the 
absence of mechanism is different from the existence of one that restrains exchange of 
information in certain circumstances. The OECD TIEA limits its commentary to the 
situation of self-incrimination. Contextualising this limitation to the hypothesis of an 
OECD TIEA signed between a developing country and a tax haven, effective exchange 
of information becomes even more complicated since the developing country might not 
have the mechanism required to access such information domestically. The tax haven 
could refuse on this basis to provide the information requested. So, under these 
hypothetical circumstances the OECD TIEA signed between a developing country and a 
tax haven would not work properly. 
 
In sum, the importance of exchange of tax information between countries has increased 
remarkably and the development of the OECD TIEA supports this argument. Even 
though the development of the OECD TIEA was important to extend exchange of 
information to situations where a DTC was not required, this instrument cannot 
implement effective exchange of information. From a critical view, the OECD TIEA 
had a greater impact on internal limitations of countries to provide information rather 
than on the mechanisms to really enforce exchange of information between countries. In 
other words, as the OECD and UN Model Income Tax Conventions, the OECD TIEA 
enforces appropriate access to information by granting that: (i) information exchange is 
not limited to criminal tax matters but also extended to information requested by civil 
tax matters; and (ii) under the dual criminality principle, domestic tax interest 
information held by financial institutions and ownership identity cannot cause 
restrictions for information exchange. However, exchange of information is based on 
exchange upon request which in practice cannot occur if the requesting state has 
insufficient knowledge of the information being requested. From the perspective of 
developing countries the flaws in the OECD TIEA became more relevant, since capital 
flight is usually invested in developed countries and they probably will not know any 
detail of the financial transactions carried outside their jurisdictions. Only when capital 
flight returns as foreign investment would developing countries benefit from the 
mechanism of exchange of information provided in the OECD TIEA.  
234	  
	  
 
This analysis put in evidence the fact that the OECD TIEA was developed from the 
perspective of OECD members. An answer to the current problem cannot be found 
easily, however the identification of the current shortcomings of the instruments 
available from the view point of not only developed countries but also developing ones 
might point out to the direction of a possible solution in which all countries need to be 
involved. 
 
The US TIEA model 
 
Even though only recently there was an international recognition of the importance of 
tax information exchange agreements due to the work of the OECD Global Forum on 
Taxation, which culminated to the elaboration of the OECD TIEA model in 2002, the 
United States of America (US) developed a TIEA model much earlier than the OECD. 
Since 1980, the US adopted a program to exchange information with developing 
countries, particularly in the Americas. The US TIEA model was part of the Caribbean 
Basis Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). The objective of the US TIEA was to 
supplement the efforts of the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to enforce the 
American income tax laws and to improve its compliance by obligating treaty partners 
to cooperate with the US on civil and criminal tax investigations.392 
 
In order to encourage the signing of a TIEA, the US offered different types of benefits to 
the contracting states. The first benefit consisted of qualifying the contracting state for 
North American treatment for Americans attending conventions there under section 274 
(h) of the Internal Revenue Code. This treatment allowed the deduction of certain 
expenses as long as the conditions established in the US domestic legislation were 
fulfilled.393 The second benefit allowed the Caribbean beneficiary country to host a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 B. Zagaris, ‘The Procedural Aspects of US Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many 
Sticks and No Carrots?’ (2003) 35 George Washington International Law Review 331 
393 The United States Internal Revenue Code § 274 (h) (2001). 
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foreign sale corporation (FSC).394 In practice, this signifies that this benefit is not 
available anymore to countries entering into a TIEA with the US. The third benefit that 
encouraged the signing of a TIEA by Caribbean countries consisted of the eligibility of 
treaty partners to receive loans under the Puerto Rico program. The Puerto Rico 
program was ended by the US Congress which means that this benefit is not available 
anymore to countries entering into a TIEA with the US. The only benefit still available 
is the first one which can be seen in the US-Bahamas TIEA395 signed in January 
2002.396 
 
Later the US’s approach to encouraging the signing of a TIEA had a reversal in strategic 
terms. Instead of offering benefits for countries that agreed to sign a TIEA, the new 
approach consisted in punishing countries that refused to sign a TIEA by not allowing 
the application of tax exemptions available in the US tax law. The exemption of non-
residents’ portfolio income illustrates this policy. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 that 
exempted interest paid to non-residents also allowed the American Revenue to deny the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 The FSC was a legal device created by the US tax legislation that allowed American companies to 
reduce their income tax burden on profits originated from exports performed by an offshore subsidiary. 
This benefit would encourage the establishment of American FSC companies in the Caribbean area, 
increasing investment in the region. However, in 1999 the European Union (EU) launched proceedings 
against the FSC provisions at the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that those benefits were an 
export subsidy. In March 2000, the Appellate Body of the WTO decided that the FSC provisions 
constituted a forbidden export subsidy. The US Congress then repealed the FSC provisions. The dispute 
did not end with the Appellate Body’s decision in favour of the EU. In November 2000, the US enacted 
the Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act which was also challenged by the EU, claiming the US did not 
properly implement the earlier WTO decision since this new US legislation reintroduced some benefits of 
the FSC legislation. The WTO decided once again that the US tax law was providing an export subsidy. 
The dispute is not completely solved but the FSC benefit is not available anymore. For further details: 
WTO, ‘Dispute DS108 United State: Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds108_e.htm> accessed 13 October 2009.  
395 The fourth paragraph of the preamble of the US-Bahamas TIEA signed in January 2002 establishes 
that: ‘Whereas the Contracting Parties wish to enter into a form of agreement that allows United States 
taxpayers to deduct expenses allocable to a convention, seminar or similar meeting held in the Bahamas in 
the same manner and to the same degree that such a deduction would be permitted if such meeting were 
held in the United States,’. Article 5 also disposes about deduction of costs incurred with respect to 
attendance at a conference in the Bahamas. OECD, Agreement between the government of the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas and the Government of the United States of America for the Provision of 
Information with respect to Taxes and for other matters, [hereinafter US-Bahamas TIEA], 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/14/35514646.pdf?contentId=35514647> accessed 14 October 2009. 
396 Zagaris, ‘The Procedural Aspects of US Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries’ (n 392) 335. 
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exemption benefit if the exchange of information between the US and the country of 
residence of the foreign taxpayer was insufficient to prevent tax evasion from the US.397 
 
The US strategy to encourage countries to sign a TIEA consisted of the attribution of a 
special benefit or even the non-application of punishment to the contracting party. This 
mechanism, in fact, tried to balance the relationship established in the TIEA. Thus, the 
assumption behind the US TIEA is that there is an asymmetry of interests between the 
contracting states, which needs to be compensated by offset conditions. On the other 
hand, the OECD initial approach was based on a different premise, since it assumed that 
both contracting parties were interested in collaborating to achieve a global level playing 
field in the areas of transparency and effective exchange of information for tax purposes. 
Thus, in principle, no compensatory measure was offered to any party to make the 
relationship symmetric in terms of rights and obligations in the OECD TIEA. Recently, 
however, the OECD adopted a more coercive approach. The OECD elaborated a 
progress report on the jurisdictions implementing the international agreed tax standard. 
The internationally agreed tax standard requires exchange of information on request in 
all tax matters for the administration and enforcement of domestic tax law without 
regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy for tax purposes.398 These 
requirements were incorporated in the OECD TIEA. So, countries that refused to accept 
the standard rules of transparency and exchange of information were included in a 
‘black list’ published on the 2nd April 2009.399 The current OECD approach follows the 
US’s strategy since both of them ‘punish’ countries that refuse to exchange tax 
information. From a critical perspective, the objective of the TIEA is to establish 
exchange of information between countries with asymmetric income tax systems, the 
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398  OECD, ‘A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in 
Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard: Original Progress Report 2nd April’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf> accessed 15 October 2009. 
399 First of all, the expression ‘black list’ refer to countries included in the table labelled: ‘Jurisdictions 
that have not committed to the internationally agreed tax standard’. Costa Rica, Malaysia, Phillipines and 
Uruguay were included in the ‘black list’ published on 2nd April 2009 by the OECD. The list published on 
14th October 2009 had no countries included in the ‘black list’. OECD, ‘A Progress Report on the 
Jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax 
Standard: Progress made as at 14th October 2009’ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/0/43606256.pdf> 
accessed 15 October 2009.  
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US and OECD’s approaches recognised this fact by adopting measures to enforce the 
relationship established in the TIEA. However, the current counterbalancing measures 
are retaliatory rather than compensatory, i.e. countries that do not collaborate are 
penalised whereas countries that collaborate do not receive any extra benefit. 
Compensatory measures could also be used to encourage exchange of tax information, 
e.g. sharing costs of exchange of information or even sharing of revenue recovered by 
both jurisdictions.  
 
The first draft of the US TIEA was released in July 1984.400 The technical explanation 
made clear that: (i) the US TIEA was influenced by Article 26 of the US Model Income 
Tax Convention; (ii) the agreement could cover all national level taxes (not only income 
tax); and (iii) the agreement did not need to include all the provisions of the Draft, i.e. 
the structure was flexible and could be adapted to countries’ negotiations, excluding 
certain clauses or even including others not predicted in the Draft.	  401   
 
The structure of the US TIEA model released in 1984 consisted of 9 articles of which 
main aspects are discussed here. Article (1) Object and Scope of the Agreement: this 
article set forth the objective of the agreement which was to provide methods for the 
exchange of information, without regard to the residence or nationality of that person or 
of the person who was in possession of the information. Article (2) Taxes Covered: this 
article identified the taxes about which the parties agreed to exchange information. As 
already mentioned, taxes covered could include not only income taxes but also taxes on 
wealth or capital, inheritances, real property and general consumption taxes such as the 
value added and sales taxes. However, sub-national level taxes should not be included. 
Article (3) Definitions: this article defined the terms used throughout the Agreement. 
Article (4) Exchange of Information: this article established the basic obligations of the 
contracting states, including the form and limitations to exchange information and to use 
it. This article allowed a discretionary choice among three forms of exchange of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 United States Department of Treasury, ‘Draft and Technical Explanation of Caribbean Basis Initiative 
Exchange of Information Agreement’, (1984) Treasury News R-2780, reprinted in R. A. Gordon and B. 
Zagaris, International Exchange of Tax Information: Recent Developments (n.225, Practicing Law 
Institute 1985), 169-206.  
401 Zagaris, ‘The Procedural Aspects of US Tax Policy towards Developing Countries’ (n 392) 336. 
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information: regular (automatic), upon request or spontaneous. It also made clear that 
the competent authority of each state needed to have power to satisfy the obligations 
accepted. Regarding bank secrecy and ownership identity, there is a specific provision to 
ensure access to such information, however there is also a disclaimer determining that 
the provision need not be included in a final agreement if the internal law of the 
contracting state does not have the effect of allowing bank secrecy or undisclosed 
ownership of securities. In addition, there is a provision making clear that the absence of 
domestic interest in the information requested cannot prevent exchange of information. 
The obligations of the requested party were limited, however, to the following aspects: 
(i) carrying out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative 
practices of either states; (ii) supplying information which is not obtainable under the 
laws or the normal course of the administration of either states; (iii) supplying 
information that could disclose a trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional 
secret or trade process; or (iv) supplying information which disclosure would be 
contrary to the public policy. Finally, Article (4) established that information exchanged 
should be treated as a secret in the same manner as tax information obtained under 
domestic laws. Information received cannot be disclosed to third countries, unless 
authorised by them previously. Article (5) Mutual Agreement Procedure: this article 
gave permission to the competent authorities to implement the program necessary to 
exchange information and to resolve any problem by mutual agreement procedure. 
Article (6) Costs: this article dealt with the allocation of costs, disposing that ordinary 
costs should be borne by the requested state whereas extraordinary costs should be 
borne by the requesting state. Article (7) Implementation, Article (8) Entry into Force 
and Article (9) Termination discussed bureaucratic procedures to implement the 
agreement.	  402  
 
The interesting aspect of examining in detail the characteristics of the US TIEA model 
released in 1984 is to compare them with the current characteristics of the OECD TIEA 
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model. Subsequently, the outcome of this comparative analysis will be used to verify 
whether the recent US TIEA signed follow the original US draft or the OECD’s model.  
 
The main differences between the US TIEA model released in 1984 and the OECD 
TIEA model published in 2002 are: (i) the OECD TIEA includes in the taxes covered 
sub-national taxes, whereas the US TIEA restrains itself to taxes levied on the federal 
level; (ii) the OECD TIEA covers only exchange of information upon request, while the 
US TIEA allows three forms of exchange of information: automatic, spontaneous and 
upon request; (iii) the OECD TIEA makes clear that the dual criminality principle 
cannot obstruct the exchange of information; in the US TIEA this principle is not 
mentioned; (iv) both models established that bank secrecy and ownership identity 
cannot limit exchange of information, however in the OECD TIEA these situations are 
not excused by the internal law of the contracting states, whereas in the US TIEA 
internal constraints override bank secrecy and ownership identity rendering the 
provision innocuous; (v) in the OECD TIEA the requesting state needs to demonstrate 
that the information requested is foreseeably relevant, while in the US TIEA there is no 
such provision; and (vi) the OECD TIEA includes among the possibilities of declining 
exchange of information by the requested state the case of confidentiality between 
attorney and client, the US TIEA does not include such provision. Besides all these 
differences, the two models have many aspects in common which allows the assumption 
that the OECD was influenced by the previous work developed by the US. 
 
The OECD TIEA improved some aspects of the US TIEA. The main improvements 
refer to: (i) permission to cover taxes imposed by or on behalf of political sub-divisions 
or local authorities; (ii) the dual criminality principle and domestic tax interest cannot 
restrain exchange of information; (iii) bank secrecy and ownership identity cannot limit 
the obligation to exchange information; and (iv) protection of attorney-client 
communication under certain conditions. Nevertheless, the OECD TIEA reduced the 
possibility of exchange of information by establishing that exchange of information 
upon request was the only mechanism of exchange covered by the agreement, added to 
the fact that when making a request, the requesting state needs to demonstrate that the 
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information requested is foreseeably relevant by fulfilling the requirements listed. These 
two aspects allow exchange of information only when the requesting state has enough 
previous knowledge of the information requested.   
 
Based on the differences between the US TIEA and the OECD TIEA, the examination 
of the most recent US TIEA signed with the Principality of Liechtenstein403, Gibraltar404 
and the Principality of Monaco	  405 demonstrate that the new US TIEAs have more 
characteristics in common to the OECD TIEA model than to the US TIEA, in terms of 
structure and substance since the new TIEA: (i) only cover exchange of information 
upon request; (ii) the requesting state needs to demonstrate that information requested is 
foreseeably relevant; (iii) bank secrecy and ownership identity cannot justify declining 
to exchange information; and (iv) the dual criminality principle and domestic tax interest 
cannot restrain exchange of information.  
 
Zagaris performed an analysis in which the characteristics of the first TIEAs signed by 
the US in the 1980s and 1990s were examined. The TIEAs studied in detail by him 
were: (i) US-Barbados; (ii) US-Dominica; and (iii) US-Peru. The outcome of his 
analysis demonstrated the flexibility of the first TIEAs signed by the US. Each one of 
the treaties had a particular characteristic that differentiated them from the others, not 
limited to small details but to the aspects on how information was effectively 
exchanged. For instance, the US-Barbados TIEA allowed information to be exchanged 
on a regular basis and both the US-Dominica and the US-Peru provided explicitly that 
information could be exchanged on an automatic basis, upon request or spontaneously, 
i.e. the three most common forms of exchange of information were included in the 
TIEA.406 In addition to the arguments raised by Zagaris’s analysis, the US-Bahamas 
signed in January 2002 also presents very interesting aspects. The US-Bahamas TIEA is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403  Hereinafter referred as the US-Liechtenstein TIEA, signed on 8th December 2008, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/1/41818936.pdf> accessed 16 October 2009. 
404  Hereinafter referred as the US-Gibraltar TIEA, signed on 31st March 2009, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/18/42542003.pdf> accessed 16 October 2009. 
405  Hereinafter referred as the US-Monaco TIEA, signed on 8th September 2009, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/24/43662746.pdf> accessed 16 October 2009. 
406 Zagaris, ‘The Procedural Aspects of US Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries’ (n 392) 337-52. 
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an outstanding example of how asymmetric interests can be reflected in a treaty. The 
clauses of this agreement made clear that the US is the party effectively interested in 
exchanging information. So, the clauses were agreed in a way that they grant the flow of 
information from the Bahamas to the US but not the other way around. Sharp et al 
described the US-Bahamas TIEA as an ‘information provision agreement’, since the 
Bahamian version does not require the United States to tender any requested information 
to the Bahamas.407 
 
Analysing the evolution of the TIEAs signed by the US, the most recent TIEAs (e.g. 
US-Monaco, US-Gibraltar and US-Liechtenstein) have lost the initial flexibility that 
they presented before the OECD TIEA model was released. As already mentioned, there 
are positive aspects of the adoption of the OECD TIEA model, however we need to be 
aware that this type of agreement can establish other types of exchange of information. 
Exchange of information upon request is only feasible when the requesting country has 
previous knowledge of the information being requested. The US’s experience with 
TIEAs demonstrated that other types of exchange of information can also be arranged 
through a TIEA. Moreover, the US went further on the assumption that this type of 
treaty is indicated only between a tax haven and a high tax jurisdiction. TIEA can be 
signed between taxing jurisdictions as well. For instance, the US signed TIEA with 
countries that had a well-developed income tax system, i.e. US-Peru TIEA, US-Mexico 
TIEA and US-Brazil TIEA.  
 
Although the US has a longer experience with TIEAs than the OECD since its TIEA 
model was developed in the 1980s, we do not have enough information to understand 
whether the TIEA is really a helpful instrument to exchange information. Governments 
usually do not share data about how much information was exchanged through the use 
of TIEA for strategic reasons. The absence of information might increase taxpayers’ 
compliance since they are not aware of the possibility of being caught by information 
exchange mechanisms. There are only a few public cases of exchange of tax information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 W. M. Sharp, W. T. Harrison III, R. A. Lunsford and S. A. Harty, ‘U.S. Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements: A Comparative Analysis’ (2002) Tax Notes International 193, 193-260. 
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between countries. For example, in 2000 the US made public that the IRS requested a 
federal judge in Miami to issue summonses of MasterCard and American Express card 
transactions in the US that were billed to banks in several tax havens.408 Nevertheless, 
the data available is not enough to perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
information exchanged through TIEAs. Thus, the US’ experience can contribute only 
with arguments for a theoretical analysis of the characteristics of the TIEA. The 
American experience expanded the debate, demonstrating that: (i) the OECD TIEA 
model was not the first one developed; (ii) other types of exchange of information can 
also be enforced through a TIEA; and (iii) compensatory measures rather than 
retaliatory ones can be used to encourage the signing of a TIEA. Even though acclaimed 
by the international community as the standard instrument to enhance transparency and 
exchange of information on a global level, the OECD TIEA has some flaws that the 
comparative analysis performed with the US’ TIEA helped to demonstrate. 
 
  The CIAT TIEA model  
 
In order to critically analyse this model, first it is necessary to understand the 
background of this organisation. The CIAT (Inter-American Center of Tax 
Administrations) is an international public non-profit organisation, created in 1967 to 
promote the integration of tax administrations of its member countries. Initially, the 
CIAT had 20 member countries from the Americas (including the US). Currently, the 
number of members has increased and this organisation gathers 38 member countries 
and associate member countries, from four continents: 29 countries from the Americas; 
6 European countries; 2 African countries and one Asian country.409 The profile of the 
members shows that, since its foundation, the CIAT was joined by developed and 
developing countries. Although developing countries from the Americas were the 
majority.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Zagaris, ‘The Procedural Aspects of US Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries’ (n 392) 362. 
409 CIAT, History 
<http://www.ciat.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=13&id=74&Itemid=111
> accessed 2 November 2009. 
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The first draft of a Model for Exchange of Tax Information was released by the 
Executive Council of the CIAT in 1990. Zagaris argued that the CIAT model attributed 
a new political legitimacy to TIEAs as an instrument for exchange of tax information, 
since until its publication the US TIEA model was the only model available.410 The 
political perspective of the CIAT TIEA is completely different from the OECD TIEA. 
While the former represented an initiative of Latin American countries to preserve their 
sovereignty; the latter was developed to enhance exchange of information between 
taxing jurisdictions and tax havens.  
 
In 1999 a new draft of the CIAT TIEA was released. This version did not implement 
theoretical innovations. It continued following Article 26 of the OECD Income Model 
Convention as well as the US TIEA model. In fact, in technical terms, the original 
aspect of this model remains in its preamble. The preamble recognises the importance of 
administrative cooperation to combat fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. The mention 
of tax avoidance is peculiar since other models only refer to tax evasion. Furthermore, 
the preamble also mentions the social importance of the agreement, emphasising that its 
benefits need to consider: (i) the economic relation of the contracting states; (ii) the 
characteristics of the transactions involving tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance; 
(iii) the capacity of the tax administrations involved; and (iv) the economic and social 
effects.411 
 
In relation to technical aspects, the CIAT TIEA can be signed by two or more 
contracting states.  It provides three mechanisms for exchange of tax information: 
automatic, spontaneous and upon request. 412  However, the provisions on the 
mechanisms for exchange of information are very broad, leaving every detail related to 
its implementation to a later agreement. Moreover, regarding limitations on exchange of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 B. Zagaris, ‘CIAT Adopts Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement’ (1990) 6 International 
Enforcement Law Report 105, 105-09. 
411 CIAT, ‘Modelo de Acuedo de Intercambio de Informaciones Tributarias del CIAT’ (1999), Preamble 
and p.2. 
412 Article 4 (3), (4) and (5) of the CIAT TIEA. 
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information, the CIAT TIEA had already secured the override of bank secrecy and the 
disclosure of ownership identity.413 
  
The CIAT TIEA model, therefore, can be regarded as the model developed by the tax 
administration of Latin American countries to enhance cooperation in the fight against 
tax fraud, tax evasion and tax avoidance. The contribution of the CIAT TIEA model for 
this analysis does not consist of the introduction of new theoretical arguments. In fact, 
the CIAT TIEA contributed to the expansion of the political perspective of the use of 
TIEA. Even though, nowadays TIEA models are constantly associated with the tax 
administration problems created by tax havens, they can also be used to enhance the 
integration of tax administration of taxing jurisdictions. 
 
7.2.2. Multilateral Agreements 
 
Even though countries have preferred to regulate exchange of tax information through 
bilateral agreements, some multilateral agreements were also signed. There are two 
multilateral conventions on mutual assistance in tax matters that deserve special 
attention: (i); the Nordic Mutual Assistance Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters414 and (ii) the Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.415 Both multilateral conventions were 
signed between developed countries. These multilateral agreements were developed to 
enhance exchange of information between countries with similar income tax systems. 
Developed countries’ experience with multilateral agreements will demonstrate how the 
discussion moved forward and the difficulties faced in this process. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Article 4 (7) of the CIAT TIEA. 
414  Hereinafter referred as the Nordic Convention, 
<http://www.itdweb.org/documents/NORDIC%20MUTUAL%20ASSISTANCE%20CONVENTION.pdf
> accessed 18 October 2009. 
415 Hereinafter referred as CMAATM. OECD, The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
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7.2.2.1. The Nordic Convention  
 
The Nordic Convention as a multilateral agreement emerged from the updating work of 
similar bilateral conventions on mutual assistance in tax matters signed between: (i) 
Norway and Sweden in 1949; (ii) Norway and Finland in 1954; (iii) Norway and 
Denmark in 1956; and (iv) Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The first Nordic Multilateral 
Convention was signed in 1972 by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
The first Nordic Convention signed in 1972 was amended several times and in 1989 a 
new treaty was signed, expanding the number of contracting states to seven with the 
inclusion of Faroe Islands and Greenland. The 1989 version has been in force since 
1991.416  
  
The scope of the Nordic Convention covers administrative assistance for: (i) the service 
of documents; (ii) the supply of information; (iii) the supply of tax return forms; (iv) 
measures to avoid the imposition of preliminary taxes; (v) the collection of tax; (vi) the 
transfer of tax; and (vii) the recovery of tax and the provision of guarantees for the 
payment of tax claims. The Nordic Convention applies not only to direct taxes but also 
to other taxes such as value added taxes and social security contributions levied at 
national and sub-national levels.417 
 
Focusing on exchange of information, the Nordic Convention encompasses five 
different ways of exchange of tax information: (i) upon request; (ii) automatic; (iii) 
spontaneous; (iv) simultaneous; and (v) tax examinations abroad. The range of 
mechanisms supports the argument that each one of them provides a different type of tax 
information. The type of information provided through automatic exchange is different 
from the outcome of spontaneous exchange or even exchange upon request. The five 
forms of exchange of information are complementary rather than substitutable. Thus, a 
treaty that provides only one form of exchange of information limits a priori its scope. 
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The automatic exchange of information encompass the following items: dividends, 
interest, credit balance with banks, ownership of immovable property, royalties, wages, 
salaries, fees, pensions and life annuities, compensation for damage, etc. As we can see, 
there is a broad range of information exchanged periodically. 418  The similarities 
between the tax systems of the contracting states facilitate the automatic exchange of a 
large amount of information. However, the conclusion of further agreements to carry out 
automatic exchange of information is required. 
 
Besides the Nordic Convention on mutual assistance in tax matters, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden have also signed in 1983 a multilateral treaty for the 
avoidance of double taxation. This is the only multilateral double tax convention among 
the OECD countries. The Nordic Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation has 
no article on the exchange of information, since this issue is regulated by the Nordic 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance.419  
 
The contracting states of the Nordic Convention have thirty years of experience with 
automatic exchange of information. According to Hengsle, Ministry of Finance of Oslo, 
the implementation of automatic exchange of information has developed throughout the 
years, requiring constant improvement. His vision supports the idea that to implement 
automatic exchange of information it is necessary to start with a minimum amount of 
information and then to develop it with the collaboration of all participant states. 
Moreover, the Nordic experience also raises the argument that multilateral treaties can 
also work for mutual administrative assistance. However, the key issue for the Nordic 
success was the regular meetings between tax authorities and the willingness of these 
authorities to make the necessary adjustments to solve problems before they become real 
obstacles.420 Of course the challenge would be greater if a larger number of countries 
with significant differences in their tax systems were involved.   
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  7.2.2.2. The Joint Council of Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (CMAATM) 
 
The CMAATM was developed by the Council of Europe and OECD in 1988. The 
Convention is a multilateral instrument, which was initially opened for signature by only 
54 countries, members of the Council of Europe or the OECD.421 Its objective covers 
not only mutual assistance for exchange of tax information but also for collection of tax 
claims.422 The language of the CMAATM is quite similar to the other OECD Model 
Conventions (e.g. DTC and TIEA), however there are substantial differences between 
them regarding the CMAATM’s scope, mechanisms for exchange of information, 
protection of taxpayers and justified reasons to refuse a request of information. These 
characteristics are discussed in the next paragraphs. 
 
The CMAATM facilitates exchange of information only on civil matters. Criminal 
matters are not included in the scope of this convention which signifies that information 
required by judicial bodies to punish crimes committed in the tax field must be obtained 
through other instruments such as the convention for mutual assistance in criminal 
matters.423 
 
There are five different forms of exchange of information covered by the CMAATM: (i) 
on request; (ii) automatic; (iii) spontaneous; (iv) simultaneous tax examinations; and (v) 
tax examinations abroad.424 It covers the same modalities of exchange of information 
established in the Nordic Convention. Regarding automatic exchange of information, 
Article 6 describes it very briefly, leaving all terms and conditions to be negotiated in a 
different agreement, which signifies that the implementation of automatic exchange of 
information is discretionary rather than mandatory. The Nordic Convention adopted a 
different position, including in the body of the convention the basic rules on how 
automatic exchange of information should work. Therefore, considering the language 
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adopted, in the Nordic Convention automatic exchange of certain information is 
mandatory.425 
 
Automatic exchange of information requires the use of standardised forms, including the 
type of information exchanged as well as codes for identifying taxpayers and residence 
countries. The OECD published a Manual on the Implementation of Exchange of 
Information Provisions for Tax Purposes. The purpose of this Manual is to provide tax 
officials with technical and practical guidance to establish an efficient method of 
exchange of information. Module 3 of this Manual provides rules of automatic (or 
routine) exchange of information.	  426 
 
Module 3 of the OECD Manual explains the general rules for implementing automatic 
exchange of information. The OECD has already developed mechanisms to implement 
automatic exchange of information. For instance, this organisation has developed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) setting forth the terms and conditions of the 
proposed automatic exchange of information. Moreover, the OECD has also developed 
standard formats to facilitate the transmission as well as the use of the information 
exchanged. In 1981 the OECD designed a paper based form for automatic exchange of 
information. In 1992, due to technological improvements, the OECD developed a new 
standard format: the Standard Magnetic Format (SMF). This new device allowed the 
transmission of information on magnetic tape. In 1997 a revision of the 1992 standard 
format was performed to improve the capacity of countries to match information 
received automatically. The key issue was the identification of the residence country of 
taxpayers and the source country of income by Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). 
Later on, a new transmission format was designed by the OECD to replace the SMF. 
The new format is the Standard Transmission Format (STF) which is based on 
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extensible language. This signifies that this new system is more flexible allowing the 
implementation of improvements without the necessity of replacing the old format.427  
 
The importance of describing these technical issues is to demonstrate that the 
mechanisms to implement automatic exchange of information have been already 
developed by the OECD. These mechanisms can support the transmission of a large 
bulk of information which needs to be specified by the parties in a MOU. Thus, the 
problem is not the absence of mechanisms to implement automatic exchange of 
information, but the fact that the implementation is discretionary and the effective way 
of how it is going to work relies on particular understandings, i.e. it cannot be 
implemented based only on what is provided in the body of the CMAATM. From this 
angle, it would be better to have mandatory rules incorporated in the CMAATM, 
establishing the minimum amount of information that must be exchanged automatically. 
A minimum amount of information could be the identification requested by the source 
country of non-resident taxpayers’ country of residence and the automatic transmission 
of this information to the country of residence. Through this information, countries of 
residence would be able to verify whether resident taxpayers had declared their foreign 
income. Whether countries wanted to exchange automatically further types of 
information would be arranged in the MOU.   
 
There are other aspects of the CMAATM that deserve a brief note due to the 
correspondence to the other OECD models (i.e. DTC and TIEA). The language of the 
article that provides  protection of persons and limits to the obligation to provide 
assistance (Article 21) is quite similar to the other OECD models, except by the fact that 
bank secrecy and ownership identity in the CMAATM can still justify the refusal to 
provide tax information.428 At last, in relation to secrecy provisions, Article 22 of the 
CMAATM only allows the transmission of requested information to a third party under 
prior authorisation by the party that provided it. Therefore, the information cannot be 
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retransmitted among the countries that signed the CMAATM. A correspondent 
understanding can also be found for the other OECD models.429 
 
Until 2008, only 13 countries signed the CMAATM. Considering that 54 countries 
could have already signed it, the acceptance of this convention was very limited.430 Even 
though the OECD’s work provides guidance on how to implement exchange of 
information, in practice very little is known about how much information has been 
exchanged through CMAATM. This lack of information makes the assessment of such 
instrument difficult since the only analysis that can be performed is the examination of 
its clauses from a theoretical perspective. It is not possible to know how much 
information has been exchanged through the mechanisms available or how much 
revenue income has been raised due to the improvement of exchange of information. 
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis of the CMAATM demonstrated that all 
mechanisms of exchange of information are important since they have different 
functions providing different types of information. Developed countries have the option 
to implement exchange of tax information though the CMAATM. The advantage of this 
mechanism consists in the possibility of implementing automatic exchange of 
information since the CMAATM provides the legal basis whereas the OECD’s work 
developed the required devices to implement it. The flaw of this instrument, on the other 
hand, refers to the fact that the implementation of automatic exchange of information is 
discretionary rather than mandatory which means that even though they have signed the 
CMAATM, countries can choose whether or not to implement automatic exchange of 
information.431  
 
The focus on exchange of information has increased since the financial crisis of 2008. In 
this sense, on 25th September 2009, the OECD published on its website the information 
that the OECD and the Council of Europe agreed to update the CMAATM in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 OECD, ‘OECD Commentary on the Model Conventions of 1977 and 1992’ (n 58) Commentary to 
Article 26, 12.2, 444-63; OECD, ‘2010 Report’ (n 70), 11-12. 
430 The countries that signed the CMAATM before 2008 were: Azerbaijan, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and 
Ukraine. OECD, ‘The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters’ (n 415) 129-30. 
431 Spencer, ‘Tax Information Exchange and Bank Secrecy (Part 2)’ (n 389) 1. 
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bring the Convention in line with the international standard. 432  In June 2011 a 
provisional edition of the Protocol amending the CMAATM was published by the 
OECD.433 The major changes consisted of: (i) exclusion of obstacles to exchange of 
information, such as those related to bank secrecy legislation and ownership identity 
[aligning its content with the OECD DTC and OECD TIEA]; (ii) permission for third 
parties [non-OECD/EU members] to sign the Convention; and (iii) authorisation for 
information obtained under the Convention be given to other authorities, e.g. law 
enforcement authorities to counteract corruption, money laundering and terrorism 
financing, but only if certain conditions were met [information may be used for such 
other purposes under the laws of the supplying Party and the competent authority of that 
Party authorises such use].434 
  
Notwithstanding the positive changes brought by the Protocol, the update of the 
CMAATM left aside important issues, required to improve the effective level of 
information being exchanged under this convention. For instance, neither automatic 
exchange of information on a mandatory basis, nor the flow of information to third 
countries without prior authorisation was established by the Protocol. Hence, although 
substantial changes were implemented, the CMAATM is still based on premises that 
only grant bilateral exchange of information. So, the crucial hurdle regarding exchange 
of information, which refers to the necessity of the residence country to have previous 
knowledge of investments made abroad by their residents, was not overcome by the new 
provisions.   
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 OECD, ‘The Council of Europe and OECD are strengthening their joint Convention to combat tax 
evasion’, <http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_33767_43772307_1_1_1_1,00.html> 
accessed 20 October 2009. 
433 OECD, ‘Protocol amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 
Provisional Edition’, < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/11/45037332.pdf> accessed 5 June 2011. 
434 OECD, ‘Brief Overview on Convention’, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/51/47690147.pdf> 
accessed 5 June 2011. 
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7.3. Supranational laws 
 
Exchange of tax information to combat tax evasion and avoidance has also been 
implemented by supranational laws in the European Union (EU).435 The expression 
‘supranational laws’ refers to legislation enacted by the EU’s institutions that binds all 
Member States. The EU’s institutions involved in the decision making process are: the 
European Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the Council of the European 
Union. In general, new legislation is proposed by the European Commission and 
approved by the Council and Parliament. There are some situations, however, in which 
the Council can pass legislation alone.436  
 
The main forms of EU law are directives and regulations. The directive form is 
addressed to all Member States and its objective is to align their national legislation. 
Thus, the content of a directive is legally binding on all Member States, however they 
can determine on how to implement it. In other words, Member States can choose on 
how to conciliate Community aims within their domestic legislation. A directive, 
therefore, requires further action of Member States to have effect. Nevertheless, even if 
a Member State has not taken the required measures to implement a directive, any 
citizen can directly invoke the neglected directive before the national courts.	  On the 
other hand, a regulation is a general measure addressed to everyone not only to Member 
States. Unlike a directive, a regulation is directly applicable. This signifies that it works 
as  domestic legislation, not requiring further measures by Member States to produce 
effect.437 
 
The EU legislation on mutual assistance for exchange of tax information is analysed 
from two different perspectives: direct taxation and indirect taxation. In relation to direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
435 The analysis of EU’s legislation is limited to mutual assistance on exchange of tax information. Mutual 
assistance on collection of tax claims will be only mentioned when its legal basis overlaps with mutual 
assistance on exchange of tax information. Thus, the Directive 76/308/EEC replaced by Directive 
2008/55/EC on collection of tax claims is not discussed in the next sections. 
436 European Union, <http://europa.eu/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm> accessed 21 October 
2009.  
437 European Union, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/droit_communautaire/droit_communautaire.htm#1.3.3> 
accessed 21 October 2009. 
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taxation, the two main acts analysed are the Council Directive 77/799/EEC concerning 
mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of 
direct taxation and taxation of insurance premium, and the Council Directive 
2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments. Regarding 
indirect taxation, the focus is on the Council Regulation EC 1798/2003, Commission 
Regulation (EC) 1925/2004 and Council Regulation EC 2073/2004, which lay down the 
rules on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax. Thus, whereas 
mutual assistance in the direction taxation field is examined through directives; in the 
field of indirect taxation, mutual assistance is analysed through regulations. The analysis 
from these two dimensions will allow a critical view on the general provision of the EU 
law as well as on practical measures of implementation. Whether the direct taxation 
should adopt the standard rules already used to indirect taxation is a question that will 
emerge in the context of the debate.  
 
Considering the relationship of the EU supranational laws with other instruments for 
exchange of tax information such as the Joint Council of Europe/OECD CMAATM and 
OECD Income Model Convention, due to the fact that the EU supranational laws are 
superior to domestic legislation, as a general rule, principles laid down in a Directive or 
Regulation override the dispositions of the OECD DTC and the Joint Council of 
Europe/OECD CMAATM. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. If the 
OECD DTC or other inferior legislation establishes further obligations to exchange tax 
information or further individual rights, this specific rule will override the disposition of 
the EU law. Another interesting aspect of the relationship between different instruments 
for exchange of tax information is whether there is a hierarchy among them, i.e. whether 
there is a tendency for the usage of a certain kind of instrument. According to the 
general report elaborated by Seer in which he analysed national reports of 13 Member 
States438 on mutual assistance in tax matters, there is no tendency or hierarchy to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 The general report prepared by Seer reflects the national report of the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. R. Seer, ‘General report “Mutual assistance and information 
exchange”’ presented at the Santiago Congress of the European Association of Tax Law Professors (2009) 
<http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/santiago/sop/TextGeneralReportRomanSeer.pdf> accessed 21 
October 2009, 3. 
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one specific instrument over another. In fact, he found out that the use depends on the 
constellation of the case and the nature of the information required.439 
 
After this overview of the general aspects of EU legislation, the specific rules available 
for exchange of tax information will be examined regarding their main characteristics 
and advantages/shortcomings compared to other instruments for exchange of tax 
information also available to Member States. This analysis will raise complementary 
arguments about the use, implementation and efficiency of instruments for exchange of 
tax information. 
 
 7.3.1. Direct taxation: Council Directive 77/799/EEC  
 
The Council Directive 77/799/EEC440 was the first intra-Community instrument in the 
area of direct taxation on exchange of tax information.441 The premises that underpinned 
the adoption of such measure were: (i) the combatting of tax evasion and avoidance 
across the frontiers of Member States that could create distortions in the movement of 
capital and in the conditions of tax competition; and (ii) the fact that collaboration 
between tax administrations on the basis of income bilateral treaties was unable to curb 
new forms of tax evasion and avoidance.442 Based on these premises, a supranational 
instrument was required to coordinate the intra-Community measures from a multilateral 
perspective.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 ibid 7. 
440  The Council Directive 77/799/EEC was later amended by the following acts: (i) Directive 
79/1070/EEC which made some changes to the wording of Directive 77/799/EEC; (ii) Directive 
92/12/EEC which amended Directive 77/799/EEC to extend its scope to cover excise duties; (iii) 
Directive 2003/93/EC which extended the scope of mutual assistance provided for in Directive 
77/799/EEC to cover the taxes on insurance premiums referred to in Directive 76/308/EEC; (iv) Directive 
2004/56/EC designed to speed up the flow of information between Member States' tax authorities; and (v) 
Council Directive 2004/106/EC which amended the original title and the content of Directive 77/799/EEC 
to cover only mutual assistance in the field of direct taxation and taxation of insurance premiums. Further 
details on the amendments of Council Directive 77/799/EEC can be found at 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/taxation/l33029_en.htm> accessed 22 October 2009.  
441 Grau Ruiz (n 324) 128. 
442 Both premises were provided in the preamble of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC.  
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The main characteristics of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC are: (i) the provision of 
three different mechanisms for exchange of tax information:  on request,443 automatic,444 
spontaneously;445 (ii) scope restrained to civil matters, i.e. criminal matters are not 
covered;446 (iii) non-predefined time limit for forwarding information, it depends on 
Member States’ capacities;447 (iv) the right to refuse to provide tax information if 
Member States’ own laws or administrative practices prevent its tax administration from 
carrying out these enquiries or from collecting or using this information for its own 
purposes (this signifies that domestic bank secrecy provisions can obstruct exchange of 
information under this Directive) or where the provision of such information would be 
contrary to public policy or would lead to the disclosure of a commercial, industrial or 
professional secret or of a commercial process, or where the Member State for which the 
information is intended is unable for practical or legal reasons to provide similar 
information;448 and (v) attribution of the responsibility for the implementation of the 
Directive to the competent authority of each Member State.449 
 
 Even though the Council Directive 77/799/EEC was amended many times, the core 
mechanisms for exchange of tax information were not modified, maintaining the same 
characteristics as when they were enacted. In the meantime, other supranational laws for 
exchange of information were developed, putting in evidence the necessity of updating 
the Council Directive 77/799/EEC. Thus, the analysis of the directive on taxation of 
savings income in the form of interest payments as well as the regulation on VAT will 
help to identify the aspects that need to be improved on the Council Directive 
77/799/EEC as well as the challenges to implement any modification. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Council Directive 77/799/EEC (n 347) Article 2. 
444 ibid Article 3. 
445 ibid Article 4. 
446 ibid preamble.  
447 ibid Article 5. 
448 ibid preamble and Article 8. 
449 ibid Article 9. 
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 7.3.2. Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the 
form of Interest 
 
Savings income in the form of interest is one of the most mobile categories of income. 
The EU’s Member States acknowledged this situation and enacted the Council Directive 
2003/48/EC to tackle the problem of tax evasion involving the taxation of interest 
income.450 Unlike the EU, the OECD preferred to leave aside the problem of interest 
income. In the OECD’s work on harmful tax competition, released in 1998, the tax 
treatment of interest on cross-border saving instruments was not considered.  The 
justification was that the Committee on Fiscal Affairs was examining alternative 
schemes to deal with cross-border interest flows, including the use of withholding taxes 
and exchange of information. However, until now the OECD has not presented a 
proposal to deal with the tax treatment of interest.451 The EU’s early strategy of 
developing an instrument to grant the taxation of interest demonstrates the incoherency 
of the OECD’s approach on not dealing with the taxation of interest when examining the 
problem of tax competition. 
 
The implementation of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC was not an easy task and it 
faced a lot of challenges. The devices incorporated in the body of this Council Directive 
2003/48/EC show that some Member States were against its implementation and the 
final draft needed to reconcile their interests with the necessity of an instrument to 
enforce residence taxation of interest paid to non-resident investors. That is, the Council 
Directive 2003/48/EC had to give an alternative to Member States that were not willing 
to implement it. As a result, the Council Directive on Savings Income provided some 
transitional measures that give the choice to Member States between exchanging 
information and levying a withholding tax. The content of the Council Directive 
2003/48/EC does not reflect the ideal solution but what was possible and achievable 
regarding the political constraints. Thus, the Council Directive 2003/48/EC can help to 
identify some aspects that need to be improved in the Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 Council Directive 2003/48/EC (n 348). Council Directive 2003/48/EC will also be referred in the body 
of the text as ‘Council Directive on Savings Income’. 
451 OECD, ‘1998 Report’ (n 70) 9.  
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however it does not contain all the answers to the current problems. The examination of 
the limitations of the Council Directive on Savings Income will put this fact in evidence. 
 
The core idea of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC is to enforce the taxation of interest 
through automatic exchange of tax information. This mechanism would provide the 
required information for the residence country to enforce taxation of interest in the place 
of investors’ residence. Thus, the assumption of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC is 
that interest should be taxed at the residence country rather than at the source country.452 
Source taxation, i.e. the levy of a withholding tax is permitted as an exceptional rule 
(transitional measure) only when the implementation of automatic exchange of 
information is not accepted by the Member State. The way these two mechanisms 
(automatic exchange of information and the levy of withholding tax) are used 
demonstrates that they are substitutable rather than complementary. The examination on 
how the Council Directive 2003/48/EC works will clarify the use of these two 
mechanisms. 
 
The Council Directive 2003/48/EC entered into force in July 2005, applying to all 
Member States. This Directive was also adopted by 10 dependent or associated 
territories453 of the EU Member States as well as by European third countries.454 The 
implementation on these jurisdictions differs from the procedures adopted in the EU 
Member States since the supranational aspect of the EU legislation does not apply to 
them. Hence, in relation to dependent and associated territories of the EU Member 
States, the Directive was implemented through bilateral treaties signed by each one of 
the 25 Member States with these jurisdictions.455 European third countries followed the 
same standard of implementation.	  456 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 A. M. Jimenez, ‘Loopholes in the EU Savings Tax Directive’ (2006) 60 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 480, 481. 
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Jersey, the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, 
Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands. 
454  The European third countries mentioned in the body of the text are: Switzerland, Andorra, 
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455 The application of the Directive by these dependent or associated territories of the EU Member States 
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According to the rules provided in the Directive on Savings Income, all Member States 
are ultimately expected to automatically exchange information on interest payments by 
paying agents established in their territories to individuals resident in other Member 
States.457 Transitional measures were, however, adopted by Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Austria, since they did not immediately introduce such a system of information 
reporting.458 In this sense, it was agreed that Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria will 
only adopt a system of information reporting at the end of a transitional period, in which 
they levy a withholding tax at a rate of 15% for the first three years, 20% for the 
following three years (starting in January 2008), and 35% thereafter.459  Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Austria must transfer 75% of the tax revenue of this withholding tax to 
the investor's state of residence.460 Nevertheless, as an alternative to the retention or 
withholding tax, investors in Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria have two options: (i) to 
authorise the paying agent to inform his Member State of residence about the savings 
held abroad; or (ii) to present to his paying agent a certificate issued by the competent 
authority of his country of residence ensuring that the tax authority is already informed 
about the taxpayer’s foreign income.461  
 
There are some conditions that can curtail the transitional period: (i) if the EC enters 
into an agreement with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explained next), the levy of a withholding tax on the same terms as Belgium, Luxembourg or Austria. For 
further details: European Commission, ‘Taxation and Customs Union: Taxation of Savings: Rules 
Applicable’, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/rules_applicable/index_en.htm> 
accessed 26 October 2009. 
456 An Agreement between the EC and Switzerland providing for measures equivalent to those established 
in the Directive on Savings Income was signed in October 2004. The key elements of this Agreement 
were also incorporated in the agreements with Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino. The 
provisions consisted of: (a) a retention or withholding tax with revenue sharing at the same rates as 
applied by Belgium, Luxembourg or Austria during the transitional period of the Directive; (b) an option 
for the taxpayer to permit the disclosure of the income to his or her Member State of residence for tax 
purposes as an alternative to the retention or withholding tax; (c) a provision for the exchange of 
information on request in cases of tax fraud or similar misbehaviour; (d) a review clause to allow the 
Contracting Parties to review its working overtime in line with international developments. ibid.  
457 Council Directive 2003/48/EC (n 348) Preamble. 
458 ibid Article 10. 
459 ibid Article 11. 
460 ibid Article 12. 
461 ibid Article 13. 
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exchange information upon request as defined in the OECD Model Agreement on 
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters released in 2002 in relation to interest 
payments, and these countries continue to apply simultaneously the withholding tax 
levied by them since 1 July 2005 on the basis of the already existing agreements with 
the EU in this field; and (ii) if the Council agrees by unanimity that the United States is 
committed to exchange of information upon request as defined in the 2002 OECD 
Model Agreement with all EU Member States in relation to interest payments.462 
 
The transitional measures demonstrated that the Council Directive on Savings Income 
had to reconcile different interests of Member States as well as European third countries. 
The limitations for the implementation of this Directive are not restrained to the 
transitional measures. There are also other limitations incorporated in the rules provided 
in the Council Directive 2003/48/EC. The constraints on the legal definitions, i.e. on the 
concept of interest, paying agent and beneficial owner are the main loopholes of the 
Council Directive on Savings Income.463 The literature has extensively criticised such 
issues by arguing that: (i) the concept of interest is restrained to certain debt claims 
leaving aside not only all negotiable debt securities issued before 1st March 2001 but 
also innovative financial instruments; (ii) the concept of paying agent relies on the 
territorial scope of the Directive which allows investors to easily circumvent the rules by 
using a paying agent located outside the EU even if the funds are invested in the 
Community; and (iii) the concept of beneficial owner refers only to individuals which 
allows individual taxpayers to avoid such rule by interposing intermediary structures not 
covered by the Directive.464 Such limitations have been already recognised by the 
European Commission and a proposal trying to improve such issues has already been 
elaborated: COM(2008) 727 final.465 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 ibid Article 10. 
463 Jimenez (n 452) 485-93. 
464 ibid. 
465 It is not the objective of this section to exhaust the discussion on the improvement of the EU Savings 
Directive. For further information: European Commission, ‘Proposal of a Council Directive amending 
Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments’ COM(2008) 727 
final at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_di
rective_review/COM(2008)727_en.pdf> accessed 26 October 2009.  
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Whereas there is quite extensive literature discussing the legal aspects of the Directive 
on Savings Income; the empirical assessment of the effects of this Directive is very 
limited.  One possible explanation for such limitation is the lack of data. Hemmelgarn 
and Nicodeme challenged this limitation by developing a study in which they assessed 
the first years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive.466 These authors concluded that 
exchange of information has not led to major shifts in international savings, even though 
the limitation of the data needs to be considered. 
 
An important aspect analysed by Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme’s research refers to the 
figures available for information exchanged and withholding tax levied. In relation to 
information exchanged, their analysis pointed out two different aspects of the data. First, 
that the way the Directive allows countries to report the data on information exchanged 
makes its assessment difficult;467 and second, that the largest economies report the 
highest values of sent information on interest payments and sales proceeds. Regarding 
withholding tax, the information available displays the amount of revenue shared with 
Member States. In this sense, most part of the revenue raised in the period analysed 
(second half of 2005, 2006 and 2007) was from Switzerland and Luxembourg.	  468 
 
The importance of statistics to assess the functioning of the 2003 Directive is declared in 
Article 18 of the Council Directive on Savings Income which establishes that the 
Commission has to present to the Council, every three years, an assessment of the 
operation of this Directive. These statistics should be provided by Member States and 
market operators, however the Directive does not contain provisions compelling them to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466 T. Hemmelgarn and G. Nicodeme, ‘Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-
Savings Taxation Directive’ (2009) Taxation Paper 18 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_pap
ers/taxation_paper_18.pdf> accessed 18 August 2011. 
467 The difficulty derives from the fact that the Directive 2003/48/EC allows countries to choose between 
two ways of reporting: (i) to restrict the minimum amount of information reported by paying agents to the 
total amount of interest or income and to the total amount of the proceeds from sales, redemption or 
refund (Article 8 (2), last paragraph); or (ii) by the type of interests (Article 8 (2) (a) to (e) and these two 
sets of data can differ. 
468 Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme (n 466) 19-24. 
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provide such information.469 The Council tried to improve such situations by elaborating 
a list of Statistics that Member States should send to the Commission every year on a 
voluntary basis.470 Despite all the effort made by Member States and market operators to 
provide the Commission with statistics, the quality and quantity of the statistics received 
were not sufficient to make a quantitative analysis of the Directive during its first years 
of application.  
 
The analysis developed by Hemmelgarn and Nicodeme added to the effort made by the 
Council to improve the quality and quantity of data available on the operation of the 
Council Directive on Savings Income demonstrates that a policy of transparency is 
missing. Thus, the reform of the Council Directive 2003/48/EC should improve not only 
the rules of reporting information exchanged but also statistics for the assessment of the 
Directive. 
 
Besides all the limitations pointed out, the contribution of the Council Directive 
2003/48/EC consists of the demonstration that automatic exchange of information is an 
adequate instrument to curb tax evasion on interest payments. As an alternative, the use 
of withholding taxes by source countries can also help. Furthermore, the sharing of tax 
revenue also emphasises a different strategy from what has been suggested by the 
OECD. The new proposal for the Council Directive 77/799/EEC could enforce a 
mandatory adoption of automatic exchange of information for some categories of 
income as the Council Directive 2003/48/EC has done for savings income in the form of 
interest payments as well as a policy of transparency regarding data on information 
exchanged.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 Commission of the European Communities, ‘Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a 
Council Directive amending Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of 
interest payments’ Commission Staff Working Document - SEC(2008) 2767 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_di
rective_review/SEC(2008)2767_en.pdf> accessed 27 October 2009, 4-5. 
470 The information requested was: for countries levying a withholding tax: the tax revenue shared; for 
countries exchanging information: the interest payments and sales proceeds reported; the number of 
beneficial owners; the number of paying agents; the part of the total annual tax collected from resident 
taxpayers on interest payments made by domestic paying agents (optional) and the part of the total annual 
tax collected from resident taxpayers on interest payments made by foreign paying agents (optional). ibid. 
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 7.3.3. Indirect Taxation: Council Regulation EC 1798/2003 and Commission 
Regulation EC 1925/2004 
 
Before the enactment of the Council Regulation EC 1798/2003, administrative 
cooperation on tax matters was established by the Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
concerning mutual assistance by the authorities of the Member States in the field of 
direct and indirect taxation, and Council Regulation 218/92/EEC on administrative 
cooperation in the field of indirect taxation. However, the existence of these two 
separate legal provisions was curbing effective cooperation on VAT. Thus, in order to 
improve the cooperation between tax authorities, Council Regulation EC 1798/2003 was 
enacted, bringing together those provisions and improving aspects of implementation.471 
 
The VAT regulation went further than other legal devices on the implementation of 
exchange of information since it provided the structure requested for cooperation 
between tax administrations. Instead of discussing principles of exchange of 
information, the VAT legislation focused on the structure to implement effective 
exchange of information. Consequently, the first impression that you have after reading 
the Council Regulation EC 1798/2003, complemented by the detailed provisions 
established in the Commission Regulation EC 1925/2004, is  that you can visualise 
information being exchanged. In the other legislation, you understand the assumptions 
that will guide the exchange of information but its effective implementation is not clear 
at all.  
 
The structure for cooperation between tax administrations in the field of VAT 
encompasses the following major issues: (i) the designation of a single central liaison 
office which is responsible for contacts with other Member States; (ii) predefined terms 
and categories for automatic exchange of information; (iii) adoption of a standard form 
for requests of information; (iv) time limit for providing information; (v) maintenance of 
an electronic database containing a register of persons to whom VAT identification 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471  European Commission, ‘Administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax (VAT)’ 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/taxation/l31003_en.htm> accessed 28 October 2009. 
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numbers have been issued by Member States; and (vi) predefined form for exchange of 
statistical data to evaluate the system. From this list, it can be inferred that all major 
problems existing in the other legislation have been surpassed in the VAT regulation. 
 
There is, however, an essential element missing in the list described above. In fact, the 
elements described cannot work properly without an operational system. Thus, the 
missing element is the CCN/CSI network which is the common platform based on the 
common communication network (CCN) and common system of interface (CSI) 
implemented by the Member States to grant the electronic transmission of all data 
requested by tax authorities in the field of VAT.472 A system like this would improve 
exchange of information between tax authorities in the area of direct taxation. 
 
In 2010, Council Regulation 904/2010 was enacted, repealing Council Regulation 
1798/2003. This new regulation improved even more the rules that enable the competent 
authority of EU members to cooperate and exchange information on VAT. The main 
innovations implemented consisted of: (i) the development of a new network system 
(Eurofisc) that allows national officials of EU countries to detect and combat new cases 
of cross border VAT fraud; and (ii) the cooperation with non-EU Member States, 
provided that previous arrangements allow the flow of information.473 More specifically, 
regarding aspect (i), Eurofisc determines the cases in which Member States must 
exchange information spontaneously, the procedures for providing feedback on such 
information and situations that Member States must conduct multilateral controls.474 In 
relation to aspect (ii), cooperation with non-EU members allows the competent authority 
of EU member to forward information received from that country to another EU country 
that requests it or to any other country to which the information may be of interest.475 
This last point is remarkable since one of the main difficulties regarding exchange of 
information is for the interested country to have previous knowledge that something that 
might interest them has occurred in that particular country. This provision, therefore, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Council Regulation (EC) 1728/2003 (n 349) Article 2. 
473 Council Regulation (EU) n. 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating 
fraud in the field of value added tax, OJ L 268, 1. 
474EUROPA, <http://www.eurofisc.eu/news/council_adopted_a_regulation.html> accessed 6 June 2011. 
475 EUROPA <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/taxation/lf0003_en.htm> accessed 6 June 2011. 
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breaks the barrier that only source countries have significant evidence to request 
information from a third country. In other words, information does not need to flow 
bilaterally only, it can change its course, relying only on the identification of the 
effective country interested in that information. 
 
The contribution of the VAT legislation to the discussion about exchange of tax 
information consists of the establishment of provisions that can effectively promote 
exchange of tax information and the implementation of an operational system that 
enforces the electronic transmission of the data. Based on the VAT approach, it becomes 
clear that the discussion involving mutual assistance on exchange of tax information 
needs to evolve from the definition of general principles to the implementation of 
practical measures.  
 
 7.3.4. Reforms on the Council Directive 77/799/EEC concerning mutual 
assistance in the field of direct taxation 
 
The previous arguments presented in relation to the Council Directive on Savings 
Income and VAT regulations help to identify the major issues that could be reformed in 
the Council Directive 77/799/EEC. In fact, these instruments have influenced the new 
proposal (COM (2009) 29 Final) for the Council Directive on mutual assistance in the 
field of taxation.476  
 
The most significant improvements in the new proposal are: (i) its scope will be 
extended to cover taxes of any kind apart from those already covered by the European 
Union legislation (e.g. VAT and excise duties); (ii) the designation of a single liaison 
office to concentrate the responsibility for contacts with other Member States; (iii) the 
establishment of automatic exchange of information for certain categories of income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Other instruments have also influenced the new proposal (COM (2009) 29 Final) as the Joint Council 
of Europe/OECD Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the OECD Income Model 
Convention and the OECD TIEA model. For further details: European Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation’ COM (2009) 29 Final, 
2009/0004 (CNS) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0029:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 28 October 
2009, 6-8. 
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which will be defined in a later regulation; (iv) the adoption of a standard form for 
requests of information; (v) the definition of time limits for providing information; (vi) 
the implementation of the rules that refusal to exchange information cannot be justified 
by own tax purpose, domestic interest and bank secrecy; (vii) the introduction of most 
favourable nation principle which requires that a Member State has to provide 
cooperation to another Member State under the same conditions as to a third country; 
(viii) the possibility to transmit information to third countries if previously allowed; and, 
of course, (ix) the adoption of the CCN/CSI network to integrate the communication of 
all tax systems.477  
 
Further legislation will be required to implement: automatic exchange of information 
(e.g. categories of income, frequency and practical arrangements); the standard form for 
requesting information; and the procedure for the provision of statistical data by 
Member States for the assessment of the effectiveness of administrative cooperation 
under this Directive. Regulations might be an adequate instrument for this purpose since 
they produce immediate effect, not requiring their implementation by national acts.  
 
The recent number of changes in the legislation of exchange of information adopted 
worldwide is undeniable. The European Union has followed the world tendency by 
improving its supranational legislation. In fact, the European effort can provide positive 
spillovers outside the territory of the European Union. The effective implementation of 
exchange of information in the field of VAT added to the reforms suggested in the 
proposal for a new Directive on administrative cooperation in the field of direct taxation 
can be used as a guideline to the improvement of the instruments of exchange of 
information available to third countries.  
 
7.4. Conclusion 
 
The legislation examined demonstrates that to implement mechanisms for exchange of 
tax information it is necessary to move step by step. The process of implementation is 
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long. Consequently, the ideal instruments that would provide effective exchange of 
information (e.g. automatic exchange) could not be proposed at the beginning of the 
process of implementing exchange of tax information. Countries were not prepared 
either to implement it or to accept it. Improvements are still necessary in the instruments 
available. However, what is important is to be aware of the relevance of these 
instruments and whether the measures adopted contribute to the implementation of 
effective exchange of information. In other words, even though the current mechanisms 
for exchange of tax information need to be improved, changes cannot be implemented 
through one single action. Therefore, what is necessary is to comprehend whether the 
legal debate is proceeding in the right direction. To this extent, the next chapter will 
examine these instruments through a dynamic perspective in order to verify how they 
work in practice. 
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Chapter VIII. Recasting the position of developing countries 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter created the framework required to develop a critical overview of 
the instruments available for exchange of tax information. In this section, the knowledge 
acquired will be used to develop a further analysis on exchange of tax information. The 
proposed analysis will have two dimensions: domestic and international. The domestic 
dimension will examine the rules required for tax information to flow from taxpayers to 
tax authorities, passing through financial institutions. The availability of such 
information is the cornerstone element for exchange of information between national tax 
authorities of different countries. The international dimension will examine exchange of 
information from another angle, i.e. it will contextualise the flow of investment with the 
mechanisms available for exchange of information between tax authorities of developed 
countries, developing countries and tax havens. The international dimension will 
develop a dynamic perspective of exchange of tax information based on the interaction 
of different instruments available for exchange of information with the flow of capital. 
The objective here is to show that current instruments of exchange of tax information 
only work properly if the requesting country is the source country, i.e. the place where 
capital is invested.  
 
8.2. Dynamic perspective on how the existing mechanisms for exchange of 
information work 
 
8.2.1. Domestic dimension 
 
Keen and Ligthart argued that in order to achieve effective exchange of information 
between national tax authorities, first it is necessary to observe three conditions: (i) 
financial institutions must hold the complete details of the taxpayer’s essential 
information (ii) tax authorities need to have the legal power to access tax information 
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from domestic financial institutions; and (iii) national tax authorities must have the legal 
power to share with other countries tax information that they have access to.478 The 
diagram below illustrates the relationships that these conditions apply: 
 
Diagram 8.2.1. Domestic dimension of the flow of tax information 
 
Country A    Country B 
  
 
   2.    3.  
 
     
   1.a    1.b 
 
 
 
                               
 
The diagram shows that each condition applies to a different relationship. The first 
condition applies to the relationship between financial institutions and resident taxpayers 
(1.a) and non-resident taxpayers (1.b). Financial institutions must hold the complete 
details of the taxpayer’s essential information. Usually domestic legislation requires 
detailed information only from resident taxpayers. The absence of a provision that 
forces non-resident taxpayers to identify themselves as well as their place of residence 
represents one of the major loopholes in the process of exchange of information. 
Spencer has argued that this situation results in de facto bank secrecy since for one 
country to request information from another it needs to have some previous knowledge 
of the information being requested otherwise the country would have to engage in 
‘fishing expeditions’, which are prohibited by most countries’ agreements.479  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Keen and Ligthart (n 341) 11. 
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The US’s experience illustrates how difficult it is to implement a rule that forces the 
complete identification of non-resident investors. In 2001, in the last days of the Clinton 
administration, a new regulation was proposed which required that banks within the US 
report annually to the revenue authority all interest paid to non-residents on bank 
deposits within the US not effectively connected to a US trade or business.480 Later, 
however, this proposal was withdrawn and an alternative regulation was proposed 
restricting its scope to non-residents of certain countries. The US would only exchange 
information automatically with these countries.481  
 
Recently, in 2010, another measure was enacted by the US to identify non-resident 
investors, however this time the rule was restricted to US persons holding investments in 
offshore accounts. Under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), foreign 
financial institutions are required to report directly to the US tax authority information 
about financial accounts with more than US$50,000 held by US taxpayers, or by foreign 
entities in which American taxpayers hold substantial ownership interest. According to 
the new rule, foreign financial institutions will be obligated to: (i) identify their 
accountholders; (ii) report annually to the IRS on its accountholders who are US persons 
or foreign entities with substantial ownership; and (iii) withhold and pay to the US tax 
authority 30% of any payments of US source income as well as gross proceeds from the 
sale of securities that generate US source income, made to (a) non-participating foreign 
financial institutions, (b) individual accountholders failing to provide sufficient 
information to determine whether or not they are a US citizen, or (c) foreign entity 
accountholders failing to provide sufficient information about the identity of their 
substantial US owners.482 Foreign financial institutions and foreign governments have 
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481 The countries included in the second proposal were: Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. ibid. 
482 Internal Revenue Service – US Department of the Treasury, 
<http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=236664,00.html> accessed 27 July 2011. 
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battled over this new regulation.483 For instance, Canada is pushing to be exempted from 
the FATCA based on the argument that Canada and the US already had an agreement to 
share tax information.484 Thus, the problem affecting this kind of regulation is the 
exceptions, since in practice they create loopholes that allow taxpayers to curb the new 
provisions through the use of different channels to allocate capital without being 
identified. On the other hand, this new regulation demonstrates that governments are 
aware of the necessity of improving the identification of non-resident investors, which is 
the core issue to achieve effective exchange of tax information. 
 
Another issue that can be raised here is how to identify the non-resident genuine owner 
when a chain of conduit companies established in different low tax jurisdictions are used 
to mask the true identity of the beneficiary.485 The power to disentangle this situation 
belongs to the source country, i.e. the country where investment in made, since it could 
enforce different tax treatments based on the identification or not of the genuine owner, 
as suggested by FATCA. For instance, it could be established that if the genuine owner 
were identified, the tax rate applied would be the one established in the legislation. On 
the other hand, if the investor does not disclose the true identity of the genuine owner, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 T. Braithwaite ‘Banks battle over US tax law’ (Financial Times, 12 June 2011) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/60896702-9521-11e0-a648-00144feab49a.html#axzz1TJY8btpF> accessed 
27 July 2011. 
484 S. Bond and T. Braithwaite, ‘Canada seeks US law exemption’ (Financial Times 16 June 2011) 
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accessed 27 July 2011. 
485 The term ‘genuine owner’ is used here to designate the individual or legal entity located in a 
jurisdiction with a substantial tax system, i.e. where income is taxable and there is no secrecy rule on 
ownership identity. The idea behind the term ‘genuine owner’ is to identify who exercises ultimate control 
over assets. Thus, if you have a chain of conduit companies established in low tax jurisdictions, the 
identity of shareholders would be required until the ultimate owner is identified as a company established 
in a country with a substantial tax system, or an individual. Tax favoured entities would not be regarded as 
a genuine owner, even if located in high tax jurisdictions. In a sense, what has guided the idea of ‘genuine 
owner’ was the combination of look through rules and exclusion of tax-favoured entities rules. The ideal 
concept would not rely on a case-by-case analysis. Moreover, the use of the term ‘genuine owner’ aims to 
avoid confusion with the term ‘beneficial owner’ used in Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model 
Convention. The term ‘beneficial owner’ has a specific meaning there and it became clear in the recent 
discussion draft, published in 2011 by the OECD, that it has a different meaning from other instruments 
(e.g. the Glossary of Financial Action Task Force’s Forty Recommendations and the 2001 report of the 
OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance – ‘Behind the Corporate Veil: Using Corporate Entities 
for Illicit Purposes’), not being used to identify persons that exercise ultimate control over entities or 
assets. OECD, ‘Clarification of the Meaning of “Beneficial Owner” in the OECD Model Tax Convention: 
Discussion Draft 29 April 2011 to 15 July 2011’, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/35/47643872.pdf> 
accessed 30 July 2011. For further details on beneficiary owner and other specific countermeasures: J. 
Schwarz, Schwarz on Tax Treaties (Wolters Kluwer Limited 2009), 274-301.  
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40% withholding tax would be levied. Subsequently, as discussed next, this information 
could be forward to the residence country of such investor.  
 
The responsibility for acquiring investors’ information is attributed to financial 
institutions, which signifies that extra costs are not borne by national government. 
However, the difficulties in introducing such a measure can rely on three different 
explanations: (i) absence of political willingness to implement such rule, even though 
the income tax system of the country requires this information from resident taxpayers; 
(ii) absence of domestic interest in the information provided by financial institutions 
based on the fact that the income tax system of such country does not require it from its 
residents; and (iii) restrictions on the administrative capacity of the country’s tax 
authority to implement this measure. The first justification can be associated with 
developed countries (e.g. American situation), the second with tax havens and the third 
with some developing countries. Hence, the first condition represents the initial step for 
a country to be able to exchange information automatically, which is an essential 
mechanism to achieve effective exchange of information.  
 
Regarding collection of information, a model must be adopted at the first stage that 
information is gathered, otherwise information becomes useless. Therefore, there must 
be an uniform language as well as a standard form agreed and used by financial 
institutions and national tax authorities in order to make possible international exchange 
of information. In other words, the procedures adopted to exchange information 
internationally need to be implemented also at the domestic level. 
 
The second condition applies to the relationship between national tax authorities and 
financial institutions. Tax authorities need to have the legal power to access tax 
information from domestic financial institutions. The assumption here is that financial 
institutions hold the required information, i.e. the first condition is fulfilled. The 
override of bank secrecy provisions and the disclosure of ownership identify by a tax 
treaty’s provisions represent a decisive step in the accomplishment of this condition.  
 
272	  
	  
The third condition relates the domestic aspect with the international one. This condition 
emphasises the necessity of a legal basis to allow exchange of information between tax 
authorities of different countries. The previous sections discussed in detail the variety of 
instruments available for countries to exchange information. Moreover, it was already 
argued that there is no hierarchy among the instruments for exchange of information, 
their use depends on the constellation of the case and the nature of the information 
required.486 
 
The accomplishment of these three conditions by countries represents the ideal scenario 
for exchange of information. In practice, however, countries vary on the compliance of 
these conditions. There are different reasons for that and the explanation might be 
connected to the characteristics of their income tax systems. The recent improvements in 
the mechanisms for exchange of tax information have focused on the second and third 
conditions, i.e. the provision of clauses in international agreements (e.g. the UN and 
OECD DTC Income Model Convention and the OECD TIEA Model) that grant the 
override of domestic bank secrecy provisions and the disclosure of ownership identity as 
well as on the supply of different instruments for exchange of tax information added to 
the international community’s pressure for countries to sign it. The first condition 
(information gathered by financial institutions) has been left aside, even though it is the 
cornerstone element for the implementation of exchange of information. Thus, in the 
same way as international organisations have provided clauses that override domestic 
obstacles for exchange of tax information, a mandatory provision requesting the 
identification of non-resident investors could also be developed. Besides all the practical 
difficulties that might be raised, the recognition of the importance of such issue at the 
international level would already represent a further step in the direction of effective 
exchange of tax information. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Seer (n 438) 19. 
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8.2.2. International Dimension 
 
In this section, the instruments available for exchange of tax information will be 
analysed from a systematic perspective, i.e. in a structure involving developed countries, 
developing countries and tax havens. The aim is to verify the effectiveness of these 
instruments when information needs to pass through tax havens. Next, the instruments 
for exchange of information will be contextualised with the flow of capital. The 
objective of this analysis is to link the effectiveness of each instrument with the 
characteristic of a country as the source of investments and residence of investors. The 
outcomes will help to understand the flaws of instruments for exchange of information 
from the perspective of developing countries. The analysis proposed is illustrated in the 
diagram below: 
 
Diagram 8.2.2. (a) Instruments for exchange of information & Flow of Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
(Note: Complete diagram comparing the flow of information with the flow of capital between developed 
countries, tax havens and developing ones.) 
 
There is some basic information that needs to be explained before examining the 
coloured transactions between countries. At first glance, the diagram shows two 
LEGEND 
Full line = Capital Flow 
 
Dashed line= Exchange of tax Information 
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different flows: (i) flow of capital (full line arrows) and (ii) flow of information (dashed 
line arrows). An important aspect is the direction of the arrows. Some of them have 
double arrows, while others have only one. The double arrows represent bilateral flows 
of capital and information. In other circumstances, however, there are two arrows drawn 
to demonstrate capital flowing out and then returning. This situation is different from the 
bilateral flow (double arrows). Even though in practice in the second situation there also 
is bilateral flow, the flow is substantially different. The two arrows in opposite 
directions between two countries, therefore, indicate the fact that the residence of the 
investor has been manipulated, i.e. capital flight has left the country and returned as 
foreign investment (also known as round-tripping). In relation to the dashed arrows, 
each one of them is associated with an instrument for exchange of tax information. The 
direction of the arrows demonstrates the way that information might flow. Further 
explanation about the way exchange of information works will be provided when 
examining the specific transactions. At last, there are different colours applied to the 
arrows. Each colour is used to designate a specific situation, where there is flow of 
capital and exchange of information. A number is associated with each colour in order 
to facilitate the identification of the situations.   
 
Diagram 8.2.2. (b) Flows between developed countries and developing countries 
 
(Note: Flow of capital and tax information between developed countries and developing ones. The blue 
arrow represents capital flight from developed countries; while the yellow arrow refers to capital flight 
from developing countries. The dark arrow illustrates capital flight originated in a developed country and 
invested in a developing one (or vice-versa). The dashed arrows, on the other hand, represent exchange of 
tax information. The direction of the dashed arrows indicates the way information might flow). 
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The first situation (illustrated in blue and indicated with number (1)) refers to the 
bilateral flow of capital between developed countries. Chapter III demonstrated that 
there is a substantial flow of capital among developed countries. In order to avoid 
double taxation and tax avoidance, developed countries have celebrated a myriad of 
DTCs among them. Developed countries can justify exchange of tax information 
through different instruments. Thus, besides Article 26 of OECD Income Model 
Convention, there are also the CMAATM; the supranational laws for Member States of 
the European Union; and the Nordic Convention for the Nordic Countries. The dashed 
blue arrow can be associated with any of these instruments. The double arrows indicate 
that both countries are interested in receiving information. These instruments can 
provide more than one form of exchange of information. In terms of automatic exchange 
of information, only EU countries have implemented it for certain categories of income. 
Thus, excepted by the European experience with automatic exchange of information, the 
mechanisms in force for exchange of information only work if the residence country has 
previous knowledge of investments made abroad by their residents.  
 
Parallel to this first situation, there is the bilateral flow of capital between developing 
countries illustrated in yellow and indicated with number (2) in the diagram. Double 
taxation and tax evasion can be curbed through the use of DTCs, which can follow the 
UN or the OECD Income Model Conventions. However, there are fewer DTCs signed 
between developing countries than between developed ones. Regarding exchange of 
information, besides the DTC models, there is also the CIAT Model that could be used 
as the legal basis for exchange of tax information. The difference between situations (1) 
and (2) refers to the existence of broader network of instruments to promote exchange of 
information. Thus, the volume of information that can be exchanged between developed 
countries is significantly higher than information exchanged between developing 
countries. It is important to note that this fact might be connected to the different level 
of flow of capital between these countries as well as to the administrative capacity of tax 
authorities in developing countries.  
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The third situation (illustrated in black and indicated with number (3)) refers to the flow 
of capital between developed and developing countries. In this case, the different 
incentives created by source and residence taxation in relation to the allocation of 
mobile capital needs to be considered. In a sense, whereas source taxation discourages 
the inflow of capital, residence taxation encourages it, without compromising a 
country’s tax base. Consequently, the enforcement of source taxation by developing 
countries followed by the enforcement of residence taxation by developed countries 
creates the perfect scenario for capital flight to be invested in developed countries. 
 
In terms of exchange of information, this signifies that developed countries as the source 
county, i.e. where capital is invested, are in a better position than developing ones to 
investigate capital flight since they can demand further information of investments made 
in their economies. In these circumstances, information upon request can provide further 
evidence of the genuine identity of the capital received. In practical terms, this signifies 
that foreign investment made by residents of developing countries can only be taxed 
when these countries have previous knowledge where the investment is made, for 
instance in round-tripping situations, where capital flight returns as foreign investment 
to developing countries. Only in these conditions the mechanism for exchange of 
information upon request provided in DTCs (or even TIEAs in specific cases such as 
TIEA US-Peru, US-Colombia and US-Brazil) signed between developed and developing 
countries might provide assistance to curb tax evasion. In sum, the mechanisms for 
exchange of tax information between developed and developing countries works 
properly when the residence country of the investor has enough information on the 
investment made abroad. The problems when this information is not available are 
discussed in the next section. 
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Diagram 8.2.2. (c) Flows channel through tax havens 
 
(Note: Flow of capital and information passing through tax havens. The red arrows represent the route of 
capital flight from developed countries; whereas the green arrows refer to the route of capital flight from 
developing countries. The dashed arrows, as indicated above, represent the direction of information being 
exchanged. Finally the purple arrow illustrates exchange of information between tax havens based on 
TIEAs). 
 
In relation to the other transactions (i.e. situation (4) in red and situation (5) in green), 
the common characteristic between them is the fact that the flow of capital passes 
through a tax haven at least once. The problem raised by tax havens is not a matter of 
substantive laws but of tax administration.487 In other words, the problem is not the fact 
that tax havens do not tax income but the fact that administrative laws of flight 
jurisdictions are not prepared to deal with them since they obstruct the identification of 
the place of investment by the residence country. In this situation, the information held 
by source countries represents a crucial element in the identification of investments 
made abroad by residence countries. The transactions (4) and (5) will draw attention to 
this fact.   
  
The transactions illustrated in red and indicated with number (4) refer to the flow of 
capital flight (KF) from developed countries. The meaning of capital flight adopted here 
is the same used in Chapter IV, which signifies capital that flows out of the country 
without any record. This capital, as demonstrated in the diagram, can adopt different 
routes: (i) to flow to a tax haven and return as foreign investment; or (ii) to flow to a tax 
haven and then to a third country (developed or developing one). In both hypotheses 
capital flight can become part of a complex structure involving more than one tax haven. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 S. A. Dean, ‘Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, 
and International Tax Cooperation’ (2007) 58 Hastings Law Journal 911, 925. 
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What differentiates both routes is the fact that in the first one, the same developed 
country is the source and residence of the investment, while in the second route, the 
source country is one country and the residence country is another one. The crucial 
aspect here is that capital flight is not invested in tax havens. It only passes through 
them to mask its real identity. To this extent, the OECD TIEA Model Convention has 
been developed to assist flight jurisdictions to identify the true source of investments 
made in their territory through tax havens. The efficiency of such instrument will 
become evident in the examination of the routes described above.  
  
Focusing on the first red route, i.e. capital flight that flows to a tax haven and then 
returns as foreign investment, exchange of information through a TIEA can be very 
helpful since the developed country has enough information as the source country to 
request further details from the tax haven through the mechanism of exchange upon 
request. In the hypothesis of a chain of conduit companies located in tax havens, i.e. 
capital flight passing through more than one tax haven jurisdiction to mask its real 
identify, to try to identify the genuine owner of the chain of legal entities located in 
more than one tax haven, the developed country will need to have a TIEA with each one 
of the haven jurisdictions which is part of the ‘chain’. The current version of the TIEA 
adopted by the OECD does not allow third countries to have access to information 
exchanged without prior authorisation. So, for instance, in the case of the UK receiving 
investment from a company located in the Cayman Islands, which is controlled by 
another company located in the Bahamas, the existence of a TIEA between the Cayman 
Islands and the Bahamas will not facilitate the process requested for the UK to have 
access to information from the Bahamas. According to the current version of the OECD 
TIEA, it is necessary for the UK to have two independent TIEAs with each one of the 
two jurisdictions to obtain full information of the transactions. This example draws 
attention to the fact that the recent OECD TIEA signed between tax haven jurisdictions 
cannot enhance the level of transparency and exchange of information worldwide. The 
recent TIEAs signed between different tax haven jurisdictions, in fact, represent only the 
compliance of these jurisdictions with the OECD’s request to avoid their classification 
as uncooperative jurisdictions. Thus, in order to comply with the standard of effective 
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exchange of information, tax haven jurisdictions need to sign at least 12 TIEAs with any 
other jurisdictions. 488  These TIEAs would only represent a further step in the 
implementation of effective exchange of information, if they allowed information 
exchanged through them to be disclosed to a third jurisdiction. Only then, the ‘chain’ of 
TIEAs made by them would improve the access of tax information from tax havens. 
 
What this first red route demonstrates is the fact that the OECD TIEA only works when 
the requesting country has enough knowledge of the transaction being investigated. In 
the absence of this information, the OECD TIEA cannot provide information to the 
residence country. The OECD TIEA will only work in this hypothesis based on the fact 
that the position of the source country and the residence country coincide. When the 
source of capital flight is one country and the residence of the investor is another one, 
the OECD TIEA will only work if the source country provides previous information to 
the residence country through mechanisms of automatic exchange of information, for 
instance. This is specifically the case of the second red route.  
 
The second red route, i.e. capital flight that flows to a third country (developed or 
developing one) through a tax haven jurisdiction, refers to a situation where the position 
of the source country does not coincide with the position of the residence country. Here 
the second route can divert in two different ways since the final destination of the capital 
flight can be a developed country or a developing one. In the first case, the mechanisms 
for automatic exchange of information between two developed countries will increase 
the probability of identification of the residence country of such capital. Initially, the 
source country will have to request information from the chain of tax havens, one by 
one. Assuming that after disentangling all parts of the transaction, the source country 
identifies another developed country as the residence of the capital flight, it could send 
this information upon request or automatically if this mechanism is applicable to that 
situation. Of course, this example relies on many different assumptions. However, here 
the objective is only to demonstrate that due to the fact that a vast amount of information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Even though OECD emphasises that a jurisdiction cannot be ‘whitened’ by signing agreements with 
any 12 partners. OECD, ‘The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes’ (2011), <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/45/43757434.pdf> accessed 7 June 2011. 
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can be exchanged between developed countries, the OECD TIEA might help developed 
countries to fight against capital flight, despite the limitations of this instrument. The 
other deviation of the second red route led capital flight to a developing country, after 
passing through tax haven jurisdictions. The problem here is the fact that capital is 
invested in a jurisdiction where exchange of information can occur only upon request. In 
this case, assuming that the residence country (developed one) has no idea of the 
destination of the capital, it becomes hard to investigate its location.  
 
The last transactions in the diagram, i.e. the green transactions identified with number 
(5), refer to the flow of capital flight (KF) from developing countries. Capital flight here 
can also adopt two different routes: (i) to flow to a tax haven and return as foreign 
investment; or (ii) to flow to a tax haven and then to a third country (developed or 
developing one). This situation, therefore, has a lot in common with the situation 
number (4) illustrated in red. Here also capital flight can become part of a complex 
structure involving more than one tax haven. What differentiates both routes is the fact 
that in the first one, the same developing country is the source and residence of the 
investment; whereas in the second route, the source country is a developing country and 
the residence country is a third country, which can be a developed country or a 
developing one. To this extent, the OECD TIEA can be useful in the first situation but 
not in the second. Thus, in relation to developing countries, the OECD TIEA can 
contribute in a certain way to identify capital flight only when the source and the 
residence country of an investment are the same. When capital flight is invested in a 
third jurisdiction, the absence of information where capital is invested makes the use of 
the OECD TIEA by them completely ineffective since they do not know what to request 
for which country.  
  
In sum, examining the routes of capital with the instruments available for exchange of 
information between developed, developing countries and tax havens what became 
evident is the fact that capital flight can be hardly curbed. The mechanisms for exchange 
of information with tax havens are only efficient when the residence country received 
enough information from the source country (or when these two positions coincide in 
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the same country). The way the current mechanisms for exchange of information work 
leaves capital flight untouched. The only hypothesis that the mechanisms available for 
exchange of information can help developing countries to curb capital flight is when 
capital flight returns as foreign investment. Currently there are only a very limited 
number of OECD TIEAs celebrated between developing countries and tax havens.489 
This signifies that not even in the situation where capital flight is reinvested in its 
country of origin might the developing country be able to curb capital flight.  
 
8.3. Conclusion: Moving forward on exchange of information 
 
The legal debate on exchange of tax information has focused on how to extract 
information from tax havens.490 As already mentioned, capital flight is not invested in 
tax havens, it only flows through it to mask its true identify.491 Thus, exchange of 
information can be improved by focusing on source countries. In fact, there are two 
crucial elements involving source countries: (i) type of information held by them; and 
(ii) availability of this information to residence countries.  
 
Considering the first element, in order to provide effective measures to improve 
exchange of information worldwide, source countries would have to require the 
identification of non-resident investors. This measure would disclose the place of 
residence of foreign investors. This could be done, as already mentioned, by the source 
country enforcing two different tax treatments: one for investors that reveals their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Up to May 2011, 479 TIEA have been signed, according to the OECD’s data. However, only 10 TIEAs 
were signed by developing countries, including China, India and Mexico. The majority of TIEAs was 
signed between developed countries and offshore financial centres, including tax havens. OECD, ‘Recent 
Tax Information Exchange Agreements’, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/59/43775845.pdf> accessed 
7 June 2011. 
490 In this sense, Dean suggested a mechanism in which a tax haven’s cooperation would be paid with a 
portion of the revenue raised by their help. Dean, ‘Philosopher Kings and International Tax’ (n 487) 957. 
491 The fact that capital flight is ultimately invested in developed countries had led authors such as Avi 
Yonah to suggest the adoption of a uniform withholding tax on portfolio investment by developed 
countries. Even though in practice this measure would help to solve the problem of tax havens, from the 
perspective of tax competition, developed countries would bravely resist its implementation. Furthermore, 
the recent developments in the area of exchange of information lead to assumptions that the problem of 
tax havens can be easily handled by focusing on the mechanisms for exchange of information rather than 
on the mandatory levy of withholding taxes by developed countries. Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax 
Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (n 122) 1667-70. 
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genuine identity, to whom the regular taxation determined in domestic statutes would 
apply; and another one for investors who do not reveal their genuine identity. In this 
case, a higher tax rate must be applied, such as 40-50%. The rate has to be expensive 
enough to encourage investors to identify themselves. Furthermore, the expression 
‘genuine identity’ means the ultimate owner of such investment. To this extent, 
investors would have to provide information not only from the intermediary legal entity 
interposed in a low country jurisdiction, but the identification of the ultimate owner 
located in a jurisdiction with a substantial tax system, where income is taxed and there is 
no secrecy on ownership.492 This kind of information would empower the source 
country with the required information that the residence country needs to enforce 
taxation.  
 
The second element refers to availability of information collected by source countries to 
residence countries. This could be done through automatic exchange of information. The 
implementation of automatic exchange of information is not easy and the diverse levels 
of tax administrations have justified the enforcement of exchange upon request rather 
than automatic exchange of information, when developing countries are involved. 
However, the cornerstone element to implement automatic exchange of information also 
in developing countries is not to collect the greatest amount of information possible, but 
rather the smallest amount that would facilitate the necessary observation.493 In terms of 
the minimum amount of information gathered, we could think of establishing a system 
that only identifies the residence country of investors. This information could be sent 
straight forward to the interested country. This hypothesis breaks down a paradigm 
situation that is faced nowadays regarding exchange of information only on a bilateral 
basis, i.e. a country needs to ask first, to receive information that it wants. In fact, this is 
what makes it really complicated to promote effective exchange of information with the 
current instruments that are available. Tax information does not need to flow bilaterally. 
It could be stored by clearing houses, which after receiving it would forward it to the 
interested country. Until now, the only instrument that overcame the necessity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 For further information on the discussion about ‘genuine owner’, check (n 485). 
493 Dean, ‘The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information’ (n 355) 55. 
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information being exchanged bilaterally was the new Council Regulation n. 904/2010, 
on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of VAT. This instrument 
allows countries to forward information received to the interested country without 
further requirements. 
 
Regarding implementation, a system for automatic exchange of information was already 
developed as well as the format and language requested for its implementation. This 
challenge was faced by the European Union, which implemented the CCN/CSI network, 
which is a platform based on the common communication network that allows the 
electronic transmission of information by competent authorities in the areas of customs 
and taxation. The limited success experienced in the VAT field has led to its adoption in 
the area of direct taxation, as suggested in the new proposal for a council directive on 
administrative cooperation in the field of taxation.  
 
In order to make exchange of information work from the perspective of developing 
countries, it is necessary to overcome the obstacle that low tax jurisdictions represent in 
the flow of information. The solution, however, does not consist only in improving 
mechanisms to receive information from them. It is necessary to focus where capital 
flight is invested, i.e. developed countries. To this extent, developed countries must 
request information when investments are made and be authorised to send it forward to 
the interested country, without further requirements.  
 
The way we have been thinking about exchange of information needs to be rethought. 
Bilateral exchange of information is not enough. The flaws identified in the current 
network of instruments for exchange of information demonstrated that if developing 
countries do not have access to source countries’ information, i.e. where capital is 
invested, they will not be able to fight against capital flight.   
 
Another important aspect to improve the debate on exchange of tax information is the 
recognition that the current knowledge on international information sharing is very 
limited. This situation can be explained by different arguments, i.e. by the position of 
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countries’ revenue authorities that use such mechanisms very carefully in order: (i) to 
avoid the breach of any clause of confidentiality; and (ii) to create uncertainty in 
taxpayers to improve their voluntary compliance with the tax laws. However, a policy of 
transparency in the field of exchange of tax information is required. Without this 
measure, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of the arrangements of exchange of 
information, and consequently, the correct measures to improve it.494 
 
Finally, it is essential to understand that the effective measures taken in the area of 
exchange of information have only been implemented due to a common consensus 
achieved among developed countries. Thus, although technical arguments are usually 
used to justify the limitations in the current mechanisms for exchange of tax 
information, in fact, the real obstacle is the political willingness of countries. The recent 
measure enforced by the OECD (e.g. the acceptance of a TIEA celebrated between two 
tax havens as the fulfilment of the criterion that considers a tax haven a cooperative 
jurisdiction) supports this line of reasoning. The involvement of developing countries 
which requires their understanding of the flaws of the current system of exchange of 
information is necessary to push the debate to a further stage, in which measures to curb 
capital flight from their jurisdictions are also implemented. 
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Chapter IX. Final conclusion 
 
This thesis aimed to provide a broader perspective of the relationship between 
international taxation and developing countries, by moving forward from arguments 
exhausted in the current literature, which are based on the assumption that developing 
countries are capital importers and, therefore, prefer source taxation, whereas developed 
countries are capital exporters, benefiting from residence taxation, to arguments based 
on the current profile of the international flow of capital.  
 
The first challenge faced by this study was to understand the phenomenon of 
globalisation in order to identify what facts led to the current level of financial 
integration, and, consequently, to the existing characteristics of the international flow of 
capital. In a sense, one of the main changes that has empowered the current level of 
financial integration was the liberalisation of exchange controls by developed countries. 
Before the liberalisation of exchange controls, countries were easily classified as debtor 
and creditor based on their economic profile, which was also explained by their level of 
development: developing countries were debtors and developed ones were creditors. To 
this extent, the allocation of taxing rights between source and residence countries 
corresponded to the division of tax base between developed and developing countries.  
 
One consequence of the assumption that developing countries continued to be capital 
importers, even in the current process of globalisation, was that their interest in 
international taxation was restricted to inflows of capital. The importance of outflows 
was left aside. Consequently, developing countries had a very limited involvement in the 
project on harmful tax competition, which in fact addresses the problem of international 
tax evasion and avoidance, involving tax havens and preferential tax regimes. In other 
words, under the label ‘harmful tax competition’ the OECD has dealt with the crisis of 
residence taxation in developed countries. The limited involvement of developing 
countries is comprehensible from this angle, since until now the basic assumption was 
that they were interested only in attracting inflows of FDI, which is not addressed by 
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these rules. Thus, one of the first arguments that this study wanted to make clear was the 
effective meaning of harmful tax competition in the legal debate.  
 
In order to drive the legal debate to address the current economic relationship between 
countries, the international flow of capital was analysed. The idea was to examine a 
long-term period in order to understand the evolution of the international flow of capital 
and whether the assumption surrounding developed and developing countries which 
characterised them as capital exporters and capital importers, respectively, was still 
valid in the current process of globalisation. The challenge faced at this point referred to 
the availability of data of a broad range of countries. The limitation of data of financial 
flows required the analysis of stocks of assets and liabilities held by countries. In a 
sense, there was previous evidence from economic studies that the flow of capital was 
not following the North/South direction anymore, i.e. that capital did not flow only from 
the developed world to developing countries. However, there was very limited 
discussion in the legal debate, considering this economic evidence.  
 
The analysis of the international flow of capital as well as stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities held by countries allowed the conclusion that nowadays it is very difficult to 
justify international tax policies based on countries’ economic profiles, i.e. countries 
classification as capital importers and capital exporters. Therefore, developing 
countries’ tax policies cannot be defined only in terms of inflows, but also in terms of 
outflows. In other words, developing countries should not only worry about incentives 
to attract foreign direct investment, but also about rules that ensure the taxation of 
residents’ foreign investments.  
 
Furthermore, it became evident that the international tax debate has to focus on the 
characteristics of the flow of capital rather than on countries’ economic profile. This 
signifies that intrinsic characteristics of investment as well as incentives created to 
allocate investments in different jurisdictions need to be regarded by policymakers. It is 
not possible anymore to think on allocation of taxing rights as division of tax base, 
without considering the mobile aspect of capital and the incentive created by tax policies 
287	  
	  
in its allocation. Policymakers must have in mind the trade-off between raising of tax 
revenue and the incentives to attract foreign investment. To this extent, residence 
taxation provides a better balance between these two goals, since the exemption of non-
resident investors does not reduce countries’ tax base. 
 
The focus on the characteristics of the flows of capital also put in evidence that: (i) tax 
havens are important players and, consequently, they need to be treated as a separate 
group; and (ii) the total sum of countries’ international investment position (IIP) resulted 
in the identification of a net asset discrepancy, which signifies that countries have 
reported better inflows (liabilities) than outflows (assets). The constraints on data have 
caused the discrepancy to be treated as badly reported data. However, the analysis of tax 
havens’ behaviour indicated that there might be other explanations for the problem faced 
in the data. It was verified that while the IIP of developed and developing countries 
contributed to the increasing value of the discrepancy over time, the IIP of tax havens 
reduced it. Even though the analysis considered, initially only 14 tax havens, out of a 
sample of 50 countries identified as tax havens by this study, it was possible to identify 
their impact on the discrepancy, leading to the assumption that if more tax havens were 
included in the analysis, the discrepancy would be further reduced. Moreover, the 
analysis of complementary data from other sources (for instance, Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey, organised by the IMF) has also contributed to the argument that 
missing assets in high tax jurisdictions are in fact allocated in tax havens.  To this extent, 
considering also the outcome of different studies, it was possible to conclude that 
besides the problem of badly reported data, other explanations could be provided for the 
current profile of the international flow of capital as well as to the stocks of financial 
assets and liabilities held by countries: the phenomenon of capital flight. In a sense, 
official figures of governments’ reports cannot capture the phenomenon of capital flight 
since it represents unreported outflows. Therefore, even if a complete dataset were 
adopted, a discrepancy would be identified, assuming that part of the problem is capital 
flight. 
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Putting together the outcomes from the analysis of the flows of capital and the 
phenomenon of capital flight, i.e. the massive amount of outflow that leaves developed 
and developing countries unregistered, it became evident that the allocation of taxing 
rights between source and residence is not the right approach to understand the position 
of developing countries in the international tax system. It is necessary to regard the 
behaviour of tax havens and their relationship with the problem of capital flight. Both 
developed and developing countries are affected by this problem, even though until now 
tax policies dealing with international tax evasion and avoidance have received much 
more attention from developed countries than developing ones. The OECD has tried to 
push the debate about transparency and exchange of tax information to involve 
developing countries, however until now the reason that justifies their involvement was 
not addressed clearly. 
 
Developing and developed countries cannot deal with the problem of capital flight by 
discussing international taxation in terms of allocation of taxing rights between source 
and residence countries. Nowadays, the main problem affecting international taxation is 
not how to solve situations of double taxation, but how to reduce the loopholes in 
countries’ tax policies that allows increasing opportunities for tax evasion and 
avoidance.  
 
In terms of tax policy, i.e. examining developing countries’ tax policies on portfolio 
investment, it became clear that developing countries have no clear idea of the 
importance of residents’ foreign income and how to enforce its taxation. Moreover, it 
also became evident that developing countries have no clear understanding of the 
incentive created by the interplay of source and residence taxation in the allocation of 
capital flight.  
 
To tackle capital flight a broader understanding of this problem is necessary in order to 
comprehend its dynamics. To this extent, it was demonstrated that capital flight is 
invested in developed and developing countries. It only passes through tax havens. 
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Thus, the key issue to curb capital flight is to empower tax administrations of high tax 
jurisdictions with instruments that force the identification of non-resident investors.  
 
The recent developments of international taxation indicate that developed countries 
opted for instruments that enforce transparency and exchange of tax information as the 
answer to deal with the problems of international tax evasion and avoidance, involving 
tax havens and other financial centres. However, the current instruments for exchange of 
tax information available are not enough to solve the problem of capital flight. In a 
sense, the developments in this area indicate the pressure of the international community 
for countries to sign TIEAs, which also ensures that domestic legal constraints (such as 
the dual criminality principle, domestic tax interest of information held by financial 
institutions and ownership identity) cannot cause restrictions for information exchange. 
Of course this was an important step for the implementation of effective exchange of 
information and, consequently, in the fight against tax avoidance and evasion, however 
the focus has also to be on the first level of the domestic scenario where the 
identification of non-resident investors can be required by financial institutions.  
 
Further improvements on rules to combat international tax avoidance and evasion are 
expected in the near future, though the answer to this problem relies on political 
willingness, since it requires the acceptance of major countries for its implementation. 
Otherwise, the measures proposed will only provide the reallocation of capital to other 
jurisdictions. To this extent, developing countries cannot be at the margin of this 
process. The involvement of developing countries will only occur if they understand the 
relationship between these rules to combat international tax avoidance and evasion and 
the phenomenon of capital flight. The reason for their involvement in the combatting of 
international tax avoidance and evasion needs to be clear. In this context, their effective 
interest in international taxation becomes evident. The crisis of residence taxation 
suffered by developed countries is also affecting developing ones. This study aimed to 
demonstrate that, and it suggests that developing countries should adopt a more 
proactive conduct in relation to tax policies to combat tax evasion and avoidance, 
defined at the international level. 
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ANNEXES 
1. Flows of FDI. 
Source: International Financial Statistics (May 2010). Annual series. ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
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2. Flows of Portfolio Investment. 
Source: International Financial Statistics (May 2010). Annual series. ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
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3. International Investment Position. 
Source: Lane P R and Milesi-Ferretti G M, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: 
Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 - 2004’, (2007) 
73 Journal of International Economics 223. 
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4. Stocks of FDI. 
Source: Lane P R and Milesi-Ferretti G M, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: 
Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 - 2004’, (2007) 
73 Journal of International Economics 223. 
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5. Stocks of Portfolio Equity. 
Source: Lane P R and Milesi-Ferretti G M, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: 
Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 - 2004’, (2007) 
73 Journal of International Economics 223. 
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6. Stocks of Portfolio Debt and Other Investments. 
Source: Lane P R and Milesi-Ferretti G M, ‘The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: 
Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970 - 2004’, (2007) 
73 Journal of International Economics 223. 
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7. Taxation of Portfolio Investment. 
Source: Tax Summary – Pricewaterhousecoopers and IBFD. 
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